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Fuel Cycle Based Safeguards 
Gontributions by* 
J.M. de Montmollin, W.A. Higinbotham, D. Gupta 
Abstract 
Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel 
cycle and degree of international interdependence are to be taken into 
account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are 
applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's 
fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. There is a 
continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA and its advisory 
bodies in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a 
state's nuclear activities as a whole, and which are at the same time non-
discriminatory. 
Some background information prepared for developing such an approach, has 
been collated and presented in this report. This fuel cycle based safeguards 
system is expected to 
a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only 
for individual facilities 
b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the 
different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the 
fuel cycle and 
c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, 
outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. 
The consolidated concept for such a fuel cycle based safeguards system is 
expected to be presented in subsequent reports. 
*The contributions collected in this report do not necessarily reflect 
the positions of the respective governments or the organizations. 
Brennstoffzyklusbezogene Kernmaterialüberwachung 
Bei träge von * 
J.M. de Montmollin, W.A. Higinbotham, D. Gupta 
Zusammenfassung 
Entsprechend den Richtlinien für die Kernmaterialüberwachung nach dem NV-
Vertrag sollen bei der Durchführung der Überwachungstätigkeiten in einem 
Staat u.a. die Eigenart und internationalen Verflechtungen des Brennstoff-
zyklus in diesem Staat berücksichtigt werden. Bisher wurden jedoch die 
gleichen Überwachungsmodelle mit den gleichen absoluten Mengen als 
Überwachungsziele für Inspektionstätigkeiten für alle Kernanlagen eines 
Typs angewendet, und zwar unabhängig von der Art des Brennstoffzyklus in 
einem Staat. Entsprechend waren auch die überwachungsrelevanten Aussagen. 
Es besteht jedoch ein ständiges Interesse der IAEO und ihrer Beratungsgre-
mien an neuen Überwachungsvorstellungen nach dem NV-Vertrag, die die 
gesamten nuklearen Tätigkeiten in einem Staat als Ganzes betrachten und 
gleichzeitig nicht diskriminierend sind. 
Einige Grunddaten, die für die Entwicklung eines solchen Konzeptes 
erarbeitet worden sind, sind in diesem Bericht zusammengestellt, Das 
angestrebte brennstoffzyklusorientierte Überwachungssystem soll in der Lage 
sein, 
a) eine Aussage für das gesamte Kernmaterial in einem Staat (statt nur für 
einzelne Anlagen) zu treffen 
b) eine realistischere Verteilung des Inspektionsaufwandes unter Berück-
sichtigung der überwachungsrelevanten Eigenschaften des Kernmaterials 
in verschiedenen Teilen des Brennstoffzyklus zu ermöglichen und 
schließlich 
c) besser koordinierte und rechtzeitige Informationen über Eingänge, 
Ausgänge und Inventar an Kernmaterialien in einem Staat zu erzeugen und 
zu liefern. 
Das Gesamtkonzept für das auf dem ganzen Brennstoffzyklus eines Staates 
aufgebaute Überwachungssystem soll in einigen nachfolgenden Berichten 
dargestellt werden. 
*Die in diesem Bericht zusammengestellten Beiträge geben nicht notwendigerweise 
die Meinungen der jeweiligen Regierungen bzw. der Organisationen wieder. 
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Fuel Cycle Based Safeguards 
Gontributions by 
J.M. de Montmollin 1), W.A. Higinbotham2), D. Gupta3) 
I. General Remarks 
During the period July 1984 - Apri 1 1985, a nurober of contributions were 
prepared on the subject of fuel cycle based safeguards which have been used 
as a basis for developing some ideas on the possibilities of international 
safeguards in the frame of NPT, for the fuel cycle as a whole in a State. 
These contributions are collated and compiled in the present report. The 
consolidated concept for fuel cycle based safeguards will be presented in 
subsequent reports. The ideas presented in this report do not necessarily 
reflect the positions of the respective governments or the organizations. 
Until now safeguards have been applied to facilities where the materials 
are located, and safeguards approaches, detection goals, and reported 
findings have been with regard to each facility. Under the NPT, States 
agree not to acquire nuclear weapons from any source, and to submit all 
their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, however, the basis is still 
the individual facility, Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify 
that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international interdependence are 
to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity 
inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of 
State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. 
There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA and its 
advisory bodies in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address 
a State's nuclear activities as a whole, and which are at the same time 
non-discriminatory. However, the fuel cycle basis is somewhat different 
from the facility basis and it leads to a re-examination of the entire 
1 )s d · · an 1a Laborator1es, Albuquerque, NM, USA 
Z)B k ' ' roo haven Nat1onal Laborator1es, Upton, LI, NY, USA 
3) 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany 
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concept of inspection goals, allocation of resources and the nature of the 
reported findings. 
The contributions in the present compilation deal with the possibilities of 
a fuel cycle based safeguards, which may meet one or more of the following 
objectives: 
I. To provide a statement of findings for the entire State besides 
providing statements for individual facilities. 
2. To allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the 
relative importance of the different categories of nuclear materials in 
and the specific characteristics of the different parts of the fuel 
cycle and 
3. To provide more timely and better co~ordinated information on the 
inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. 
On the basis of the contributions, it appears that a fuel cycle based 
safeguards system could have the following principal features: 
I. Division of the complete fuel cycle into three zones, each containing 
materials having a different degree of significance for safeguards. 
Any commercial nuclear fuel cycle based on light-water reactor systems 
with or without recycled plutonium and with the corresponding R+D 
facilities, would have, in principle, 3 categories of nuclear materials 
based on their safeguards significance; namely: 
- natural or low-enriched uranium (LEU having < 20 % U-235) 
- irradiated fuel elements 
separated plutonium or high enriched uranium. 
It is to be noted that in anticipation of such distributions, the 
INFCIRC/153 recommended 3 different levels of inspection efforts in such 
a fuel cycle (Article 80). In implementing its safeguards measures, the 
Agency considers the natural uranium and LEU up to < 20 % U-235 concen-
tration, to have the same safeguards significance. This is reflected by 
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the fact that these two categories of materials have the same signifi-
cant quantity SQ of 75 kg of contained U-235 and the same detection time 
of I year. The Agency considers the plutonium contained in irradiated 
fuel elements to be of different safeguards significance than separated 
plutonium. This is reflected by the different detection times considered 
for these two types of materials (3 months for plutonium in irradiated 
fuel elements and 3...,4 weeks f.or separated uranium in oxide or nitrate 
form). 
The contributions by de Montmollin and Gupta (2. 10, 3.4) indicate that 
the ratio IMD/WSQ ~n a facility could be used for considering the allo-
cation of inspection efforts in the different zones of a fuel cycle based 
safeguards system. Besides SQ, this ratio is sensitive to other safe-
guards cri:teria such as the detection time and the containment possi-
bilities in reactors irradiated fuel elements. 
2. Closing a verified material balance araund each zone, supplementing the 
present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them 
for others. 
A model fuel cycle has been defined (2.6, 3.4, 4.3) for the purpose of 
developing the concept of fuel cycle based safeguards and to investigate 
the possibilities of establishing verified material balances araund each 
zone. The reference fuel cycle comprises of a nurober of LWR's supported 
by conversion and fabrication facilities, spent fuel storages, reprocess-
ing, MOX fabrication, and LWR recycle facilities as well as some R+D 
activities. The zones about which material balances are closed are those 
containing natural uranium and LEU, spent fuel, and separated plutonium. 
All flows in and out of zones are verified, and PIV's are made and 
balances closed annually araund each zone. In the third zone with 
separated plutonium, balances are also verified araund each MBA at 
intervals governed by the present timeliness criteria. In the second 
zone with the reactors and spent-fuel storages C/S measures and 
inspections verify the presence of material at three monthly intervals 
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and the occasional transfers between facilities. In the first zone with 
LEU, no internal flows are verified. 
Provision is made for other facilities that are not included in the 
three zones. Any enrichment plants would be covered individually, with 
separate, verified material balances. R+D facilities, including those 
involving plutonium fuel developments, would also be outside the zonal 
boundaries. Provision can be made for verification of flows associated 
with all MBA's, both facility and zonal. 
The preliminary investigations by de Montmollin and Gupta show (2.6, 
3.4) that verified material balances can be drawn around each zone 
without increasing any of the present-day inspection activities at the 
facilities. Some marginal additional computer calculations might be 
necessary at the IAEA headquarters. The investigations of Higinbotham 
(4.2) indicate that, it would be useful to retain the facility base 
structure for the zone 3 materials, since it might permit a better 
resolution of anomalies by the Agency with regard to location, amount 
and time of a possible loss or a diversion of nuclear materials. 
3. Maintenance by the Agency of a current book inventory for each facility 
location by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility 
transfers. 
The contributions of de Montmollin and Gupta (2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.4, 3.5) 
in particular, the detailed analysis of de Montmollin on the possibili-
ties of material balance closings in a fuel cycle based safeguards 
system, indicate that an inspector validated accounting system for the 
flow and inventory of nuclear materials for all the three zones, is 
possible on a near-real-time fashion. The present-day practice of the 
Agency generates virtually all the necessary information for this 
purpose. The near-real-time treatment of the information flow from a 
state to the Agency may improve the timeliness and transparency of the 
reporting system of the state. The time required by the Agency to 
report formally to its Board on a diversion after it has been definitely 
detected by the Agency, is not expected to be shortened by a fuel cycle 
based safeguards approach (3.5). 
-5-
4. A modified set of inspection criteria which reflect what can be attained 
for each material-balance closure. 
The inspection activities for individual facility types had been 
analysed in detail in the frame of SAGSI activities. They were specially 
compiled and extended where necessary for the purposes of fuel cycle 
based safeguards by Gupta (3.4). The types of actual inspection 
activities at the facilities under the conditions of fuel cycle 
safeguards, arenot expected to be altered much, although the intensity 
and frequency of inspections may be different. However, the inspectors 
would be required to recognize the important cross linkages, correla-
tions and interdependences of the flows and inventories of nuclear 
materials amongst the different facilities and zones in the fuel cycle 
in a State as well as those of the fuel cycle and the outside world. 
The overall effectiveness and credibility of fuel cycle based safeguards 
can be improved if the capabilities of the Agency inspectors to recog-
nize the normal flow and inventory patterns and their deviations on the 
one hand and their capability to verify these flows and inventories on 
the other, could be combined properly. Further investigations under 
practical conditions would be required in this area. 
5. A periodic statement of findings for the entire State that takes the 
form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards 
are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty. 
It was mentioned earlier that a fuel cycle based safeguards would 
require in all probability, a different concept for inspection goals and 
the safeguards relevant statements. De Montmollin has investigated this 
problern in his Warking Paper V (2.8). It is found that in a fuel cycle 
based safeguards, the presently accepted (eventhough provisionally) 
fixed goal quantities per facility would put the Agency in an untenable 
position. The total quantity that might be diverted below the detection 
threshold is a function of the nurober of facilities in the State. If the 
threshold for the State is raised proportionate to the nurober of 
facilities, there is no langer any justification for the present values. 
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If the present values based on a one-bomb quantity are applied to the 
entire State, that would require that more intensive measures be applied 
to the same kind of facility in a State with a large fuel cycle than one 
with a small one, which would in no way reflect the relative needs for 
the assurance that safeguards are intended to provide. The investiga-
tions show that the Agency could make reasonable safeguards relevant 
statements with a different type of inspection goals, e.g. variable 
inspection goals for individual facilities and a fixed threshold for the 
State as a whole or vice versa. "Fixed" in this connection does not mean 
an absolute amount but a fixed criterion. 
This possibility needs further investigations. 
The main purpose of the contributions which follow ~s to present ideas for 
more basic concepts by which IAEA safeguards might be made more effective 
and efficient within the basic structure that was adopted for the NPT 
safeguards. 
-7-
The contributions of Messrs. J.M. de Montmollin, D. Gupta and W.A. Higin-
botham on the various aspects of a fuel cycle based safeguards system are 
presented in the following pages. The contributions under the name of the 
author are arranged chronologically. 
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2. Contributions by James M. de Montmollin, Sandia Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, N.M., USA. 
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2. Gontributions by James M. de Montmollin 
Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., USA 
2. 1 A Suggested Concept for Improved IAEA Safeguards 
2. 2 Further Thoughts on a Suggested Fuel-Cycle 
Safeguards Concept 
2. 3 Working Paper I Extended MBA's 
2. 4 Working Paper II Zone-1 Accounting 
2. 5 Working Paper III: Zone 2 Accounting 
2. 6 Working Paper IV Zonal Flows 
2. 7 Excerpt from a letter of J. de Montmollin to 
W. A. Higinbotham with comments on extended-MBA 
approach for Zone 3 
Aug. 6, 1984 
Aug. 23, 1984 
Nov. I ' 1984 
Nov. 28, 1984 
Dec. 13' 1984 
Jan. I 1 , 1985 
Jan. 11, 1985 
2 0 8 Working Paper V Goals for Fuel Cycle Safeguards Feb. 1, 1985 
2. 9 Zone 1 Flow and the Neutron Collar 
(Excerpt of a letter from J. M. de Montmollin to 
D. Gupta dated 19th April 1985 
2.10 Distribution of Safeguards Inspection over the 
Fuel Cycle 
Apr. 19, 1985 
Apr. 23, 1985 
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2.1 A Suggested Concept for Improved IAEA Safeguarcis 
Following recent discussions at Brookhaven, this paper is intended to 
document my understanding of a concept for improved safeguards suggested by 
Dipak Gupta, which we intend to explore and develop. 
We seek to improve the IAEA safeguards system in two respects: the 
timeliness of findings derived from each inspection activity, and more 
efficient use of inspector resources, measured in terms of the contribution 
of inspection ef~ort to the safeguards objectives. 
With regard to timeliness, the usual consideration of inspection interval 
is overshadowed by the total time required to generate, receive, and 
analyze all information and arrive at a conclusion for each separate 
facility. The system would better meet the purposes for which it is 
intended if more current inforrnation on a State's entire nuclear-material 
holdings could be obtained, thereby providing more up-to-date assurance 
that all were accounted for. At the same time, if the safeguards system 
were coordinated to verify the flow of materials through the State's 
nuclear cycle the information obtained from each facility could be used 
more efficiently in providing assurance regarding the State as a whole -
the ultimate purpose of safeguards ~ than if each facility is considered in 
isolation. 
There is an inherent conflict between timeliness, to the degree that safe-
guards designers have sought, and the completeness of verification. If both 
objectives are to be accomplished, it is necessary to recognize that safe-
guards operations are applied in two stages, as with interim and annual 
inspections of power reactors, or continuous inspections and cleanout 
inventory-takings of some bulk plants. One dimension of assurance derives 
from the more complete verification at langer intervals; another from the 
more frequent verification of some part of that information so as to 
maintain more current accounting of all of the State's safeguarded 
materials. It is for the latter purpose that improvements might be made. 
Figure 1 is a simplified representation of an advanced State fuel cycle. 
Any State fuel cycle would include some, but not necessarily all, of the 
sarne elements. A significant point is that in all transfers between facilities 
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.. 
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+ NRT for bulk materials 
complete inventory: yearly at refueling yearly 
FIG. 1: Concept for Fuel-Cycle Safeguards 
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material is in the form of discrete items, such as fuel assernblies or indivi-
dual containers of bulk material. The same is true of those materials held at 
each terminal point, which could be defined generally as feed and product. 
Another point indicated in the figure is that the cycle can be divided into 
three phases that reflect the sensitivity of the nuclear material, wherein 
the forms are LEU, Pu associated with fission products, and separated Pu, The 
differing importance of materials in the three phases is reflected in the in-
tervals between inspection verifications, 
The suggested new concept includes the following: 
I. The first step in an inspection cycle would be on-site inspections, to 
verify discrete items, that are conducted on scheduled dates jointly by 
the Agency and the State. Such verification might include item identifica-
tion, seal checks, and sampling of contents as appropriate. 
Each party would thereby obtain a verified listing of the item inventory. 
That would cover allmaterial not in process, ranging from perhaps 60 per-
cent to 100 percent of the total material inventory at each facility, and 
the portion that is in the form most readily available for diversion or 
seizure by the State. Those inspections would be clone at the sarne inter-
vals as the present interim inspections: monthly for LEU, every three 
months for irradiated fuel, and continuously by resident inspectors for 
separated Pu, (For fresh LEU fuel at the reactor the logic falls down; 
it might be more appropriate to continue to include it in the schedule 
for irradiated fuel, as at present. Also, MOX fuel after it leaves the 
fabricator requires further thought.) 
2. Where separated Pu is present, as at reprocessing and MOX plants, the bulk 
material in process would be monitared by resident inspectors by means of 
NRT accounting, using operator information, partially but independently 
verified by appropriate sampling, C/S, or other such measures. 
3. Complete physical-inventory taking would be clone annually (or at LWR 
refueling) jointly by operator, State, and Agency. 
-16-
4. Inventory change reports would be submitted periodically, as at present, 
to allow the Agency to update its book-inventory records. Preferably, 
abbreviated ICR's covering transfers between facilities would be submitted 
within 24 hours, so that the Agency's records by facility would not be sub-
ject to the delays now experienced with the State reports, ranging from a 
nominal 45 days to several months or more. 
The suggested concept could provide the Agency with continually-updated book 
inventories by facility location, with most of that verified by inspection as 
frequently as is done now, but with much quicker availability of results; a 
reduction in accounting and analysis effort through joint inspection with the 
State rather than later verification of outdated book-inventory information; 
and the basis for conclusions regarding the State's entire inventory rather 
than by individual facilities. The appropriate intensity of complete inventory 
verification as a function of the significance of the forms of materials would 
be unchanged. 
In evaluating the suggested concept, it is important to retain as a reference 
point the proper understanding of the purpose of safeguards. As set forth in 
the NPT, INFCIRC/66, and INFCIRC/153, it is the verification of accounting for 
nuclear materials, and not the detection or deterrence of diversion as the 
primary function. The objective in seeking to improve safeguards should there-
fore be in the direction of more complete and timely verification/of the 
Agency's book-inventory records rather than to block more hypothetical diver-
sion paths. 
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2.2 Further Thoughts on a Suggested Fuel-Cycle Safeguards Concept 
In a working paper dated August 6, I described a concept for State-wide 
integrated safeguards that had been suggested by Dipak Gupta for further 
consideration. In this paper I explore certain aspects of the concept in 
greater detail. 
A central feature of the suggested concept is the joint verification by 
the State and Agency of feed and product book inventories at each facility 
at interim inspections. Book inventories of materials in process are 
updated and partially verified thereby, at appropriate intervals depending 
on the sensitivity of the material. Feed and product stocks are essentially 
all discrete items, and in-process inventories are normally held within 
nominal limits. Since a large fraction of a State's total inventory is in 
the form of feed, product, and inactive stocks, essentially all in the 
forms of discrete items, a large part of a State's nuclear-material in-
ventory can be verified in a timely manner. How large a part? 
I have made estimates of the fractions of a hypothetical State inventory 
that would be in discrete and in bulk form. The model cycle was defined by 
Avenhaus and Gupta in a paper presented at the 1970 IAEA Symposium on 
Safeguards Techniques, Val. I, p. 345, "Effective Application of Safeguards 
Manpower and Other Techniques in Nuclear Fuel Cycles." The fuel cycle 
consists of 12 LWR's (6 GW ), enrichment, LEU fabrication, storage of Pu, 
e 
U recycle, and conversion. Quantities for input, holdup, output, and waste 
are given for each facility in terms of absolute chemical-compound weights 
and effective kilograms. I made the following assumptions regarding in-
active quantities, which were not covered in the model cycle: 
1. A two-year stockpile of yellowcake. 
2. An accumulation of spent fuel equal to five years of discharge from 
each reactor, not including an additional one-year discharge stored 
at each reactor and considered as active stock. 
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3. An accumulation of separated plutonium equal to five years' production 
of the reprocessing plant. 
Table 1 shows the percent of material in the form of discrete, packaged 
items broken down by facility type and type of inactive stock, by absolute 
weight of the chemical compound in which it is contained and by effective 
kilogram. Absolute weight is significant in terms of the inspection effort 
required to verify the inventory, and effective kilogram reflects the 
safeguards sensitivities. It turns out that the percentage of material in 
discrete form is essentially the same in either case. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the concept envisions: 
1. Periodic, joint State/Agency verification of feed, product, and inactive 
inventories at intervals generally. corresponding to present interim 
inspections. As the table indicates, that could cover more than 95 per-
cent of the State's total inventory, generally that which is in dis-
crete form. Assurance would be fu~ther strengthened by correlation of 
shipper/receiver transactions between adjacent facilities in the fuel 
cycle. By that means, over 95 percent of the State's total book inven-
tory would be verified. 
2. Input/output correlations would partially verify the in-process book 
inventories of holdup-materiaL, which would be generally in bulk form. 
C/S, NRT accounting, and resident inspectors as appropri.'lte would 
provide further assurance between cleanout inventories, at which time 
complete material-balance closure would be attained. That would be 
nominally at yearly intervals, adjusted to conform with reactor re-
fueling or shutdown between campaigns. 
Thus, more than 95 percent of the Agency's book inventory of a State's 
nuclear material holdings would be verified at each minimum inspection 
interval, and limits would be set on the possible discrepancy in the 
remaining (holdup) inventory). 
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Table 1 Percent of Nuclear Material in Discrete-Item Form 
Active Stocks By Absolute Weight By Effective kg 
Plant: 
Gonversion to UF6 88 84 
Enrichment 75 77 
Gonversion to uo2 87 83 
Fabrication 79 77 
Reactors 100 100 
Reprocessing 86 82 
--
Aggregate 96 96 
Inactive Stocks By Absolute Weight By Effective kg 
Yellowcake 100 100 
Spent Fuel 100 100 
Separated Pu 100 100 
Aggregate 100 100 
Grand Aggregate 97 99 
How much assurance would be provided depends on the beholder. There are 
those who will immediately point out, taking the conventional view of 
safeguards objectives, that there are many significant quantities of 
material in the only~partially verified in-process material, regardless of 
the overwhelming fraction of the State's holdings that had been verified. 
To that, there are several counter arguments: 
1. The conven tional view of safeguards obj ecti ves--the "timely" detection 
of a diversion of one bomb's worth--does not deal realistically with 
the proclaimed timeliness objective, and it does not address at all 
the possibility of aggregate diversion from a nurober of separate 
facilities within a State. 
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2. A more fundamental argument is that the purpose of safeguards is to 
provide reasonable assurance that the State's entire inventory of 
nuclear material is verified by the Agency. That position is solidly 
grounded in the IAEA Statute, the NPT, INFCIRC/66, and INFCIRC/153. 
Measured against that criterion, and considering the resource limita-
tions and the other constraints under which the Agency must operate, 
the suggested concept should appear to an objective observer to provide 
considerably more assurance than the present concept. 
3. For those who are unwilling to judge safeguards by that standard, the 
suggested concept offers at least as much as the present one: the 
information available on each facility taken in isolation is no less 
than that which is now available. For those who would gain further 
assurance from the degree of verification suggested by Table I, the 
new concept should provide much more confidence in safeguards. What 
that suggests is the need for a reorientation of thinking, and public 
indoctrination, on the purpose of safeguards as defined in the Statute 
and the Treaty. The differences between the two views of safeguards 
purposes assumes much greater significance when the entire fuel cycle 
rather than individual facilities in isolation are addressed. 
-21-
2.3 Warking Paper I: Extended MBA's 
It seems worthwhile to reflect on the reasons why fuel-cycle rather than 
isolated-facility safeguards may offer advantages. Depending on how much 
relative value we may put on each particular objective, it may help 
clarify our thinking in developing the concept. 
Same potential advantages are: 
I. Findings frorn inspection activities relate more directly to the purpose 
of safeguards, which is with regard to the entire State.and not indivi-
dual f aci 1i t ies. 
2. Analysis of coordinated information frorn all the activities in the State 
should produce more rneaningful results than analysis of each facility 
in isolation. 
3. Safeguarcis resources can be better allocated to each facility in the 
context of the entire State fuel cycle, because the relative signifi-
cance of a particular kind of facility depends on its function in the 
overall State fuel cycle. 
4. Closing of material balances requires verification of both flows and 
static inventories. Flow verification requires much more frequent 
inspection at some types of facility than is necessary solely to meet 
timeliness objectives. MBA's extended to include rnore than one facility 
allow the selection of KMP's where flows can be more efficiently and 
effectively verified. 
There may be other advantages that might becorne apparent as we examine 
the problern in greater depth. With these possible advantages taken to be 
objectives, we can investigate various alternatives to see how well they 
might be accomplished. 
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Les Fishbone and Wi ll:y Higinbotham are working independently on a study 
with a similar objective, although it is stated in somewhat more re-
strictive terms (I). While their work explicitly addresses the question 
of optional allocation of inspection resources over the fuel cycle, other 
of the above objectives might also be served. They are studying one 
approach, based on dividing a hypothetical State fuel cycle into "extended 
MBA's". Three extended MBA's, or zones, are envisioned: Zone I, with only 
LEU or natural U; Zone 2, irradiated fuel; and Zone 3, Pu separated from 
fission products. The boundary between Zones I and 2 is the loading of 
fresh fuel into the reactors and between Zones 2 and 3, the disolution of 
spent fuel at the reprocessing plant. The intensity of safeguards measures 
in each zone would reflect present inspection goals, and "sub-MBA's", or 
MBA's similar to those used at present, would not be precluded. 
For our purposes, we should consider the idea of extended MBA's as one 
alternative approach to meeting the more general objectives listed above. 
I start with the assumption that a more optimal allocation would be a 
reduction in Zone I, and that measures heretofore considered for Zone 3 
.would be at least the minimum that should be considered. For now, I will 
limit the discussion to Zone I. 
The input to Zone I is the importation of enriched uranium in any of 
several chemical forms, or, if the State has an enrichment plant, the 
shipment of enriched uranium to a conversion or fabrication plant within 
the country (2). Since international transfers are of primary importance 
to safeguards, each shipment will be verified in any case. The output KMP 
for Zone I is at reactor refueling. That flow could be verified, as is 
presently clone, by the inspector at refueling. Unless additional inspector 
visits were made at all reactors at the same time, the PIV for Zone I could 
not be taken simultaneously at all locations. (Electrical demand would pre-
clude the shutdown of all reactors for refueling at the same time.) At the 
time the annual PIV was taken at the conversion/fabrication plant, fresh-
fuel stocks at reactors might be verified on a random-inspection basis. 
Or, the actual presence of assernblies reportedly shipped to reactors but 
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not yet loaded into cores might be assumed for purposes of timely closing 
of the material balance, to be verified at the next inspector visit to the 
reactor. 
If a State has more than one conversion or fabrication plant, simultaneaus 
PIV's there would also present a problem. Plant schedules would not 
necessarily coincide, and the demand for inspector services (both State 
and IAEA) wouldpeak. Considering all of Zone I, which contains numerous 
reactors as well, simultaneaus inspections would create a problern for 
efficient scheduling of inspectors. We should look very critically at any 
arguments that are advanced in justification of simultaneaus PIV's. 
One argument might be that the material balance must be closed at a 
particular date, at the end of an inspection interval, wherein all inputs, 
outputs, and static inventories are brought together. Heretofore, with 
static inventories at individual facilities the timing was no problem. It 
is necessary in principle that a material balance be related to some time 
period. However, there is a distinction between the material balance on 
the basis of operator's data and the verification of that data by the 
Agency. Although an idealized concept envisions a material balance computed 
from measurements reported by the operator which is compared with a 
corresponding balance determined by the Agency on the basis of independent 
measurements, the actual practice usually falls short of that, especially 
with respect to facilities having less-sensitive material. All flows are 
not independently measured or verified, and the material balance determined 
by the Agency, when it is clone at all, includes some unverified flows (3). 
The reason why all flows are not verified is that, for LEU, the timeliness 
goal is one year, and the PIV needs be clone only at that interval. (lf a 
plant conducts its own PIV at a semi-annual shutdown, which is often the 
case, the Agency may do so at the same time.) Because inspector visits 
annually or semi-annually are too infrequent to verify flows, the Agency 
also conducts monthly inspections, on the basis that a least some of the 
receipts and shipments will still be available for inspection in 
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verifiable form. In effect, the Agency makes 10 or II PIV's per year in 
addition to the annual or semiannual PIV during shutdown. While the justi-
fication for monthly inspections is to verify flows, the objective appears 
tobe a complete PIV (4). 
While each monthly inspection requires less manpower than the annual PIV, 
the total required is substantially more -- at least five times as much (5). 
The actual effort required may be even greater than estimates based on 
hypothetical model plants. Depending on the size of feed and product stocks 
relative to throughput, monthly snapshots would vary as representations 
of actual flows. If the stocks were small, corresponding to much less than 
a month's flow, a relatively smaller portion of the flow would be available 
for verification. If they were much larger the monthly inspection would 
have a higher probability of verifying a flow that would have occurred 
in the past, or would occur in the succeeding period. However, the larger 
the stocks the greater the inspection effort required for what is essen-
tially an interim PIV. 
The model plant that we have considered is defined in the SAGSI-WG-2 
report. The UF6 feedstock is about a 36-day supply, assuming a 300-day 
operating year. The product stock is about 31 days production, or about one 
fuel reload. The assumption is made that there is only one enrichment. 
It appears that actual plant inventories would be substantially greater, 
something that we should examine carefully because it may be important to 
our investigations in other respects. Based on conversations with a middle 
manager at a US fabrication plant, a number of factors suggest that the 
model plant is unrealistic. 
1. The UF6 (or uo2) feedstock should be on the order of a six-month 
supply, rather than 36 days, to ensure steady operation. 
2. The assumption of a single enrichment is not realistic, because it 
leads to underestimation of inventory quantities. The model plant shows 
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average pellet and rod inventories of about five days respectively, 
which seems somewhat small for even one enrichment line. In most 
cases individual reloads will require several enrichments, which 
would be fabricated in separate, parallel process lines. It appears 
that the rod and pellet inventories should be greater by a factor 
equal to the number of process lines, typically 3 or 4. 
3. Each of the many different enrichments -- for all reactors, there is 
on the order of 20 -- is obtained by the utility customer from the 
diffusion plant. (With centrifuge enrichment, some blending may be 
necessary, possibly in the conversion or LEU plant.) The utility 
retains ownership of the material throughout, and it must be ordered 
and accepted in accordance with the long lead times between enrichment 
and reactor loading. While it may be stored elsewhere, the fabrication-
plant Operator would require that it be shipped to his plant at least 
early enough to ensure a 6-month supply. 
4. The uranium is not fungible (except for recovered scrap and waste, 
about six percent of the plant inventory). A single reactor reload 
would be built from a separate streams of material that are kept 
separate throughout the plant. The uranium is owned by the utility 
customer, and hence is kept separate for financial accountability 
reasons as well as to preserve the unique enrichment. 
5. Because the uranium (and the complete assembly, after acceptance) is 
owned by the customer and not the fabricator, the associated inventory 
costs are not borne by the fabricator. Consequently, he has no incen-
tive to move products out of the plant to reduce inventory costs. He 
may hold it for a considerable time for the convenience of the 
customer. Regardless of ownership, the material is covered by the 
plant's safeguards inspection. 
6. Because of the long lead time between enrichment and fuel loading, 
there is uncertainty as to the date that the customer will want a 
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reload to be shipped, The initial schedule is fixed by the nominal 
refueling date, sometimes before the reactor is even completed. Any 
delay in refueling date, whether due to construction and licensing 
problems, accidents, or low capacity factor, extends the date at which 
the utility will want the fuel shipped. It is likely that those delays 
would be after fabrication is complete, because the fabricator would 
want to maintain his schedule and cash flow. The likely result is that 
when refueling is delayed more than one interval the fabricated fuel 
will be stored by the fabricator, thereby further increasing the inven~ 
tory to be safeguarded. In one case the fabricator is storing a first 
reload indefinitely, because the reactor was cancelled before it was 
even finished. 
I point out these things because it appears that we need to look critically 
at model plant specifications, which are the basis for inspection-effort 
estimates. As for the extended-MBA concept for Zone I, it appears that much 
more effort would be required for the present approach than is indicated in 
the WG-2 report, if the safeguards approach were actually implemented as 
defined, According to the 1983 SIR, the average inspector man-days spent at 
fabrication and conversion plants was only about half the WG-2 estimate of 
what is required (6). 
When we compare the extended-MBA concept for Zone 1 with the present con-
cept, we need to look at them both realistically instead of in terms of 
hypothetical model plants and safeguards approaches. Flows at the KMP's 
bounding Zone I can be verified adequately by means that are already in 
place. Even though 80 percent or more of the inspection effort at LEU 
fabrication plants is estimated to be spent in the attempt to verify flows, 
and probably much more if the approach is actually implemented, the interim 
PIV's cannot actually verify all flows. Material could be deliberately 
passed through the feedstock or product inventories between interim in-
spections. A much more rigorous and verifiable material balance can be 
struckaraund Zone 1, using flow verifications that arealready in place, 
than can be obtained araund a single conversion or fabrication plant. 
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Another question, addressed at some length by Les and Willy, is the 
possibility of shuffling fuel assernblies between facilities to defeat the 
Zone 2-3 flow measurement. I don't believe that a feasible solution is 
simultaneaus PIV's. However, I think the concern is exaggerated. Fuel-
assembly identification counters that strategy. Identification is more than 
the serial number; only some of the assernblies in the pipelines from 
fabrication to reactor are identical, and so it is more than a matter of 
altering serial numbers. We should give it further thought, but simultane-
aus PIV's do not seem to offer a feasible solution. 
Aside from the possibility of fuel shuffling, simultaneaus PIV's are not 
necessary in order to close the material balance around Zone I. For the 
particular time interval covered by the balance, different parts of the 
inventory will have been verified at different times. It is not necessary 
that all verifications coincide in time, as long as there is reasonable 
assurance that verifications previously made remain valid. If appropriate, 
seals might be used in some way to provide that assurance. 
To summarize, I have tried to make five points: 
1. Tobring the safeguards coverage into better balance, we need to sub-
stantially reduce the effort allocated to the LEU portion. 
2. The extended-MBA idea is worth careful study as a means of doing that. 
3. The simplified model-plant specification for LEU fabrication plants is 
unrealistic. It understates the facility inventory and consequently the 
inspection effort needed for interim inspections. 
4. The justification for monthly interim inspection -- to verify flows --
is overstated. While material-balance-closure around an LEU plant seems 
necessary on a facility-safeguards basis, adequate verification of flows 
requires an unreasonable proportion of inspection resources available 
for the fuel cycle as a whole. 
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5. The extended-MBA concept is entirely consistent with INFCIRC/153. 
NOTES 
I. L.G. Fishbone and W.A. Higinbotham, "A Study of Fuel-Cycle Approaches 
to IAEA Safeguards; ISPO Task C.55, draft report ISP0-196, July 1984. 
2. If an enrichment plant is included in the State 1 s fuel cycle it 
probably should be considered a separate zone, although nominally it 
contains only Zone materials. For now, as with the ISPO project, we 
will assume that the State imports all its enriched uranium. 
3. Although numerous papers over the last 15 years have described the 
determination of MUF on the basis of separate and idenpendent material 
balances by the operator/State and the Agency INFCIRC/153 does not re-
quire it. While par. 30 states that the Agency should determine material 
balances for each MBA, it does not say that all measurements that go 
into it must be independently verified. In a description of the process, 
the Agency says, with regard to the verification of flows, only that 
"Routine IAEA inspections may be carried out to verify these changes, 
and the records are examined and compared with the reports sent to the 
State". (IAEA Safeguards, An Introduction, IAEA/SG/INF/3, 1981, p.21) 
/ 
4. IAEA draft paper, "Safeguarding Low Enriched Uranium and Fuel Fabrication 
Facilities", STR-157, August 1984, p. 46. Because of the problems of 
measuring the content of complete fuel assemblies, even if the inspector 
were available before they were shipped, inspection of material at 
various stages of fabrication is thought necessary. Since material 
actually in process is not generally available for inventory verifica-
tion, in one plant material in buffer interim storage, in the form of 
pellets and rods, is inventoried monthly by safeguards inspectors --
A. Rota, et. al, "International Safeguards Verification Capabilities 
and Constraints in an LEU Fabrication Plant", ESARDA. 
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5. Draft, "Report of WG-2 of SAGSI on Safeguards Approaches", 
5th August 1983, Table 3. 1. I, p. 6. Gonversion plants, shown Ln 
Table 3. 1.2 on page 7, showalso that about 5 times as much inspector 
effort is spent on the interim inspections. 
6. The SIR lumps conversion and fabrication, use and direct use material 
into one figure, so it is not clear what was spent at LEU fabrication 
plants. In any case, it was substantially less than the WG-2 estimate. 
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2.4 Working Paper II: Zone-! Accounting 
In Working Paper I I discussed extended MBA's as an approach to fuel-cycle 
safeguards, with particular reference to the LEUpart of the fuel cycle, 
referred to as Zone I. In this paper I consider an accounting scheme for 
Zone 1 which is intended to provide a degree of assurance commensurate with 
the relative proliferation concerns in that part of a State's fuel cycle. 
The scheme would provide (a) an annual material balance around each enrich-
ment stream, with Zone-1 inputs, outputs, and inventories verified annually 
by Agency inspection, and (b) a current book inventory listing the U-235 
holdings, by enrichment, at each facility and fuel assernblies by serial 
nurober and U-235 content at each reactor. The information in the Agency's 
current book inventory would be up to date to within 48 hours. 
The suggested system would operate at two complementary levels that adress 
timeliness and verification respectively. Timeliness and full verification 
are conflicting objectives; completion of the verification process and the 
resolution of any anomalies may be as much as several month beyond the end 
of an inspection interval during which a diversion may have occurred. 
Information on changes in the quantities and locations of materials for which 
the State is accountable under safeguards can be reported as interfacility 
transfers occur, thereby providing the Agency with a current book inventory. 
The information can be partially verified by means of accounting cross-check, 
and periodically by inspection. 
The present system for LEU and Natural U 
The timeliness goal for natural and low-enrichment uranLum is one year. 
At that interval the Agency intends to make statements, fully verified to 
the extent that available resources permit~ assuring that all material under 
safeguards in each facility is accounted for. While one year has been 
accepted as satisfactory for a fully-verified statement, confidence in 
safeguards w·ould be enhanced if the Agency could maintain current knowledge 
on the location of all material for which the State is held accountable. 
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That objective, while not stated so explicitly, is nevertheless implicit in 
the present system wherein Inventory Change Reports are required for the 
purpose of reporting any transfers from one MBA to another. They are to be 
submitted within 30 days of the end of each 30-day period during which 
transfers take place, but many do not arrive until considerably later. They 
report a level of detail that is needed at the PIV, and beyond what is 
needed to provide the more basic information on the total amount of material 
that is at that facility location. The information now provided by ICR's is 
more relevant to verification than timeliness. 
Under present concepts for safeguarding LEU or natural U facilities, in 
principle a material balance is to be struck araund each MBA. The model approach 
defines three MBA's for a conversion/fabrication plant (1). The material 
balance requires that flows into and out of each MBA be balanced against 
beginning and ending inventories. Thus, to verify the balance, the Agency 
must verify flows as well as inventories. The latter can be verified at the 
annual PIV, but flows occur continually while the plant is operating. 
Interim inspections are held every 30 days, for the purpose of at least 
partially verifying flows (2). However, flows are intermittent events, and 
the related inventories can give some indication of flows only by changes 
in stocks of identifiable, sealed items between inspections (and only if 
the item was present at at least one inventory-taking). Hence, flows arenot 
very well verified in relation to the PIV. What is called a verified material 
balance is more accurately described as a verified annual inventory, which, 
combined with declared flows, produces a partially-verified mater{al balance. 
Nevertheless, more than 80 percent of the nominal inspection effort is esti-
mated to be required for interim inspections for the sole purpose of veri-
fying flows (3). Furthermore, the Inventory Change Reports, being typically 
outdated, do not provide the declared value of the flows to be verified over 
the 30 days preceding an interim inspection. They serve little purpose other 
than provide the Agency with delayed information with which to update its 
book inventory. 
As noted in STR-96 (2), when a plant receives shipments from an out-of-
country enrichment plant or ships products to other countries those flows 
would be verified by the ad-hoc inspections required for international trans-
fers under par. 91-97 of INFCIRC/153. However, transfers between MBA's 
within the plant or State would not be covered ifi that way. 
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Suggested Verification Scheme 
Under the extended-MBA concept suggested for Zone 1 input, flows would be 
verified at the receipt of imported LEU and the output of a domestic repro-
cessing plant (if any), and the output would be verified upon loading into 
a power-reactor core or any exporting of fuel assemblies. The ad-hoc 
inspections would verify all flows involving international transfers. We 
will assume for now, that, if there is a domestic enrichment plant, all 
products will be verified before shipment. In the general case, outflows 
from Zone 1 will be at loading into reactor cores within the country. Since 
that is clone in the presence of inspectors, all flows out of Zone 1 can 
be verified with existing, or only marginally increased, inspector resources. 
The PIV at each bulk-handling plant in Zone I would be conducted essentially 
as now, to provide the inventory component of the verified material balance. 
Since theremay be more than one such plant, as well as several reactors, the 
question of shuffling inventories as a cover for diversion arises. 
Simultaneaus inventories should not be considered, because the Agency should 
not assume that it can dictate plant operating schedules, because electri-
cal demand would preclude it for power reactors in any case, and because of 
the peaking of demand in IAEA inspection effort. Some other solution is 
needed, one that is commensurate with a realistic appraisal of the risk of 
diversion by that means. 
In addition to the assurance afforded by the periodic verified material 
balance, the accountability trail through Zone 1 can be enhanced if it is 
divided into separate enrichment streams. There are many different enrich-
ments, on the order of 20, used in LWR fuel. A material balance can be 
closed around each enrichment stream, with the qualification that several 
streams may merge, insofar as verification is concerned, when different 
enrichments go into a single fuel assembly. (An exception is that some part 
of the flow may be blended to new enrichments during processing. That is 
discussed below). 
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Fuel assernblies are uniquely identifiable items, and comprise many different 
groups that differ in mechanical details and enrichment. The outer rods can 
be easily assayed nondestructively. Each group of identical assernblies is 
used only in a particular model reactor, although there may be the same 
model reactor in more than one location. Bulk feed material is packaged 1n 
discrete containers before it enters the process stream. The package can be 
sealed and be made securely identifiable. Feedstocks comprise the major 
part of the bulk-plant inventories, and the identification of containers 
is associated with operating records and reports to the Agency. Thus, bulk 
material not in the process line, like fuel assemblies, is not fungible, 
and both are held accountable at the proper facility. 
As noted elsewhere, shuffling seenarios require continuing actions to con-
ceal a single diversion. Taking all these factors into consideration, I 
suggest that adequate assurance for Zone I could be provided even if the 
annual PIV's were not concurrent. The Zone-) material balance could cover 
the period following the PIV at the principal bulk-handling plant in the 
State. The verified inventories at other plants and reactors could be ad-
justed on the basis of reported transfers, which would be verified during 
the next time interval. For the relatively lower diversion concerns of 
Zone I, the objective s.hould be reasonable assurance, not the covering of 
every less-likely diversion path. To keep things in perspective, we should 
not forget that the present facility-oriented approch does not address 
shuffling strategies at all. It can hardly be a serious criticism of any 
new fuel-cycle approach that it does not provide absolute protection against 
a diversion strategy that is not even considered with the present system. 
The principal outflow from Zone I is reactor loading. The material balance 
for each enrichment stream would use reported values for the quantity of 
each enrichment. Those values would be checked individually for conformance 
with fuel-assembly specifications. The independent verification would be 
measurement of the average enrichment at the reactor, by means of the 
neutron collar. The verified material content of each assembly, identified 
by serial number, would be entered into the Agency's boök inventory carried 
over into Zones 2 and 3. 
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Whenever verification is mentioned, some sampling level is assumed. The 
essential point is that the entire stratum be available for sampling at the 
time and place. That requirement would be met without additional inspector 
visits if the neutron-collar assay is clone in connection with reactor 
refueling. That, and the importance of adequate flow verification at the 
KMP joining Zones I and 2, justify strong efforts to solve any problems that 
may arise. Fuel-assembly handling at that point may complicate refueling 
operations, and may necessitate inspector presence over a longer span of 
time. It may be desirable to adapt the neutron-collar for underwater oper-
ation, if that would help relieve those problems. Since refueling within a 
particular State or region will not generally be concurrent for more than a 
small nurober of the total reactors, neutron-collar instruments might be 
designed to facilitate movements between reactor locations. 
The problern of calibration standards for the neutron-collar may pose 
difficult choices. I don't know enough about it at this point to do more 
than speculate. Does the calibration hold over time, or is it necessary to 
recalibrate at each use? If the former, it might be calibrated at the 
fabrication-plant assembly point, using an assembly containing rods verified 
by the inspector using a rod scanner. That might require additional inspec-
tor visits in order to calibrate for each assembly type, although at least 
some might be clone at the annual PIV. If the instrument requires recali-
bration with time, and hence at the reactor point of use, maybe a cheaper, 
secondary standard could be calibrated at the fabrication plant as above, 
and used at the reactor for recalibration at use. If the calibration prob-
lems are as difficult as had been indicated, and ~n view of the importance 
of an NDA measurement at the outflow KMP of Zone I, the system designers 
should work closely with the developers of the neutron collar to resolve 
any problems of calibration and impacts on refueling operations. 
Enrichment streams are generally segregated throughout Zone I, with two 
exceptions. One is the material recovered from recycled scrap, wherein the 
scrap frotn different enrichments is consolidated for recovery, blended as 
necessary , and fed back into the production line. Typically that is clone 
entirely within a single facility, and so the individual enrichment accoun-
ting would not balance. 
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The amount of scrap on storage and process, where enrichments might be 
interrnixed, is on the order of 3 or 6 percent of a conversion/fabrication 
plant's nominal inventory (4). The effect would be that the balance around 
the plant would show discrepancies in some enrichment streams, but they 
would compensate, so that the total U-235 flow would balance. 
The other situation leading to imbalances in individual enrichment streams 
arises if feed material is not received at the exact enrichment needed, and 
blending is clone within Zone I to obtain a new enrichment. That might be a 
cornrnon practice with centrifuge enrichment, where it is more difficult to 
provide separate custom enrichments. As with recycled scrap, the individual 
enrichment imbalance should be compensated in the complete U-235 balance. 
While custom blending might lead to changed enrichments covering a much 
larger part of the total flow, the correlation of individual-enrichment 
and total U-235 balance should provide adequate overall accountability, 
while preserving the assurance given by separate-enrichment material 
balances. 
Current Book Inventory 
The proposed scheme will provide a completely-verified material balance 
covering Zone I, something that the present facility-oriented approach 
does not do. An objection might be that, since apart of the State's fuel 
cycle included in Zone I is not subject to interim inspections, it is less 
visible to the Agency and hence the continuing assurance is less timely, 
although it meets the timeliness criterion. The complementary part of the 
system is intended to meet those objections, by closer reporting ties with 
the State to enable the Agency to maintain a simplified book inventory that 
shows at all time the locations and quantities of material for which the 
State is held accountable. That information enables the Agency to state 
at any time how much material is where. In the event of any unexpected 
international development in which the State was under suspicion, the 
Agency would not be dependent on the State for information after the fact 
in order to be able to make a statement as to the current accounting. 
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The Agency's book inventory would maintain accounts of quantities of U-235 
by facility and by enrichment, and of fuel assernblies by serial number. 
The accounting would be in units of U-235, with separate accounts for each 
enrichment. Information would be reported by the facility receiving or 
shipping material, by electronical message within 24 hours of receipt or 
shipment. The report would contain the following information, coded for 
abbreviation: 
Reporting facility 
Receipt (shipment) 
Shipping (receiving) facility 
Date received (shipped) 
Total U-235 quantity in kilograms: 
enrichment a 
enrichment b 
etc. 
Container identification numbers e to f inclusive 
For fuel assemblies, the following additional information would be included: 
Type x: 
serial numbers 1 to i inclusive 
Type x: 
serial numbers k to 1 inclusive 
ect. 
The Agency's book inventory would include separate accounts for fuel 
assernblies identified by type and serial number, for identified, filled 
containers transferred between facilities, and for the contained U-235. 
The item accounting would establish fuel-assembly accountability for Zone 
2 and 3, through irradiation and the resulting changes in fissile content, 
to the point of final disposition. 
For accounting purposes, U-235 would be considered fungible within each 
enrichment group. The Agency's requirement would be that it maintain 
current information on the quality at each enrichment level at each facility, 
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for which the State is to be held accountable. For fuel assemblies, the 
primary accounting unit is the individual assembly, which is not fungible. 
The accounting trail for each assembly begins in Zone 1 when it is shipped 
from the fabricator, and continues until it is dismantled at the repro-
cessing plant (or safeguards are terminated at final disposal). After ini-
tial fabrication, the fuel assembly is the unit of accounting; it is treated 
as a sealed unit containing a declared quantity of U-235 at each enrichment 
level, subject to verification of the aggregate U-235 quantity by NDA and 
by analysis at dissolution. 
Summary 
The suggested accounting scheme for Zone I would provide a verified material 
bälance in conformance with the timeliness goal of one year, with a par-
tially verified, continually-updated book inventory by which the Agency 
has available current information on the quantities and location of all 
material for which the State is held accountable. It would provide more 
current information and more rigorous verification than the present system, 
along with a substantial reduction in inspection effort. 
The s~heme would establish the item-accountability trail for fuel assemblies, 
which would be the principal basis for accounting in Zone 2, from which the 
material enters Zone 3 at the reprocessing-plant accountahility tank. 
NOTES 
1. S. Ermakov, Safeguards Approach for Low Enriched Uranium Gonversion and 
Fuel Fabrication Plant (LWR Fuel), IAEA/STR 96, draft, 
August 1980. 
2. STR-96, p. 28. 
3. Report of WG-2 of SAGSI on Safeguards Approaches, draft, Aug. 5, 1983, 
Tab1e 3.1 .1 
4. STR-96 indicates about 3 percent; in one U.S. fabrication plant produ-
cing a variety of fuel types the estimate is 6 percent. 
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2.5 Werking Paper III: Zone-2 Accounting 
In Werking Paper II, dated November 28, a concept for materials accounting 
in Zone I was suggested. Zone I comprises the LEU and U t parts of an LWR 
na 
fuel cycle, except for enrichment plants. The input is the receipt of im-
ported uranium, natural or enriched, and the shipments from any domestic 
enrichment plants; the outputs are loading of fuel assernblies into the 
cores of in-country reactors and any expert of fuel assernblies to other 
states. Under the zone concept internal flows would not be verified. 
Zone 2 is defined as all activities within a state that involve irradiated 
fuel. The Zone 1-2 boundary is at reactor refueling, and a fuel assembly 
moves from Zone 1 to Zone 2 when the reactor head is closed. All accounting 
in Zone 2 is by discrete items, nominally identifiable fuel assemblies. 
When items are consolidated within Zone 2, as whenmultiple fuel assernblies 
are sealed into a single storage cask or the item identity is otherwise 
transformed, the transition must be verified. It is assumed that any sub-
sequent form that fuel assernblies take within Zone 2 will be discrete and 
identifiable as an accountable item. 
Although accounts may be kept of the material content of items in Zone2 
for other purposes, that is not the basis for accountability. Such other 
purposes might be annual reporting of safeguard operations by the IAEA or 
for verification of inputs to Zone 3 by assay at the reprocessing-plant 
accountability tank. 
The figure shows possible flows among Zone 2 facilities. Different states 
would have some, but probably not all, of those shown. Possible flows out 
of Zone 2 are (1) at the dissolver of an in-country reprocessing plant, 
(2) at the point of transfer to another state of fuel assernblies are ex-
ported, and (3) with geologic disposal, when safeguards are terminated. 
The corresponding key measurement points are (1) the reprocessing-plant 
accountab:ility tank, (2) the storage pool of a reprocessing plant or other 
facility in another state, and (3) the final inventory inspection by which 
the Agency verifies that safeguards may be terrninated. The case of perma-
nent geologic disposal may be only hypothetical; it is included for com-
pleteness and consistency. 
-40-
Timeliness 
For the material in Zone 2 the timeliness objective is three month. 
"Timeliness" is generally understood to mean the determination of MUF: 
the closure of the material balance. That would require PIV's at each fa-
cility every three months. As with Zone I, it would be desirable to reduce 
the inspection effort in Zone 2, if it could be justified on rational grounds. 
Under the present approach for LWR safeguards, described in STR-80I), PIV's 
are conducted annually (or at refue1ing) and interim inspections every 
three months. The interim inspection is stated to be for the purpose of 
exarnining surveillance information. Although a PIV of the spent fuel may 
be taken at the same time, for example to investigate any anomaly in the 
surveillance record, the timeliness objective is met if it is verified that 
there were no spent-fuel shipments. Closure of the material balance at in-
tervals shorter than one year is not a requirement. 
STR-80 did not explore the possibility of langer interim inspection inter-
vals because the recording capacity of surveillance cameras was only three 
months (sometime two) and a visit was necessary to service the cameras. 
That is no langer a constraint; capabilities up to a year are technically 
feasible. However, the point is that the timeliness objective is now met 
on the basis of surveillance of transfers and not closure of the material 
balance. Under the zone concept the material balance is closed araund the 
entire zone, not each facility. Flows into and out of the zone are verified 
as they occur. If PIV's are clone annually, the t<imeliness obj.ective is met 
on the same basis as now, except that inflows and outflows are verified 
more directly, as they occur. Hence, if interim inspections at the reactor 
were omitted, the timeliness goal would be met on the same basis as now: 
an annual PIV with material-balance closure, and interim verification of 
flows in and out of the MBA. Beyond that, the flows would be verified more 
effectively than under the present approach. 
I) Lovett and Tolchenkov, "Safeguarding Light Water Reactors", STR-80, IAEA, 
May I979. 
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AFR Problems 
Shipments to AFR sto~age will be a common activity in at least some coun-
tries. If the individual assernblies retain their integrity and identity in 
the AFR storage configurations, they could be verified at the PIV. However, 
in at least one case it is planned that transport/storage casks would be 
loaded at the reactor pool and remain closed thereafter, with no provision 
for opening them at the AFR. There is a·. need to verify the identities of 
the fuel assernblies loaded into each identifiable cask, in order to main-
tain the accountability trail, and that must be done at the reactor, at the 
time of loading. The annual discharge from a typical large reactor will re-
quire about 20 cask shipments, and a larger nurnber would be required for 
some time to reduce the backlog. To have an inspector present at each cask 
loading would require a substantial increase in inspector effort. 
The problern is the same, whether the present approach or the zone concept 
is adopted. It is not the verification of a flow internal to Zone 2 that 
is the problem; it is the verification of cask contents. Possible solutions 
are discussed in another paper 1). 
A similar problern is the consolidation or reconstitution of fuel assernblies 
for more compact storage, if that is done at the reactor. Here also, the 
problern is not affected by the zone concept; it must be addressed/in any 
case. 
Summary 
A general concept for Zone-2 accounting has been outlined, following the 
same approach that has been considered for Zone 1. The concept would meet 
the same criteria as wilith the present approach, but with more effective 
verification of flows. 
1) J.M. de Montmollin, "The problern of Material-Balance Closure with Certain 
Reactor/AFR Spent-Fuel Transfers", Warking Paper, December 12, 1984. 
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Spent-fuel transfers frorn the reactors to AFR's are internal to Zone 2 and, 
applying the sarne criteria as under the present approach, a logical case can 
be made that carnera surveillance at reactor pools is not necessary. That 
argurnent rests on the principle, as in Zone I, that the rnaterials within 
the zone would not be under continous surveillance between rnaterial-balance 
closures. However, the greater sensitivity of spent fuel rnay rnake it poli-
tically expedient to retain pool surveillance. 
The problern of maintaining itern identity through the transition frorn indi-
vidual assernblies to closed AFR storage casks is independent of the choice 
between the present approach and the zone concept. It rnust be addressed in 
either case. 
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2.6 Warking Paper IV: Zonal Flows 
In earlier working papers I considered the fuel-cycle material flows asso-
ciated with Zones 1 and 2. In this paper I include certain additional flows 
that may exist in some States' fuel cycles, and I define the zone boundaries 
for Zone 3. 
In a recent working paper (5. 7.44) Willy examined safeguards alternatives 
for Zone 3, comparing facility safeguards with an extended MBA. My tenta-
tive conclusion is that the principal basis for Zone 3 safeguards should 
continue to be on a facility basis, incorporating all such measures as 
near-real-time accounting and resident inspectors that have been considered, 
as may be appropriate. The reason is that Zone 3 covers all parts of the 
fuel cycle where separated plutonium is present, and the political accept-
ability of the entire safeguards system is dominated by perceptions of the 
adequacy of plutonium safeguards. 
However, applying safeguards to each facility in Zone 3, including the 
closing of material balances around each, does not preclude also closing 
a balance araund the entire zone. The objective is to make a comprehensive 
statement concerning a State's entire fuel cycle, which, because of the 
differing concerns regarding materials in the different z6nes, should logi-
cally be in three parts, with appropriate criteria for each. In Zone 3 the 
material balance can be determined from the information available from 
each facility, adjusted as necessary for different dates when PIV's were 
made at each facility. The zone material balances provide a quantitati~e 
basis for the statement of findings for the entire State, and they inte-
grate the material balances from each facility, an important improvement 
over the present system.Whether the PIV's in each facility are simultane-
aus or not~ the zone balance must be referenced to a particular time, and 
so it is necessary to at least implicitly address the question of material 
shuffling as a diversion strategy. 
Willy did not include MOX fabrication and the subsequent disposition of 
the fuel in his analysis. Here, my purpose is to include all flows that 
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might be encountered in any of the three zones. In developing a concept 
for fuel-cycle safeguards it is necessary to include all flows, in order 
to close the zone material balances. That is especially true in Zone 3, 
where plutonium and MOX fuels will continue for a lang time to be involved 
mainly in R&D programs for thermal recycle and breeders. 
Besides the separate facilities within Zone 3, facility safeguards should 
continue to be applied to enrichment plants and R&D facilities. The former 
is nominally within the definition of Zone 1. However, the potential for 
clandestine production and higher enrichm~nts, as well as the general per-
ception that enrichment is a particularly sensitive activity, justifies 
continuation of the present facility-based approach. 
Until plutonium-fuel use has reached a stage of maturity, as LEU fuels 
have, Zone 3 will continue to be complicated by R&D activities and special 
situations. One aspect is that, in Zone 3, a State's "fuel cycle" is much 
less integrated than may be the case with the other zones. Development 
programs are often multinational, and Zone-3 materials are transferred to 
other States ~n various forms. Materials do not pass through a well-defined 
sequence, as in a mature fuel cycle. 
At the same time, the nominal fuel-cycle sequence in Zone 3 should be the 
( basis for fuel-cycle safeguards, anticipating the eventual operat~onal use 
of plutonium-bearing fuels. Both situations can be accommodated in terms 
of a model fuel-cycle sequence, with provision for the inflows and outflows 
that are encountered during the R&D phase. 
The figure shows a diagram of such flows for all three zones. It is inten-
ded to include essentially all the flows that may be encountered in a com-
plete fuel cycle, including thermal recycle. Although no distinction is 
made between thermal and breeder reactors, it represents a combined thermal 
and breeder cycle as well. It provides also for R&D material flows that are 
associated with the operational fuel cycle. A particular State's activities 
may include only some of the flows that are shown, but the basic concept is 
unaffected if some of the flows are not encountered. Minor variations of 
those shown may also occur, but they are complete enough to illustrate what 
must be provided for. 
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The areaswhereinmaterial balances would be verified are enclosed by double 
lines. Those are: Zones 1, 2, 3; each facility in Zone 3; enrichment plants; 
and R&D facilities that interface with the fuel cycle, but are not part of 
it. Various export and import flows join the fuel cycle with those of other 
States because of such things as source-material imports, fuel fabrication 
for export, reprocessing services for others and by other States, trade in 
plutonium, and multinational recycle and breeder programs. All such flows 
must be included in the zone material balances. MOX fuel fabrication in-
volves flows ofU-Natand LEU, which must be included in the Zone-1 material 
balance. 
The zonal flow measurement points are numbered in the figure. Interzonal 
flows within the State, such as 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19, 
could be verified at single points. Since both shipping and receiving flows 
are under the control of the same State, the credibility of the safeguards 
findings would not be enhanced by separate verifications. 
The zonal boundaries shown in the figure are operational, and do not 
necessarily indicate physical location. For example, KMP's 15 and 16 would 
logically be at the MOX fabrication plant. 
The KMP's for verification of international transfers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
10, 11 and 17) involve more than one State. In principle, additional con-
fidence could be gained by separate shipper/receiver verification. 
INFCIRC/153 provides forthat (par. 71(c), 93, 96). However, a sirigle 
verification at either the shipping or receiving end may be adequate, for 
several reasons. LEU is imported mostly from weapon States, and there 
should be little concern that they would be in collusion with safeguarded 
States Ln a conspiracy for the latter to divert. In few cases where non-
weapon States may export LEU the concern should also be minimal. 
If only one verification of international transfers is needed, should it 
be in the shipping or the receiving country? The safeguards concern is 
that imports are not understated and that exports are not overstated. 
Where a weapon State is the other party, it may be sufficient to accept 
their reported values as independent verification. 
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That would require that the safeguarded State also accept those values in 
the determination by the Agency of the quantity for which the State is held 
accountable (subject to minor adjustments when shipper and receiver disagree 
on measured values). Independent verification by the Agency at the weapon-
State end has the practical disadvantage of requiring additional inspector 
presence in weapon States to verify shipments. Generally, it would appear 
that direct verification by the Agency, where necessary, should be at the 
facility within the safeguarded State where the material is accepted; for 
example, KMP's I, 3 and 4 should be at the enrichment, conversion, and sto-
rage sites respectively. 
The transactions covered by KMP'a 5, 6, 10, II and 17 will generally involve 
other non-weapon States. For 10 and II, and particularly 17, the greater 
concerns over those materials should probably require independent verification 
at both the shipping and receiving ends. That would be necessary in any case 
for KMP II, since the scheme requires closing a material balancearaund each 
separate facility in Zone 3, and perhaps for Zone 2 as well. 
General Summary of System Concept 
The figure diagrams the entire fuel-cycle safeguards concept, with appropriate 
differences among the zones. The Zone-3 scheme is the present facility-based 
approach, upon which is superimposed the closing of the material balance 
araund the entire zone. The characteristic flows and inventories for the 
zone as a whole convey additional information on a timely basis that is rele-
vant to verification of the State's compliance with its obligations. A prin-
cipal objective of the current systems -- to keep all material continously 
visible by means of surveillance, inspector presence, and NRT accounting --
is retained. The location of all materials by facility is kept current in the 
Agency's book inventory by means of prompt, abbreviated facility-transfer 
reports to the Agency. 
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For Zone 1 the approach is fundamentally different. All flows in and out of 
the zone are reported and verified, providing the Agency with a8current book 
inventory of the material for which the State is held accountable. Prompt 
interfacility transfer reports provide information on the reported 16cations 
of the material, to be verified at annual intervals. The essential difference 
from Zone 3 is that there is no attempt to maintain continous visibility of 
the State's Zone-1 inventory. It is verified only as required by the time-
liness goal annually. At that time, only, is the material balance closed 
to verify that all the materials for which the State is held accountable are 
there. The Zone-1 approach meets the present objectives, may be, at a con-
siderable saving of inspection effort, which is now largely applied to ·the 
verification of flows at each MBA in each facility. 
The Zone-2 approach takes a middle ground,commensurate with the relative con-
cern over Zone-2 materials. It takes advantage of the discrete nature of the 
material and the relative infrequency of interfacility transfers. Material 
balance are glosed annually, as at present. Because the timeliness goal is 
3 months, assurance is needed at more frequent intervals to verify that the 
material is still present. That is clone, as under the present approach, by 
continuous instrumental surveillance to detect unreported transfers out of 
the facilities. Interfacility movements are relatively infrequent, and to 
the extent it deems necessary the Agency can verify them by ad-hoc inspections. 
The essential difference between the Zone-1 and Zone-2 approaches is that 
internal, interfacility flows are verified in Zone 2, responsive to the 
3-months timeliness objective. 
The product of the system in an annual material balance closure araund each 
zone. That provides the basis for a statement of findings regarding the 
State that takes the following form: 
The Agency finds no e~idence of diversion of nuclear materials 
from declared peaceful uses. All natural and low-enriched uranium 
is accounted for with a limit of error of % of the U-235 in-
ventory with a ___ % confidence level; all fuel assernblies are 
accounted for; and all direct-use material is accounted for with 
a limit of error of % of the inventory with a % confidence 
level. 
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The limit values and confidence levels would be the same for all States, 
and would be based on technica1 feasibility and not weapon capability. 
The values for Zones I and 3 might be different, but it may be politically 
expedient to make the limit of error for Zone 3 no larger than for Zone I. 
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2.7 Excerpt from a letter of J. de Montmollin to W. A. Higinbotham which 
connnents on extended- MBA approach for Zone 3, Jan. II. 1985 
The paper compares the extended-MBA approach for Zone 3 with the present 
facility-based approach. MY conclusion is that, while the extended-MBA 
approach would provide most of what the present approach does, it appears to 
be a less intensive system. The biggest problern that IAEA safeguards face is 
the perception, mainly in the US, that safeguards for separated plutonium 
are inadequate or even infeasible. Any new approach that seems to be less 
effective would appear to those critics to be a copout and an admission that 
their öbjections had merit. 
The closure of the material balance araund each entire zone is the basis for 
the safeguards statement with regard to the State: that the presence of all 
the State's materials has been verified. I believe that the present approach 
for Zone 3 should be retained, and in addition the balance should be closed 
araund the entire zone. The latter is largely an accounting step, since the 
facility balances provide all the field information that is needed. What the 
zone approach would add is the coordination of verification activities at the 
facility level and the integration of the facility results into a statement 
that goes into the Statewide findings with those from the other zones. 
A statement on the zone balance addresses, at least implicitly, the problern 
of material shuffling. Whatever assessment of the risk and specific measures 
that the Agency may take, the statement would cover it. Material shuffling 
now is ignored altogether, providing one more contention for the critics. 
A State's entire inventory mnnot be covered anyway by the complete Substi-
tution of the zone approach for the facility approach. Enrichment plants are 
too sensitive to cover them on the same basis as other Zone-1 activities. 
It will be a lang time before separated plutonium is restricted to neatly-
closed and balanced fuel cycles; meanwhile, R&D activities will continue to 
be an essential part of the Zone-3 safeguards problem. What is needed is a 
Zone-3 approach that anticipates a mature plutonium cycle, but which provides 
for the transitory R&D phase. 
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I agree with your other points also. I have already responded to your comments 
on Zone I; your points are well-taken on Zone 2 also. In the enclosed paper 
I have brought all these things together, explaining some thoughts on Zone 
2 and 3 and describing the system as a whole. 
There is a subtle, but I believe fundamental distinction between the approaches 
for Zones I and 2 and for Zone 3. In Zone I and 2 the approach is to maintain 
a book inventory, updated by verified flow reports, that states what material 
the State is held accountable for. There is no attempt to keep the material 
continuously visible or to verify internal flows; the presence of the material 
is verified only at the annual PIV. The one exception is necessitated by the 
3-month timeliness requirement for Zone-2 material. Since any spent-fuel 
movements are both infrequent and conspicuous, optical surveillance can be 
used to detect any transfer. 
For Zone 3 there is a fundamental difference. In addition to verifying the 
presence of all materials periodically, an objective is to maintain conti-
nuous visibility of all materials and activities, to the extent practicable 
and feasible. One of the faults of the present system is that it attempts to 
do that indiscriminately to all safeguarded material, and not just in Zone 3. 
Under the proposed concept we would have: 
I. A periodic statement covering all the State's holdings, 
based on the material balance for each zone, 
2. For Zone 3 and other sensitive facilities, continuous 
observation by means of C/S, resident inspectors, NRT 
accounting, and the like, in order to provide further 
assurance by making those activities more visible and 
to provide moretimely detection of anomalaus events. 
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2.8 Warking Paper V: Goals for Fuel-Cycle Safeguarcis 
Much of the work on the fuel-cycle approach to safeguards has been con-
strained by a requirement that the present inspection goals are to remain 
unchanged. In view of the wide disparities in the numbers of facilities in 
the fuel-cycles of various States, it appears the present set of goals would 
be unworkable in any sort of fuel-cycle-based safeguards. An unresolved and 
generally-ignored problern is that the present absolute-quantity goals that 
are applied to individual facilities are based on the external consequences 
of diversion; hence, being applied to separate facilities in isolation,, 
they have no relevance to the purpese of safeguards, which is assurance re-
garding the entire State. There is correspondingly less assurance the grea-
ter the number of facilities in the State. At the same time, a State with a 
larger number of facilities is likely also to have more sensitive materials 
in bulk form in some of them. Because the quantitative goals are not even 
technically feasible in some facilities, they are relaxed in the name of 
expendiency, but at the cost of undermining the entire rationale upon which 
they are based. For fuel-cycle-based safeguards, the present rationale puts 
the Agency in an untenable position. The total quantity that might be di-
verted below the detection threshold is a function of the number of facili-
ties in the State. If the threshold for the State is raised proportionate to 
the number of facilities, there is no longer any justification for the pre-
sent values. If the present values based on a one-bomb quantity ate applied 
to the entire State, that would require that more intensive measures be 
applied to the same kind of facility in a State with a large fuel cycle than 
one with a small one, which would in no way reflect the relative needs for 
the assurance that safeguards are intended to provide. Beyond that, the more 
stringent goals apportioned to each facility would be infeasible as is now 
the case with a few large bulk plants, and the last remaining shred of justi-
fication would vanish. 
The question of inspection goals seems to be inherent to fuel-cycle-based 
safeguards, regardless of how desirable it might be to address those two 
issues separately. In the case of the zonal concept, which is the principal 
approach to fuel-cycle safeguards that has been considered, what is to be 
the criterion for closing the zonal material balance? It would appear that 
that question is fundamental. 
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The problern of goals should be addressed concurrently with the development 
of a concept. Better, we should begin with the purpose of safeguards, wor-
king frorn that to the product needed frorn safeguards operations, to the details 
of the suggested concept. The following ordered description follows that se-
quence. It might provide the frarnework for the report. It could be prefaced 
by a staternent that the work discusses a hypothetical concept that is based 
only on the NPT and INFCIRC/153, and does not address the rnerit or historical 
precedent established by the present set of goals. The following set of State-
ments is a logical ordering of the problern defination, and it provides the 
basis for the sequential development of a solution. 
I. The purpose of safeguards is to provide assurance that a 
State is cornplying with its obligations to use nuclear 
energy only for peaceful purposes. 
2. As explicitly provided in the NPT and as practiced by the 
Agency in all its safeguards activities, that assurance is 
provided by a determination that all the State's materials 
that are under safeguards are verified as being in peaceful 
use (or storage). 
3. "Material under safeguards" rneans, for NPT parties, all the 
State's nuclear materials as declared by the State, or as 
determinded by the Agency to have been exported to the State. 
For others, it rneans all material specifically covered by 
agreements with the Agency or another country. For present 
purposes, the discussion is lirnited to NPT States. 
4. The Agency provides assurance by rneans of periodic staternents 
that the State's material under safeguards is accounted for 
to the degree that i t concludes that there is no reason to 
believe that any of it has been diverted to non-peaceful use. 
Routinely such Statements are rnade annually. (Under abnormal 
circurnstances, the Agency would report any situation when-
ever it deerned it appropriate to do so.). 
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5. The Agency statement that is most directly responsive to the 
purpose of safeguards is to the effect that all the State's 
material under safeguards has been accounted for by the Agen-
cy, qualified by a stated degree of uncertainty as to the 
quantity verified. In the design of the system the Agency 
strives for the lowest level of uncertainty that it can 
achieve, subject to limitations imposed by negotiated arrange-
ments, available resources, and the technical state of the 
art. The same design goal will be applied to the same classes 
of material in each State. 
6, Because of the differing degrees of importance of various 
materials for direct use in explosives, it is appropriate to 
extend the principal finding by subordinate, supporting state-
ments covering the major classes of material: natural U and 
LEU, irradiated fuel, plutonium separated from fission pro-
ducts, including HEU. 
7. Normally, the first three classes of material cover the com-
plete fuel cycle, some or all of which may be involved in a 
particular State. Statements covering each are developed from 
information relating to the flow of materials through the 
cycle, among other. 
8, Quantitative Statements as to the degree that the material 
is accounted for by the Agency take the form of the closure 
of a material balance araund the State's holdings of each 
class of material. 
9. As appropriate, the Agency's statement as described above 
will be further supported by material balances closed araund 
each facility and internal MBA, and by information obtained 
from Containment and surveillance measures. 
10. Periodic statements of assurance, as described above, are 
made annually, requiring that verified material balances be 
obtained at intervals no langer than that. Depending on the 
class of material, interim assurance may be obtained more 
frequently by means such as more-frequent balance closure, 
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C/S, NRT accounting, and resident inspection. Any unresolvable 
discrepancies will be reported by the Agency as early as it 
deems appropriate, without regard to the annual cycle. 
The implied conclusion would be that present goals will have to go if we are 
to move to fuel-cycle safeguards with a rational basis. A second implication 
would be that the inspection goals for individual facilities would vary as 
a function of the quantity of material held by the State and the nurober of 
facilities over which it was distributed. One o,r the other alternative must 
be chosen: either a fixed threshold for each facility and consequently a 
variable threshold for the States, or vice versa. ("Fixed" does not necessa-
rily mean an absolute value; it means a fixed criterion). There should be no 
question that the purpose of safeguards is with respect to the State and not 
facilities in isolation. 
The sequential development described above would establish criteria for the 
entire State fuel cycle; it would allocate tolerances to each zone, taking 
account of the differing safeguards importance of each zone; and it would 
further allocate to individual facilities in each zone. The development of 
the goal structure would be the driving element; the zone concept and other 
features would follow from that. There appears to be an important function 
for the zonal material balances, in order to segregate the different classes 
of material as component parts of the final statement. 
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2.9 Zone I Flow and the Neutron Collar 
(Excerpt of a letter from J. M. de Montmellin to D. Gupta, April 19, 1985) 
I have studied your March 18 letter and tables carefully. IMD/WSQ certainly 
seems to be a logical measure for the distribution of inspection effort. 
GOV/1982 does not explain how the values for WSQ were selected, and they 
might be improved upon, but for our present purposes it is better to stay 
with values that others have chosen rather than open more issues. 
As your Table 7 indicates, the problern remains with Zone I, unless something 
else ~s clone to reduce the interim inspections at LEU fabrication plants. 
Most of the inspection there is to verify flows: 123 + 324 ~ 447 IMD vs. 33 
for PIV. Since the model fuel cycle includes only LEU fabrication, and would 
not in any case be more than that plus separate conversion plants, the Zone 
in/out flows are essentially the same as the LEU-fabrication-facility flows. 
The PIV alone requires about two IMD/WSQ for the Zone, leaving little for 
flow verification. If the neutron collar is to be used, those measurements 
proper require about 1.3 times as many IMD's (Table 2) as the entire PIV. 
More than that, since each inspector visit requires more time than the 
actual measurements. 
I suggest that we eliminate interzonal flow verifications entirely as sepa-
rate verifications within Zone I. The rationale is partly based on a point 
I made earlier: for Zone 1, the State is charged with the responsibility of 
accounting for materials that flow into the Zone, and the Agency verifies it 
with an annual material balance. That contrasts with the present concept of 
maintaining continuous visibility of each facility (Working Paper IV, p. 7). 
The two possible inflows to Zone 1 are imported LEU and the product of a 
domestic enrichment plant. For the latter, shipments would be verified by 
the Agency as part of the more intensive safeguards for enrichment. 
The same would be true for any other enrichment plant under safeguards. How-
ever, fuuch LEU comes from weapon States, where the availability of IAEA in-
spectors is unlikely. My idea is that the State would accept the responsi-
bility of accounting for the quantity of LEU reported by the exporting 
State, without independent verification by the Agency. That would be the 
same quantity that it was paying for, and it would merely be accepting safe-
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guards responsibility for it. Any S/R differences due to measurements would 
have to be resolved for financial reasons, and the adjusted values would be 
reported to the Agency. The outflow from the zone is more important to veri-
fy. For the State to be relieved of responsibility for a quantity of material, 
the Agency should independently verify the transfer. That does not require 
separate verification, since the interzonal KMP is the loading into the re-
actor core, which is an essential verification from Zone 2. Thus, interzonal 
flows in connection with Zone I could by verified entirely outside the Zone, 
by measures that would be necessary in any case. 
As we have noted, fresh fuel assernblies are unique items with a very high 
unit value, both direct and in terms of the impact on reactor operations. 
The State would have every incentive to account for each assembly, ensuring 
that it would move into the reactor on schedule, whereupon the Agency could 
verify the movement from Zone I. The State would also be motivated to help 
verify all inventories and waste streams in order to close the balance, 
thereby accounting for what it had been charged with. For the inflow of LEU 
imported from a weapon State, we can rely on the assumption of no collusion. 
That is certainly sound, since any collusion would be a most fundamental 
violation of the NPT Article I by the weapon State. Surely no one would can-
tend that the safeguards scheme should cover such a possibili ty; if so, they 
would safeguard weapon States against Article-I violations! 
We still have the problern of using the neutron-collar. Although everyone 
seems to think it is useful and needed, it should be rationalized in some 
way that is consistent with the Zone-1 strategy. Could a significant amount 
of material be taken from the inner rods of an assembly, without an unreason-
able penalty to reactor operation? Would such a diversion be detectable at 
dissolution? Would that be too late? What is the difference in the detectable 
diversion quantity using the neutron collar and external gamma scan, and 
what is the effect of the diversion on reactor operation? Is the neutron-
collar verification useful in connection with the reprocessing accountability-
tank verification? 
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Assuming that the neutron-collar measurement is needed, the cost in IMD's 
must be held at a low level if the desired IMD/WSQ distribution among the 
zones is tobe achieved. We might consider allocating 5 IMD/WSQ to Zone I. 
With 2 for the PIV, that leaves 3 for the neutron collar, or about 50 IMD. 
In order for any sample testing to be valid for the whole population of a 
year's production of assemblies, each assembly must have an equal chance of 
being tested, and there must be assurance that none of the assernblies in 
the population is altered after the sample is taken. Judging from the acti-
vities listed in Table 2, an interim inspection to test a sample group of 
assernblies might require 40 MH, or about 7 MD. There could therefore be 
about 3 or 4 such visits in a year with 50 IMD, (assuming two inspectors), 
sampling a total of about 75 assernblies of population of 2160 in the re-
ference fuel cycle. For valid sampling, the inspector visits would have to 
be randomized in time, and all assernblies on hand for a particular inspec-
tion would have to be made available. That would necessitate moving 
the assernblies for testing. All assernblies would have to be sealed, inclu-
ding those not in the facility at the time of the inspector visit, in order 
to ensure that no assembly was altered after the risk of being sampled had 
passed. That would require the application of some kind of seal by the 
operator at the completion of manufacture, the seal being valid for IAEA 
purposes. It is not clear that there is a solution to the sealing problem. 
All of this seems to me to raise serious questions as to how the neutron 
collar can be used at the fabrication plant. The problern is already there 
under the present concept, and SAGSI has tried to deal with it, without 
success. My present opinion is that there is no way to use it there without 
a substantial further imbalance in the IMD/WSQ, we should not try to make a 
place for it in our concept. The remaining question is, could the neutron 
collar contribute something that is important to overall fuel-cycle safe-
guards, going beyond the individual facility or zone for which it has been 
envisioned thus far? 
The problems that I have posed are inherent also in the present approach of 
trying to verify flows at LEU plants without excessive IMD/WSQ. Presently, 
neither is accomplished adequately. It appears to me that the neutron collar 
is a casualty, along with the other flow verifications in Zone I. 
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That bring us back to rny suggestion that no interzonal-flow verifications 
and no neutron-collar rneasurernents be clone in Zone 1. That would result in 
2 IMD/WSQ for Zone I, all for the PIV. That is not out of line with Zone 3 
and with the U-nat cycle. As we have noted, Zone 2 is a special case, with 
no bulk rnaterials and heavy coverage by C/S, and hence a. different figure 
is justified. Maybe the neutron collar will find a harne with MOX fabrication, 
where the stakes are a lot higher. 
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2.10 Distribution of Safeguards Inspection over the Fuel Cycle 
NPT safeguards, unlike the earlier INFCIRC/66 safeguards that established 
the precedent for safeguards concepts, are concerned with a State's nuclear 
activities as a whole, rather than individual facilities in isolation. 
INFCIRC/153 calls for the concentration of verification procedures on the 
more sensitive stages of the fuel cycle (1). It also specifies the criteria 
for a differentiation of inspection effort, as a function of the characteris-
tics of a particular State's nuclear establishment (2). 
Those two sections of INFCIRC/153 are often mentioned in connection with 
fuel-cycle safeguards, and the Agency has contended that present safeguards 
meet those objectives to a considerable degree. However, much more can be 
done, leading to payoffs in effectiveness and efficiency. 
Paragraph 8l(a,b,c,d) calls for differentiation of routine inspection effort 
on the basis of material forms, the fuel cycle including the degree of inter-
national interdependence, and the SSAC. Only the first has been addressed 
explicitly, except possibly in the negotiation of individual facility attach-
ments. 
The form of the nuclear materials, except for different SQ's for 1EU and HEU, 
is differentiated only in terms of inspection frequency, which is rationalized 
from conversion time. The diversion seenarios for various material forms 
postulate the existence of clandestine facilities of major significance, 
such as reactors, enrichment, fabrication, and reprocessing plants. 
The assumed conversion times for running materials through those plants are 
a poor estimator of the risk that the plants exert, and hence timeliness, 
even as a relative measure, does not adequately represent safeguards concerns. 
!. INFC/!53; 6c 
2 • INFC / I 53 , 81 
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Material quantities are incorporated in inspection criteria only on the 
basis of "the quantity of fissile material in respect of which ••.. the 
possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded" 
(3). Since the same quantity of contained fissile material defines SQ (ex-
cept for the two levels of enriched U), SQ does not reflect the relative 
risks of the different chemical and physical forms, nor the item or bulk 
configuration, nor its accessibility. SQ is merely an extreme limit ratio-
nalized on the basis of the consequence of an assumed diversion. Being a 
fixed, absolute quantity, it does not take account of the relative utility 
to a diverter of the great differences in material forms, and hence the risk, 
~n relation to the size of a State's total fissile inventory. 
The present rationales for both timeliness and quantity, questionable as they 
are for individual facilities, lose even that shred of credibility as mea-
sures of relative safeguards concerns when applied to the fuel cycle of a 
State as a whole. Consequently, they do not provide a suitable basis for the 
allocation of inspection effort over the fuel cycle. 
With regard to quantity, SQ could be weighted by arbitrary factors reflec-
ting the accessibility and other things that define the relative attractive-
ness, and hence the assumed risk of diversion. As long ago as 1980 the 
Agency arrived at the same conclusion, in categorizing bulk-material plants 
containing a variety of materials in terms of a single index of safeguards 
significace (4). SQ is adjusted by weighting factors to Weighted Significant 
Quality, as follows: 
3. IAEA/SG/INF/1, Item 89 
4. GOV/1982, para 89 
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TABLE I 
Weighting factors for converting SQ to WSQ 
Type of nuclear material 
Plutonium 
and 
Uranium-233 
and 
Uranium enriched 
to ~ 20 % in 
uranium-235 
Uranium enriched 
to ~ 20 % in 
uranium-235 
Natural uranium 
Depleted uranium 
Thorium 
Material form 
metal or pure material 
compounds 
non irradiated mixtures 
and impure compounds 
irradiated 
all forms 
Weighting factor 
0.33 
0.1 
0.02 
There is an inconsistency in using as the basis for the verification thres-
hold, and hence the allocation of inspection efforts, and WQS as a measure 
of safeguards significance. For parts of the fuel cycle with lower we~ghting 
factors, inspection designed on the basis of SQ are disproportionately large 
relative to the presumed need for verification reflected as WQS. 
The basis for the values of weighting factors selected by the Agency is not 
available, but apparently i t only covers the chemical form and the presence 
or lack of fission products. Other differences in material characteristics 
stated in par. 81(a), such as bulk or item form and accessibility in terms 
of the kinds of chemical processing to convert to direct-use material, 
might also be accomodated by appropriate weighting factors. 
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Par. 8l(c), in part, and 81(d) provide for differences Ln inspection effort 
on the basis of the State's fuel cycle. As with 8!(a), those differences 
are more logically related to WQS than to timeliness. Separate weighting-
factors could be applied to further adjust the inspection-effort allocation 
on the basis of interactive flows among facilities internal to the State. 
International interdependence (81(d)) isaseparate factor, and the inspec-
tion allocation can be further adjusted because it is assumed that separate 
States are not acting in collusion. 
Par. 81(b) and the remaining parts of 81(c) cover differences that are 
' 
unique to individual States, and hence they cannot be applied through uni-
versal criteria. However, guidelines might be developed for the application 
of quantified weighting factors in the negotiation of individual facility 
attachments. 
The above suggests that the allocation of inspection effort as directed by 
par. 81 should be done by adjusting the SQ rather than timeliness. Timeli-
ness criteria can always be applied on an arbitrary basis, and that is 
essential what is done now. There are two problems with using timeliness as 
the sole weighting factor. First, it is too crude a criterion to account 
explicitly for all the variables covered by par. 81. There are presently three 
levels of timeliness; one is constrained by the operational impact of PIV 
and another, one year, is merely an arbitrary outer limit. The tnird has 
no more real basis in terms of the proclaimed rationale of conversion time 
than the other two. What we have is merely a set of inspection intervals 
that reflect nothing more than relative, unquantifiable degrees of safe-
guards concern. As such, there is no reason to think the values are inappro-
priate, but they do not provide the scope for accomodating the factors co-
vered by par. 81. 
The other problern with timeliness as the variable for applying par. 81 is 
that the nominal values of one, three and twelve months are grossly dis-
torted by the time required for the Agency to arrive at findings. An inspec-
tion at the end of the interval is followed by perhaps one month or more to 
analyze the results. The outcome is either that the State's reports are veri-
fied or that there are anomalies that must be investigated. Further analysis 
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and possibly reinspection is necessary, requiring weeks or months. The final 
conclusion of the safeguards inspectorate is either that the State's accoun-
ting is verified, any anomalies having been concluded to be unrelated to 
diversion, orthat the Agency is unable to verify the State's accounting, 
That result, reported to the Board, is the end of the safeguards inspection 
activity. The total time required, from the date of the last previous in-
spection to any report to the Board of an inability to verify, is on the 
order of three months in addition to the nominal 1, 3, or 12-month inspec-
tion interval. Thus, the differentiation in inspection effort on the basis 
of timeliness is not by factors of I, 3, and 12; it is more like 4, 7, and 
15. That range does not reflect the range of safeguards concern spanning 
separated Pu and HEU to depleted uranium. 
The problern of fuel-cycle safeguards is essentially the allocation of in-
spection effort on the basis of par. 81. The factors specified in par. 81 
are in effect indicators of relative safeguards concerns, and hence the 
problern is to match allocation with relative concerns. Resources are always 
limited, and consequently the inspection effort allocated to one type of 
facility is necessarily constrained by the need for balanced coverage. It 
follows that inspection goals in absolute, quantitative terms and based on 
multiple diversion scenario~ cannot provide the basis for optimum allocation, 
unless the resources are at least sufficient to cover all seenarios to the 
degree deemed necessary. INFCIRC/153, par. 6 and 81 recognize that, and 
hence specify a basis for allocation beginning with the State's entire 
nuclear establishment and working toward the inspection of individual 
facilities. 
Inspection goals must be in relative terms, so that they are adaptable to 
the resources allocated to each facility in the context of all the State's 
nuclear activities. The adjustments called for in par. 81 lead to differing 
levels of inspection activity for similar facilities in different fuel-
cycle contexts, and therefore fixed-value goals cannot be applied to indi-
vidual facilities. The necessary differentiation needed to cover the wide 
range of relative safeguards concerns cannot be abtairred from timeliness 
alone; weighting more directly based on material forms is necessary, for the 
same reasons that the Agency uses WQS to categorize types. 
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3. Gontributions by Dipak Gupta, 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, F. R. of Germany 
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Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, FR Germany 
3.1 Draft Outline for a Joint Paper on 
Fuel Cycle Safeguards 
3.2 Points to be Considered for the Joint Paper on 
Fuel Cycle Safeguards 
3.3 Telex to J. de Montmollin on 
Preliminary Analysis of Allocation of Inspection 
Efforts in the Reference Fuel Cycle 
3.4 Comments on 
- SQ (Significant Quantity) and WSQ (Weighted 
Significant Quantity) 
- IMD/yr; IMD/WSQ.yr 
- LE, LMUF in the Reference Fuel Cycle 
in Connection with Fuel Cycle Based Safeguards 
3.5 Comments on 
- Nature of the Information System in a Fuel 
Cycle Safeguards System 
- Reporting System of the State 
- Pattern Recognition Methods 
- Timeliness of Agency Actions 
- Different Types of Fuel Cycle 
in Connection with Fuel Cycle Safeguards 
Juli 31, 1984 
Jan. 22, 1985 
Jan. 24, 1985 
March 18, 1 985 
April 12, 1985 
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3. I Draft Outline for a Joint Paper on Fuel Cycle Safeguarcis 
Structure and Content and the Necessary Investigations to be Carried Out 
I. In this paper the following aspects of a fuel cycle of the safeguards 
approach could be investigated: 
I. I How this approach could improve the robustness of the safeguards 
data base by improving the verification capability of inspections 
at the facilities. 
1.2 How the credibility and timeliness of the same data base could be 
improved by using the in-situ inspector validated material balance 
data base for a State's Reporting System. 
1.3 As a secondary result the investigations could also indicate how 
such an approach could open up possibilities of improved allocation 
of safeguards resources. 
2. As a reference case, the fuel cycle studied by the SAGSI WG-2 or a 
modified version of it could be used for these investigations 
(3 LEU fabrication facilities, 20 light water reactors, I reprocessing 
I MOX and the associated storage facilities). 
3. Some calculations would be necessary for the points I. I and 1.3. 
These investigations could preferably be carried out at BNL. They would 
involve the following types of calculation: 
3. I Calculate the optimun allocation of inspection efforts with 
increasing number of inspection mandays per year for the 
following two levels, using the computer program for allocation 
of inspection efforts by Les Fishbone: 
i) Level two 
Full coverage as foreseen in WG-2 report for full allocation 
of inspection efforts. 
ii) Level one 
Inspection coverage without all redundant flow verification 
activities in the reference fuel cycle (e.g. input LEU fabrication 
facilities; input reactors; input MOX facility and any other 
activities found tobe redundant in the reference fuel cycle). 
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3.2 Calculate the corresponding MUF and LMUF for the two levels using 
the operater's data for the individual facilities as well as for 
the super MBA one (consisting of reprocessing and MOX facilities 
with the corresponding storage areas) and the super MBA two 
(consisting of the three LEU fabrication facilities) by esablishing 
a material balance on the basis of the operater's data. MUF and LMUF 
need not be established for reactors since the material balance in 
these facilities are based on digital accountancy. 
3.3 Investigations in connection with the possibilities of increasing the 
credibility of the data generated at the State's level by using in-
situ inspector validated data base in connection with the relevant 
safeguards activities. They could be carried out by Jim de Montmollin 
and myself. 
4. The proposed paper could be structured in the following way: 
4. I Introduction indicating the necessity and the expected results out 
of such investigations. 
4.2 Short description of the base case consisting of the facilities 
in the fuel cycle as well as the relevant safeguards activities. 
4.3 Parametrie investigations to assess the influence of the proposed 
changes in safeguards activities for the fuel cycle as a whole on 
the robustness and credibility of the safeguards relevant data base. 
4.4 Analysis of the results and concluding remarks. 
-~-
3.2 Points tobe Considered for the Joint Paper on Fuel Cycle Safeguards 
1. Possibilities for readjusting the relative importance of the different 
categories of nuclear materials after taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the fuel cycle as a whole and subsequent possibili-
ties of improving allocation of safeguards resources. 
2. Timeliness of inspector validated safeguards information and the re-
porting system of the State. 
3. Possibilities of improving the verification capability of inspectors at 
the facilities. 
4. Alternative concept for inspection goals, and safeguards relevant 
Statements. 

-75-
3.3 Preliminary Analysis of Allocation of Inspection Efforts in the 
Reference Fuel Cycle 
Re. 
Here 
(Telex from Dr. D. Gupta, EKS to Dr. J. de Montmollin, Sandia 
Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA, Jan. 24, 1985) 
Joint paper on fuel cycle safeguards in a State 
Preliminary analysis of allocation of inspection efforts in the 
reference fuel cycle 
Basis: Estimates of inspection activities in IMD/yr for reference fuel cycle 
with neutron collar measurement system in LEU fabrication facility 
as considered by SAGSI WG-2. 
Further assumptions for IMD/yr for other facilities: 
- Enrichment facility 100 
- Pu research facilities for fresh and irradiated fuel elements 100 
- Pu recycle reactor 54 
- Gonversion facility in Zone one 16 
Storage facility in Zone one 4 
- AFR in Zone two 10 
Total IMD/yr in 
- Zone one 
(I conversion, I storage, 
3 LEU fabrication facilities) 
- Zone two 
(20 LWR's plus 2 AFR storages) 
- Zone three 
(I reprocessing plus I MOX) 
- Outside Zone facilities 
(I Pu recycle LWR, I enrichment 
facility, Pu R&D facilities) 
- Total IMD/yr for the reference 
fuel cycle 
500 (18 % of total) 
300 ( II) 
1697 (61) 
274 ( 10) 
2771 (100) 
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Analysis: 
1. Out of a total of about 2770 IMD/yr in the reference fuel cycle 1970 
IMD/yr (70 %) are fixed (Zone 3 and outside Zone facilities). 
They are independent of zonal or MBA approach since material balances 
are to be closed araund each MBA. 
2. Out of the rest of 800 IMD/yr in Zones 1 and 2, only those IMD/yr which 
involve a coverage of material flows from conversion and storage to 
LEU fabrication in Zone 1 and from reactor to AFR in Zone 2 could be 
eliminated while changing from an MBA-based approach to a zone-based 
approach. 
Preliminary analysis indicate that they would be in the range of 
20 - 30 IMD/yr., i.e. less than 1 % of the total inspection efforts in 
the reference fuel cycle. 
3. Out of 500 IMD/yr in Zone 1 about 240 IMD/yr are required for fuel 
assembly flow verification at the LEU fabrication which includes 
160 IMD/yr for n-collar measurements. If n-collar measurements are to 
be transferred for those fuel elements which are sent to the reactors 
to the input KMP of the 20 reactors in the zonal approach, 104 IMD/yr 
will have to be transferred to the reactor input storage. This means 
increasing by 5 IMD/yr per reactor over the MBA approach. The rest of 
the 56 IMD/yr for n-collar measurements and 80 IMD/yr for the product 
end activities have still to be carried out at the LEU fabrication be-
cause fuel assernblies which are to be exported have to be n-collared in 
LEU fabrication. Sealing of all the fuel assernblies and other product 
end activities will also have tobe maintained there. In other words, 
there would be no net reduction of IMD/yr in the zonal approach against 
an MBA approach in the first two zones because of the shifting of n-
collar measurement activities from LEU fabrication to reactor inputs. 
4. The main improvement of the zonal approach as discussed in our joint 
paper will therefore, not lie in a reduction in the inspection efforts. 
It will be more in the following directions: 
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i) Enabling the Agency to have a more objective basis for obtaining 
safeguards relevant statements for the State as a whole. 
ii) Having a more effective and credible safeguards system which can 
achieve its goal with the technical means available t6 the Agency. 
However, this achievement of goals is obtained not by the zonal 
approach as such but by changing the nature of the goal, i.e. 
instead of trying for a statement for an absolute amount and the 
associated probability of detection, using a statement as you have 
indicated in your working paper no. 4 page 8. 
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3.4 Warking Paper I: Comments on SQ; WSQ; IMD/WSQ.yr; LMUF in Connection 
with Fuel Cycle Based Safeguards 
(sent in the form of a letter to J. de Montmollin and W.A.Higinbotham 
on March 18, 1985) 
Enclosed herewith is the first series of my calculations in connection with 
fuel cycle safeguards. The main results are incorporated in the 8 tables 
included with this working paper. The first 4 tables include all the 
relevant data for calculating the distribution of inspection efforts in the 
individual facilities in the reference fuel cycle. The next 4 tables, i.e. 
tables 5-8, include data on throughpu~ inventories and inspection effort 
distributions for the reference fuel cycle as a whole based on the data for 
individual facilities. The last 4 tables actually form the basis of the 
preliminary analysis which follows in this working paper. I would suggest 
that you take the necessary material out of this information and prepare 
the joint paper as you may deem suitable. 
As a reference fuel cycle I could use only such data which were available 
to me in connection with our work on WG-2 of SAGSI!)The data base for this 
reference fuel cycle is slightly different to that used by Willy for his 
analysis. However, this data base can be quite easily changed to the data 
base of Willy and the major conclusions or analysis are not influenced by 
the type of data base used. 
I would like to restriet my comments in this paper to the following three 
subjects: 
- Significant quantities (SQ) and weighted significant quantities (WSQ) 
in the three zones of the reference fuel cycle. 
- IMD/yr; IMD/WSQ.yr; diversion scenarios. 
- LE, LMUF in the fuel cycle. 
I) Report of WG-2 of SAGSI on Safeguards Approaches 
Sept. 1983 (unpublished) 
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I. Significant quantities, weighted significant quantities in the three 
zones 
Willy in his letter of February 25 had used IMD/SQ in the input or output 
stream in a facility to determine the adequacy of the distribution. As I 
had indicated in my telex of March II, 1985, this ratio has been considered 
by many to be somewhat inadequate and rather irrsensitive to the influence 
of the distribution of inspection efforts in different facilities with 
different categories of nuclear materials. The SQ alone does not reflect 
the inaccessibility of nuclear materials (e.g. Pu in irradiated fuels) or 
the influence of detection time on the inspection efforts (e.g. in LEU 
fabrication facilities or facilities handling separated Pu). As a result, 
the Pu contained Ln irradiated fuel elements is given the same weightage as 
the separated Pu Ln a reprocessing facility although in actual practice 
these two types of materials are treated differently by the Agency. Similar-
ly, the ratio IMD/SQ alone does not take into account those activities 
which are influenced by the detection time considered by the Agency for the 
different categories of nuclear materials. Besides, the ratio IMD/SQ in 
either the input or the output stream of a facility does not reflect 
adequately the activities which are carried out by the Agency in safeguard-
ing materials in inventories or in the other stream which is not considered 
for arriving at SQ for the throughput. As a consequence, the Agency had 
been using the WSQ as an indicator for assessing the relative importance of 
the different categories of materials which may be present in a fuel cycle 
for the last five years. This quantity for a given category of material is 
obtained by dividing the actual amount of material in a stream or Ln 
inventory by the amount required for one significant quantity for that 
category of material and by the approximate detection time expressed in 
weeks. This is explained and defined in GOV/1982, para 95. The WSQ in a 
facility expresses in a more adequate fashion the relative importance of 
the materials from the point of view of safeguards since it takes into 
account the inaccessibility of the nuclear material as well as the timeli-
ness factors. I have, therefore, used the ratio IMD/WSQ.yr for a large part 
of my analysis. You will, however, note that I have also included the 
corresponding SQ and the IMD/SQ in the relevant tables. Another point to 
note is that I have used as an indicator the sum of the input plus output 
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plus the inventories expressed in WSQs. This is because of the fact that 
the inspection activities are carried out for inventories and for both the 
input and the output streams in a facility. Particularly these streams are 
relevant from the point of view of fuel cycle safeguards. They form the 
interface between the two consecutive zones in a fuel cycle. 
You will note from Table 6 that the amountsof WSQ in zone I with 3 LEU 
fabrication facilities are 16, in zone 2 with 20 LWR 609, and in zone 3, in 
the reprocessing facility 254 and in the MOX facility 58. From this 
distribution one establishes the fact that the maximum amount of WSQs is 
present in zone 2 in the cores and wet storage facilities for spent fuels 
in the 20 reactors followed by a total of 437 in zone 3 and 16 in zone I. 
If one now compares the different inspection efforts spent in these zones 
one sees that zone I gets a coverage of a total of 480 IMD/yr, zone 2 with 
the 20 reactors a coverage of 280 IMD/yr, and zone 3 with reprocessing and 
MOX facilities a total coverage of 1697 IMD/yr. This distribution of 
inspection IMD/yr brings out among others three interesting points. 
Firstly, about 70 % of the total inspection efforts are concentrated in 
zone 3 although only 33 % of the WSQs are used in this zone. Zone 2 
contains 65% of the total WSQs in the fuel cycle but receives II % of the 
inspection coverage, and lastly, the zone I receives 20 % of the inspection 
coverage although only 2 % of the WSQs are handled in this zone. These 
observations permit one to conclude that the zone 2 with the reactors 
receives an unusually low coverage whereas in zone I with the LEU fabri-
cation facilities the materials receive unusually high coverage through 
inspections. This is indicated in a more clear fashion if one considers the 
ratios IMD/WSQ.yr or IMD/NMI. 
2. IMD/yr; I~ID/SQ.yr; IMD/WSQ.yr; IMD/NMI (WSQ and NMI explained in Table 6) 
I have extracted a few relevant numbers from Table 6 and reproduced below 
for ready reference: 
Zone 
2 
3 
U-Nat-fab* 
Repro (Zone 3a) 
MOX (Zone 3b) 
-~-
IMD/SQ.yr 
0.6 
0.04 
1.03 
0.05 
0.97 
1.44 
IMD/WSQ.yr IMD/NMI 
30 51 
0.46 0.46 
5.43 6.41 
2.6 4.8 
5.64 6.37 
4.53 4.62 
*The values for U-Nat fabrication are included 1n this table for comparison. 
It can be quite easily seen from this table that if one considers the ratio 
IMD/SQ.yr as the main indicator, the values for the bulk facilities 
excepting u~Nat-fab range between 0.6 to 1.5 approximately whereas the 
values for the reactors (zone 2) and the U-Nat-fab are in the region of 
0.05. If one, on the other hand, considers the ratios IMD/WSQ.yr or 
IMD/NMI as the indicator then one sees that for all the bulk facilities 
excepting LEU fabrication, these ratios range between 2.5 and 5.5. The 
corresponding values for the zone 2 are in the range of 0.5. In view of the 
considerations which I have made above in connection with the ratio 
IMD/WSQ.yr, I will concentrate my considerations on this ratio. One sees 
that all the bulk facilities (except the LEU fabrication) indicate 
approximately the same range of coverage of 2.5 to 5.5 IMD/SQ.yr. The 
reduction by a factor of about ten for the zone 2, i.e. the reactors, can 
be explained by the fact that the inspection coverage takes into account 
the particular characteristics of the reactors, i.e. the containment 
possibilities in the form of reactor cores and wet storages for the 
radioactive spent fuels, and the coverage with seals and other surveillance 
techniques. The possibility of utilization of the special characteristics 
of this part of the fuel cycle enables the Agency to reduce its inspection 
efforts in such facilities by approximately a factor of 10. 
I feel that the very high coverage in LEU fabrication facilities, which is 
higher by about a factor of 10 than in the other bulk handling facilities 
like U-Nat fabrication or the reprocessing and MOX, can be explained simply 
by the fact that inspection efforts in LEU facilities have been determined 
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up to now in isolation. As a result, the importance of the nuclear material 
handled in this zone has been considered to be the same as that in 
reprocessing or in MOX. Only then can one justify almost a full coverage 
for the input and output streams, which naturally increases the total 
inspection efforts in such facilities. One will be in a position to reduce 
the intensity of coverage of this material and bring it down to approxi-
mately the same level of coverage provided in the other zones with bulk 
handling facilities, that is in the range of 2-5 IMD/WSQ.yr, if the 
safeguards relevance of this material in this zone be considered in 
relation to the materials in reprocessing and MOX facilities. Another 
reason for providing a lower coverage for fabrication facilities handling 
LEU lies in the fact that LEU and U-Nat belang to the same category of 
materials. They both have the same values for significant quantities, i.e. 
75 kg of U-235 contained and the same detection time of one year. 
Such considerations in connection with the fuel cycle safeguards as a whole 
could therefore, enable the Agency to relativate the safeguards importance 
of the materials of different categories and reassess the possibility of 
distribution of efforts in the different zones of the fuel cycle. The 
natural categorization of nuclear materials (U-Nat, LEU and Pu on the one 
hand and Pu in irradiated fuels on the other) in the fuel cycle as well as 
the utilization of the safeguards relevant characteristics of the facili-
ties when considered in the frame of the fuel cycle as a whole leads one to 
the fact that the specific inspection efforts, expressed as IMD/WSQ.yr, 
spent on nuclear materials handled in such a fuel cycle can broadly be 
divided into two categories. One for all types of nuclear materials in bulk 
handling facilities handlingnatural Uranium, LEUs, and Pu with a coverage 
of about 2-5 IMD/WSQ.yr, and the other, for all materials used, stored or 
handled in LWR type reactors. In such reactors because of the prevailing 
containment possibilities, the inspection mandays can be reduced by a 
factor of ten against those for the bulk handling facilities and kept in 
the range of 0.5 IMD/WSQ.yr. 
The very high coverage in the LEU fabrication facilities can also be 
explained by the fact that the diversion possibilities considered for 
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nuclear materials in these facilities, have been given the same weightage 
as those in reprocessing and MOX facilities. Therefore, these materials in 
the input as well as in the output, are covered through very intensive 
inspection activities. If one considers diversion possibilities for the 
fuel cycle as a whole, one is in a position to place different weightage 
for the same diversion possibilities in the different parts of the fuel 
cycle. This fact is implicitly implied in Art. 6, INFC 153. According to my 
opinion, the fabricated fresh fuel elements pose the lowest diversion risk 
in a fuel cycle of this type. The material is extremely costly (appxly. 
DM I Mio/FE) and the material contained in the fuel rods is relatively more 
inaccessible than those for example in the UF6 cylinders or in the 
birdcages containing Pu. The uranium oxide pellets inside the fuel rods are 
sintered at about I I00°C. It will be difficult to recover uranium from such 
sintered material without excessive chemical processing. The oxide has to 
be reconverted into uranium hexafluoride for higher enrichment if an 
enrichment path is considered; or the fresh fuel elements after diversion, 
have to be irradiated in a clandestine reactor and then reprocessed in a 
clandestine facility if the Pu path is considered. Both of these paths are 
much more complicated than those involving Pu or UF6 which may be readily 
available in other parts of the same fuel cycle. Following this trend of 
thought I feel that the weightage factors for the diversion possibilities 
should have the lowest value (in a fuel cycle of the sort we are consider-
ing) for the fresh fuel elements followed by the UF6 and other bulk 
materials in the LEU or U-Nat zones, then the irradiated fuel elements 
followed by the fresh fuel elements containing MOX fuels, and finally 
followed by separated and accessible Pu contained in birdcages or in other 
types of containers. Also, the importance of the diversion possibilities 
through borrowing or shuffling in such a fuel cycle reduces considerably 
because of the fact that very seldom similar types of materials are handled 
in different facilities in the same zone (as Willy has already pointed out) 
and because of the fact that these nuclear materials can be given different 
types of coverage at the different parts of the fuel cycle as we have 
considered in the zone approach. The question of shuffling Ln the zone 
arises only during the physical inventory taking which happens only once in 
a year. Since the fuel elements may be either of the BWR or of the PWR type 
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the shuffling may not be that easy and the possibilites of shuffling can 
quite simply be eliminated by having very simple type of seals during the 
physical inventory taking in this zone. In zone 2 also, the problern of 
shuffling poses according to my opinion, a very minor problem, eventhough 
the reactors are not inventorized simultaneously in our concept. The 
facts that the fuel elements can be properly sealed or that the fuel 
elements are in active form or that the transport of such fuel elements is 
always associated with a considerable amount of multi-organizational activities 
(involving independent transport organizations, licensing authorities, 
insurance companies, plant operators, electrical companies etc.) such 
reshufflings cannot be carried out secretly. Therefore, for zone 2, the 
threat of reshuffling, does not exist under practica.l conditions. This fact 
has also been recognized by the Agency in designing its facility based 
approach. In zone 3, the problern of shuffling does not arise at all because 
of the very heavy coverage through continuous inspections in reprocessing 
and bi-weekly to monthly inspection in the MOX facilities. The fuel cycle 
safeguards provide therefore, a more realistic rationale for allocating 
different weightage for different categories of material and for the 
diversion possi~ilities in different parts of the fuel cycle. 
If one considers these two factors i.e. the relative importance which can 
be allocated to the different categories of nuclear materials handled in a 
fuel cycle and the weightage which can be given to the different diversion 
possibilities, one comes to the conclusion that with about 30 IMD/WSQ.yr 
the specific coverage for LEU is very high and that there is a strong 
justification for investigating the possibilities of reducing the 
inspection coverage in the LEU part of the fuel cycle. On the other hand, 
the distribution of inspection activities in the other two zones appears to 
be quite reasonable. 
3. IMDs at the interface of the reference fuel cycle 
In Table 7, I have indicated the annual throughputs of nuclear materials 
under safeguards and the inspection efforts spent on them at the interface 
of the three zones of the reference fuel cycle. I have included some data 
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on the LWR system with recycled Pu also, which Willy had presented in his 
data base. It can be seen that the maJor part of the inspection activities 
is concentrated at the interface of each of the zones. Of special interest 
are the activities at the input of zone I, that is for the LEU fabrication 
facilities, then the activities at the output of this zone and the input 
of zone 2 with reactors, and thirdly the activities at the output of 
reprocessing and the input of the MOX facilities. You will note that most 
of the activities in zone I at the input and output, are required to 
establish independently and with virtually full coverage, the amounts of 
nuclear materials coming into the or out of the zone. If we accept the 
argumentations provided above on the relative importance of the nuclear 
materials and the corresponding diversion strategies, then there appears 
to be sufficient room for reassessing the inspection activities for these 
two streams in the zone. For example, if the measurement data base are 
accepted from the shipper's data by the Agency, more than half of the 
inspection activities can be reduced at the input. If the probability of 
detection for the fresh fuel subassemblies were to be reduced from 95 % to 
75 % or the frequency of verification activities could be expanded from 
I month to 2 months period or the detection amount for significant quanti-
ties could be increased by a factor of two, the amount of inspection 
efforts for the output stream would also be reduced by more than half. The 
very high coverage at the input of a reprocessing facility at interface 
reactor reprocessing is fully justifiable because at this point, the fuel 
elements lose their identity and a direct measurement of Pu content in 
these fuel elements takes place. On the other hand, the output of the 
reprocessing and the input of the MOX for Pu in birdcages could be a point 
for further considerations. In most of the modern reprocessing and MOX 
facilities which are being designed, planned or constructed, the MOX fuel 
fabrication forms an integral part of the reprocessing facility. The Pu and 
U at the reprocessing end are stored mainly in the form of nitrates to 
simplify the separation of americium which builds up with time. They are 
then mixed in certain proportians 1n liquid form and precipitated simul-
taneously to form the mixed oxide which then forms the input to the process 
area of the MOX facility. In such a combined process, the particular 
strategic point of Pu nitrate storage at the interface between reprocessing 
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and MOX, may be considered to be a single key-measurement point where some 
of the duplicating activities, as foreseen in the present reference case, 
can be eliminated. Another point of interest is the fact that a major part 
of all the interface inspection activities is carried out for descrete 
items. At the input and output of each of the zones we have considered, we 
do not have any material in bulk form. All the material is contained either 
Ln UF6-cylinders or finished fuels are birdcages and other types of 
Containers. This fact points to a possibility of pattern recognition by 
repetative measurements on these items. Excepting in zone 2, the activities 
on these interface materials are carried out mostly in a cyclic fashion 
repeating the same type of activities on a monthly basis. In zone 2 this 
happens on a three-monthly basis. This type of repetative activities on 
same or similar type of containers all through the balancing period, can be 
used as a basis for pattern recognition. As you know, a pattern recognition 
method has been used in the NRTA system in a reprocessing plant. This is 
only an idea but which I think could be developed to the advantage of 
safeguards. 
If one considers the ratio IMD/WSQ.yr given in Table 7 one finds that there 
is a jump from 19 to 50 when one goes from the input to the output stream 
of zone I and a jump of 0.8 to 20 when one transfersmaterial from zone 2 
output to zone 3 input. In the first case it is because of the intensive 
use of NDA at the output in the second case it is the coverage of nuclear 
material at the reprocessing input through the actual presence of inspec-
tors. It is interesting to note in this connection that a major part of 
inspection activities at this point as well as at the output of this zone 
(zone 3), is concerned with activities which do not involve measurements or 
Containment/ surveillance measures but sheer physical observation of the 
movement of materials through inspectors. This is an important point in 
itself because it indirectly brings out one fact into focus involving the 
continuity of knowledge. As opposed to seals or camera surveillance, 
observation by inspectors enables the Agency to retain and maintain in an 
active fashion,the continuity of knowledge for the time for which the 
inspectors observe the movements. The inspectors decide on a continuous 
basis through such observations about the presence or absence of materials 
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at these particular points. One could also say that the inspectors know 
through experience the normal flow and inventory patterns of nuclear 
rnaterials at these points. Through observations they could recognize a 
departure frorn or the rnaintenance of the normal pattern. This becornes of 
irnportance when we corne to the consideration of the LEs and LMUFs in the 
different zones. 
4. LE and LMUF values for the different zones in the reference fuel cycle 
I have included sorne very rough estirnates of the variances and LMUF values 
for the different strearns, inventories and the zones as a whole in Table 8. 
It is to be noted that in zone I as in the case of zone 3 the largest 
fraction of the LMUF values is obtained frorn the throughput rneasurernents. 
In zone I the uncertainties in the throughput rneasurernents are of the sarne 
order of rnagnitude as the arnount of bulk rnaterials in the process area of 
that zone. The variance analysis in this zone also indicates that there 
will be a roorn for irnprovernents in the inventory rnanagernent in this zone. 
For exarnple, the extrernely large inventories of rods and finished fuel 
assernblies could probably be reduced under normal operating conditions. The 
total uncertainty of the MUF for the annual material balance in the zone 
cornes to approxirnately two tons of uraniurn. This is slightly less than I 
significant quantity. Considering the fact that in this zone with tbe 3 LEU 
fabrication facilities approxirnately 1800 tons of rnaterials are rneasured 
yearly, the uncertainty caused by the balance is in the order of 0.1 % of 
the total arnount rneasured (or approxirnately 0.2% if one considers only the 
input and the inventories). In other words, one sees through this variance 
analysis that the book inventory values which are generated on a rnonthly or 
a bi-rnonthly basis provide a fairly accurate indication of the flow and 
physical inventories of rnaterials in this zone. One also sees that the 
total arnount of material in this zone is covered by the material balance 
rneasurernents with an uncertainty of approxirnately 0.1 % (2 sigrna value 
corresponding to 95% confidence). This fact, coupled with the absolute 
value of the uncertainty of 2 tons of U (which is less 1 significant 
quantity) in this zone, could easily be used as a basis for rnaking 
safeguards relevant staternent on the basis of the percentage of the total 
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amount of material covered instead of on the basis of absolute numbers. 
Besides, even if the absolute numbers were to be larger than I significant 
quantity the importance of this uncertainty can be regarded to be much 
lower than the corresponding uncertainty in the zone 3 of the fuel cycle. 
In zone 2 involving only reactors we do not have any MUF since we assume 
digital accountancy and coverage of flow and inventories in this zone 
through activities which can detect in each reactor, one significant 
quantity of material. This capability is independent of the number of 
reactors or the size of reactors. Therefore, for the fuel cycle safeguards 
concept zone 2 provides the basis for a safeguards relevant statement both 
for a relative and an absolute amount with regard to the presence of 
nuclear materials. 
In zone 3, we have a very interesting situation. About 90% of the total 
LMUF of 24.6 kg Pu in this zone stem from the input of the reprocessing 
facility, Also out of this total, 24.1 kg Pu come from the reprocessing 
facility alone, and 4.53 kg Pu from the MOX facility. These variances have 
been calculated on the basis of the warst situation, i.e when all the 
uncertainties are accumulated and one balance is carried out per year per 
facility. If we consider the possibilities of using NRTA measures in these 
two facilities, the LMUF values for the reprocessing facility as well as 
for the zone as a whole are expected to be reduced by a factor of 5 to 10. 
Irrespective of the absolute numbers which one can get on the basis of the 
variance analysis the most important point is the fact that the major 
source of the variance is the measurement at the input of the reprocessing 
facility. And particularly at this key-measurement point and at the output 
of the process area the Agency has concentrated its efforts on different 
safeguards activities. At these points the Agency tries to ensure through 
a combination of observation and measurement activities that the materials 
follow a preset pattern in the facility and leave also in a preset pattern 
the facility. After having detailed discussions with the Agency's inspectors 
and observing their activities at our reprocessing facility I come to the 
conclusion that the inspectors in this particular zone, zone 3, utilize two 
distinct types of capabilities in generating the safeguards relevant data 
base and in enabling the Agency for making a safeguards relevant statement. 
-90-
The first capability is in the actual measurement, sampling and evaluation 
of the measured data. The second type of capability is to recognize the 
underlying pattern of flows and inventories in the facilities in this zone 
which may be considered to be normal and the capability of recognizing a 
departure from the normal pattern ~n case it so happens. The departure is 
considered as an anomaly which is then followed up by inspectors and resolved. 
Only a combination of these two capabilities can enable the Agency to arrive 
at the required statement. In other words, even if the measurement uncertain-
ty in a facility happens to be such that the LMUF exceeds a certain amount of 
value, the inspectors can still make a statement with regard to the normal 
flow and inventory pattern in a facility and come to the conclusion that 
all the materials have been accounted for. This has been the practice of 
the Agency in the past. This fact leads me to the conclusion that in this 
zone also, a statement with regard to the percentage of the total amount of 
material covered can be made. The variance analysis shows that for the 
total amount of materials covered approximately 0.8 % uncertainty exists 
(LMUF) which can be reduced to approximately 0.2-0.3% by the NRTA method. 
In other words, the entire amount of material in this zone can be covered 
with the uncertainty of approximately 0.3 % (at the level of 95 % 
confidence) if NRTA method is used. 
The preliminary analysis of the variances in the different zones in the 
fuel cycle safeguards indicate, therefore, that the safeguards relevant 
statement in the sense which you had formulated in your last paper can be 
made without any difficulty. Summarizing my thoughts in this paper, I have 
first tried to show that the fuel cycle safeguards provides a rationale for 
reassessing the relative importance of the nuclear material and the 
corresponding diversion possibilities. The specific inspection activities 
IMD/WSQ.yr could provide a basis for such reassessment. The facility based 
approach allocates undue importance to LEU materials. The maximum uncer-
tainty in knowledge through measurement errors comes from the input of a 
reprocessing facility. The Agency inspectors could overcome the effect of 
this uncertainty by recognizing normal flow and inventory patterns in this 
zone as well as in the fuel cycle as a whole. A safeguards relevant 
statement in the line you have suggested can be made. 
I will end the present working paper at this point and provide some 
further information in the next. 
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Table 1: Total Yearly Inspection Activities (IMD/yr) at an LWR* +) 
*A=Fresh Fuel (FF) KMP; B=Core (CF) KMP; C=spent fuel (SF) KMP 
ABC 
Interim 
(3/yr) 
Inspections 
(MH) 
PIV (1/yr) 
Inspections 
(MH) 
Concealments expected 
to be covered 
1------+------+-----------·-
I. Discussion 
2. Identify outst. Items 
3. Campare S/R - ICRs 
4. Comp. Ace. Records/Reports 
5. Update Agency BI 
6. Check int. cons. Records 
7. Determine Inv. Listing 
8. Examine power Records 
9. Comp. Crane + Transfer 
Records 
10. Discussion 
II. Identify outst. Items 
A. I. FF item count 
2. FF identification 
3. FF NDA attributes 
4. FF NDA variables 
B. I. CF item count 
2. CF identification 
3. CF NDA attributes 
4. CF NDA variables 
5. CF guide tube exam. 
C. I. SF item count 
2. SF idenfification 
3. SF NDA attributes 
4. SF NDA variables 
5. SF guide tube exam. 
BC.I. Service cameras/TV 
2. Review film 
3. Attach seals to cameras 
4. Attach seals to m. shield 
5. Attach seals to ship. casks 
6. Return removed seals to HQ 
Totals (MH) 
l:ABC= 
7.25 
l:BC= 
4.5 
II. 75 
o. 75 
o. 75 
0. 75 
o. 75 
o. 75 
o. 75 
0.50 
o. 75 
o. 75 
o. 75 
2.25 
o. 75 
1.50 
l:ABC= 
15.0 
l:A= 
7 .o 
l:B= 
6.0 
l:C= 
13.5 
l:BC= 
4.5 
46.0 
Int. IMD/yr = 3 x 11.75 • 7 5.0 
PIV IMD/yr = 46 • 7 6.6 
plus one inspection (IMD) 
to install core seal 
Total IMD/yr 13 
Training I 
Total IMD/yr 14 
o. 75 
o. 75 
2.00 
1.50 
3.50 
3.00 
0.50 
1.50 
o. 75 
o. 75 
1.50 
I. 50 
4.00 
1.50 
3.00 
1.50 
2.50 
3.00 
8.00 
2.25 
o. 75 
1.50 
Falsification of: 
- S/R differences 
- Record/Report data 
- Records 
Falsification of Records 
(No. of items; id. no's; 
Concn.; Amount) 
As in A and 
misuse of neutrons 
As in A and 
radioactivity level 
- unreported removal 
or replacement of 
materials 
- tampering with 
C/S systems 
+) Data presented in Tables I-4B were extracted from the SAGSI WG-2 report 
of Sept. (1983). 
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Table 2: Inspection Activities at a LEU Fuel Fabrication Facility 
(with Neutron Collar) 
I. Flow Verification (12/yr 
including at PIV) 
A. UFG receipts (18/rnonth) 
1. Count cylinders + verify id. no's 
2. Attribute test (NDA + gross wt.) 
3. Variable test (UF6-sarnple+net wt.) 
4. Calibrate scales 
B. Production of rods + assernblies 
(60/rnonth) 
I. Count assernblies + verify id. no's 
2. n-collar rneasurernents 
3. Establish calibration standards 
4. Seal assernblies 
5. Variable test for rods 
C. Auditing Activities 
1. Cornpare acctg. records with 
supporting docurnents 
2. Updat.e BI 
3, Exarnine op. records + 
Collect op. data 
D. C/S 
I. Sealfunseal NDA standards 
2. Seal sarnples 
E. Quality Control 
I. Exarnine op. rneasurernent results 
F. Shiprnent of Waste 
1. Count and tagcheck 
2. NDA 
G. General 
1. Meetings 
2. Investigations 
3. Sarnpling plan calculation 
4. Packaging of sarnples 
No. iterns/ 
Inspection 
18 
18 
18 
60 
60 
60 
13500 
Sarnple 
Size 
all 
15 
2 
all 
22 
all 
27 
MH/ 
Activity 
MH/ 
Inspection 
0.5 
40 rnin 
2 
1.5 
I 
5 rnin 
5 rnin/sarnple 
+ 4 MH 
0.5 
10 
4 
0.5 
~ 15 
1.5 
22 
3 
5 
6 
3 
I 
2 
~ 37.5 
~ 6 
0.5 
~ 0.5 
0.5 
~ 0.5 
0.5 
2 
~ 2.5 
0.5 
0.5 
~ 2 
Table 2 (contd) 
II. PIV Inspection (1/yr)* 
A. Audit activities 
B. Inventory changes 
C. Verification of NM 
I. UF6 
2. uo2 powder 
3. uo2 pellets 
4. Pins 
5. Assernblies 
6. Wastes 
7. Scrap 
8. Archives, samples etc. 
D. Sealing 
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I. Sealing/unsealing standards 
2. Mise. sealing/unsealing 
E. Calibration/Quality Control 
I. Scales 
2. Examine operator's evaluation 
of measurement results 
F. General activities 
I. Meetings 
2. Sampling plan calculation 
3. Packaging of samples 
MH 
8 
(included under I) 
4 
4 
8 
5 
2.5 
2.5 
1 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
6 
I 
E 27 
E 4 
E 7 
E 10 
~ Activities listed above are in addition to those foreseen for 
flow verification 
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Table 2A: Total Yearly Inspection Activities (IMD/yr) at a 
LEU Fuel Fabrication Facility with Neutron-Collar 
Inspection Activities Flow, I (I2/yr) PIV II (I/yr) 
(See Table 2 for details) MH MH 
I.A.I 0.5 
2 IO.O 
3 E IA= 4.0 E IIEI= 
4 (II.E.I) I5 0.5 4.0 4.0 
I.B. I 1.5 
2 22.0 
3 3.0 
4 E IB= 5.0 
5 37.5 6.0 
I.C. I 3.0 
2 1.0 
3 L: IC= 2.0 E IIA= 
4 (II.A) 6.0 - 8.0 8.0 
I.D.I (II.D.I) 0.5 2.0 
2 E ID= - E IIDI, 2 -
3 (I I. D. 2) 0.5 - 4.0 2.0 
E IE= E IIE2= 
I.E. I (II.E.2) 0.5 0.5 3.0 3.0 
I.F. I (II.C.6) E IF= 0.5 E IIC6= 0.5 
2 (II.C.6) 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 
I.G.I (II.F.I) 1.0 3.0 
2 - -
3 (II.F.2) 0.5 6.0 
4 (II.F.3) E IG= 0.5 E IIF= 1.0 
5 (II.F.4) 2.0 - IO ~ 
II.C. I -
2 4.0 
3 4.0 
4 8.0 
5 5.0 
6 (incl. above) -
7 E IIC= 2.5 
8 24.5 1.0 
Totals 64 56 
Flow IMD = 64 X I2 .. 6 = I28 
PIV IMD = 56 .. 6 9 
Flow + PIV IMD/yr I37 
Training IMD/yr 23 
Total IMD/yr I60 
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Table 2B: Concealment Methods expected to be covered by 
Inspection Activities in a LEU-Fabrication Plant 
Location 
2. Process Area 
Diversion Possibility 
- Removal of UF 6-Cylinders 
- Removal of enriched U. 
in bulk form 
- Removal of scrap 
3. Product Storage: - Removal of U. from rods 
Rads and Fuel and FA's 
Assernblies (FA) 
Concealment Methods 
1.1 Falsification of S/R data 
1.2 Falsification of Report/Record 
1.3 Falsification of Measurement 
and Calibration systems 
1.4 Borrowing from other Locations 
2.1 Falsification of Record/Report 
2.2 Falsification of Measurement 
and Calibration systems 
2.3 Wrang Measurement Uncertainty 
data in DI 
2,4 Diversion into MUF 
2.5 Substitution with inert material; 
riaturai or depleted U. 
2.6 Borrowing from other Locations 
3.1 Falsification of Reports/Records 
3.2 Changing serial numbers and 
presenting for reinspection 
3.3 Substitution with inert, natural 
or depleted U. 
3.4 Borrowing from other Locations 
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Table 3: Inspection Activities at a 240 t HM/yr Reprocessing Facility 
I. Flow measurement 
A. Spent fuel receipt and transfer 
I. Observe cask opening/closing 
and count assernblies 
2. Check assembly identification numbers 
3. Assembly NDA 
4. Surveillance of spent fuel storage 
5. Verify transfer and start of chopping 
6. Surveillance of transfer raute 
B. Accountability tank 
I. Observe calibration 
2. Measure solution volume prior to feed 
3. Measure solution volume after feed 
4. Observe sample taking 
including dilution 
5. Observe sample packaging 
6. Analysis of sample (HQ) 
7. Verify hulls 
C. Uranium product 
I. Observe calibration of U product scale 
2. Weigh container 
~. Sample container 
4. Sample packaging and shipment 
5. InstaU seal 
D. Pu(N03)4 output 
I. Tank calibration 
2. Tank measurement before and after 
3. Tank sampling 
4. Sample packaging and shipment 
5. Sample analysis (HQ) 
E. Pu02 powder output 
I. NDA attribute measurement 
2. NDA variables measurement 
3. Sample and weigh for 
variables measurement 
4. Seal birdcage 
5. Calibrate scale 
6. Calibrate NDA (incl. E.l,2) 
7. Package and ship samples 
8. Sample analysis (HQ) 
F. Waste 
I. Medium active waste 
2. Low acitve waste 
No/yr MH/ Activity 
72 2 
72 4 
72 4 
4 2 
576 I 
4 2 
2 16 
288 0.5 
288 0.5 
288 3 
36 4 
- -
144 2 
4 0.5 
87 0.5 
87 0.5 
10 2 
600 5 min 
/ 
2 8 
300 I 
300 3 
40 4 
- -
239 0.5 
281 I 
98 + 14 3' 4 
1200 5 min 
4 0.5 
- -
20 4 
- -
~ 1100 -
~1ooo -
MH/yr 
144 
288 
144 
8 
576 
8 
l.A 1168 
32 
144 
144 
864 
144 
-
288 
L:B 1616 
2 
43 
44 
20 
50 
L:C 159 
16 
300 
900 
160 
-
L:D 1376 
120 
281 
350 
100 
2 
-
80 
-
L:E 933 
32 
16 
L:F 48 
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Table 3 (contd): Inspection Acitvities at a 240 t HM/yr Reprocessing Facility 
II. Physical inventory taking (2/yr) 
G. Spent fuel pond 
I. Item count 
2. Identification number check 
3. Cerenkov glow 
H. uo 3 
I. Item count 
2. Check seals and identification numbers 
3~ Replace seals (45/PIV) 
4. NDA remeasurement (42/PIV) 
I. Pu02 
I. Item count 
2. Check seals and identification numbers 
3. Replace seals and examine contents (242) 
4. NDA remeasurement (351) 
J. Miscellaneous 
I. Verify miscelllaneaous material 
2. Verify completeness of inventory 
K. Additional partial physical inventories (NRTA) 
I. Item count PuOz cans 
2. Check seals on Pu02 cans 
3. Replace seals on Pu02 cans (34) 
4. Reverify contents of PuOz cans with NDA 
5. Verification of in-process material at 
other strategic points 
6. Other verification activities 
III. Other inspection activities 
I. Health physics and access 
2. Camparisan of records and reports 
3. Camparisan of accounting records with 
supplementary documents 
4. Examination of operating records 
5. Updating of book inventory 
6. Other auditing activities 
7. Other tank calibrations (4) 
8. Other weighing system calibration (4) 
9. Quality control of chemical measurement 
10. Other calibrations and quality control 
II. Meeting with operating staff for 
discussions, clarifications, etc. 
No/yr 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
22 
-
22 
22 
22 
44 
-
12 
12 
250 
12 
-
I 
4 
2 
-
50 
MH/ MH/yr Activity 
8 16 
8 16 
32 64 
EG 96 
16 32 
- incl. in H.l 
5 min 8 
0.25 21 
EH 61 
16 32 
- incl. in I. I 
5 min 47 
20 min 234 
EI 313 
32 64 
32 64 
EJ 128 
16 352 
- in"cl. in K.l 
5 66 
20 min 59 
8 176 
2 88 
EK 741 
- -
2 24 
6 72 
I 250 
2 24 
80 80 
8 32 
2 32 
8 16 
- 100 
2 100 
EIII 730 
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Table 3A: Total Yearly Inspection Activities (IMD/yr) at a 240 t HM/yr 
Reprocessing Facility 
Inspection Flow NRTA PIV Activities MH/yr MH/yr 2/yr for details see Table 3 MH/yr 
A. I (G. I) 144 16 
2 (G.2) 288 16 
3 (G.3) 144 L:G 64 
4 8 
5 576 96 
6 L:A 8 
1168 
B. I 32 
2 144 
3 144 
4 864 
5 144 
6 -
7 L:B 288 
1616 
c. I 2 
2 43 
3 44 
4 20 
5 L:C 50 
159 
D. I 16 
2 300 
3 900 
4 160 
5 m -
1376 
E. I 120 
2 281 
3 350 
4 100 
5 2 
6 -
7 80 
.ß L:E -
933 
F. I 32 
2 L:F 16 
48 
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Table 3A (contd): Total Yearly Inspection Activities (IMD/yr) 
at a 240 t HM/yr Reprocessing Facility 
Inspection Flow NRTA .PIV Activities MH/yr MH/yr 2/yr for details see Table 3 MH/yr 
(H. I) 
(H.2) 
(H.3) ~H 
(H. 4) 61 
(K. I) (I. I) 352 
(K.2) (I. 2) ~ 
(K. 3) (I. 3) 66 LI 
32 
-
8 
21 
32 
-
47 
(K. 4) (I. 4) 59 313 234 
J. I 
2 
(K. 5) 
(K.6) 
III. I 
2* 
3* 
4* 
5* 
6* 
(III. 7) 
(III. 8) 
9 
10* EIII 
II* ' 666 
Total Manhours (MH) 5966 
IMD = mhrs/6 
Training = 
Total 
~K 
741 
-
24 
72 
250 
24 
80 
L:III NRTA 
64 
16 
Flow 100 
100 
805 
(5966 + 805 + 598)/6 
1228 IMD/yr 
205 IMD/yr 
1433 IMD/yr 
~J 64 
128 64 
176 
88 
32 
32 
598 
* These activities are associated with the measurements of flows and 
inventories for verifying the 6-months material balances 
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Table 3B: Concealment Methods expected to be covered 
by Inspection Activities in a Reprocessing Facility 
Location Diversion Possibility 
I. Spent Fuel Spent Fuel: 
(SF) Storage - Diversion 
- Removal during transfer to process 
-·unrecorded transfer to process 
2. Dissolver - Chopped pieces removed 
- U + Pu not fully dissolved 
3. Feed: - Ac.-Tank by-passed from dissolver 
Ac.-Tank - unrecorded transfer to process 
4. Process Area - Solution removal through 
non process pipewerk 
- Solution removal by by-passing 
product Ac.-Tank 
5. Pu02 Storage - Removal of Pu from sealed cans 
- Removal of sealed cans 
Concealment Methods to be covered 
by Inspection Activities 
I .I Substitution and Borrowing 
1.2 Falsification of Records/ 
Reports 
I ,3 Tampering with surveillance 
systems 
2.1 Diversion into MUF 
2.2 Falsification of Hulls/ . 
Ac. Tank measurements 
2.3 Falsification of Records 
3. I Falsification of op; records 
3.2 Wrong measurement 
uncertainties in DI. 
3.3 Falsification of measurement 
and calibration systems 
3.4 Falsification U/Pu data in 
Recycle Acid 
4.1 Falsification of op. records 
(for Wastes and Processing 
Inventories) 
4.2 Wrong measurement 
uncertainties in DI 
4.3 Falsification of measurement 
and calibration systems 
4.4 Falsification U/Pu data in 
Recycle Acid 
4.5 Diversion into MUF 
5.1 Falsification of Records/ 
Reports 
5.2 Falsification of measurement 
and calibration systems 
5.3 Substitution by inert or 
active materials 
5.4 Borrowing 
5.5 Tampering + counterfeitung 
of seals 
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Table 4: Inspection Activities at a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
(MBA 1: Pu02-storage; MBA 2: Process; MBA 3: Rod+ Assembly storage) 
I. PIV (2/yr) Total Items Sample MH/ MH/ 
Inspection Activity at PIV Size Activity PIV 
A. MBA I 
I. Item count Pu02-cans, check 110 all 2 2 
seals + id. numbers 
2. Replace seals + examine contents 100 24 5 min 2 
3. Remeasure sealed cans with NDA 100 29 20 min 10 
4. Quick NDA: unsealed cans 10 3 20 min I 
5. Lang NDA: unsealed cans 10 2 I 2 
6: Seal unsealed cans 10 10 5 min I 
7. Weigh sample + analyse 10 I 2 2 ETA = 20 
unsealed cans 
B. MBA 2 
1. Weigh Pu02 lot 1 I 1 1 
2. Sample Pu02 lot I I 1 I 
3. Weigh MOX lot 1 1 I I 
4. Sample MOX lot I 1 I I 
5. Count pellet stacks 108 all 0.5 0.5 
6. Weigh pellet stacks 108 4 15 min I 
7. NDA pellet stacks 108 4 I 4 
8. Count rods 110 all 0.5 0.5 
9. NDA rods 110 2 I 2 
10. Count waste drums 60 all o.s 0.5 
II. NDA waste drums 60 1 o.s 0.5 
12. Count scrap drums 3 all - -
13. NDA scrap drums 3 I 0.5 0.5 ErB = 13.5 
c. MBA 3 
I. I. c. rods in partial assernblies so all 0.5 0.5 
2. NDA partial assembly I I I I 
3. Quick NDA unsealed assembly 5 3 0.5 1.5 
4. Lang NDA unsealed assembly 5 I I I 
5. Seal unsealed assembly 5 5 5 min 0.5 
6. I. c. sealed assembly + check 40 all 1 I 
id. no's + seals 
7. Replace seals 40 1 I 5 min I 
8. Remeasure sealed assembly, 40 20 o.s 10 
Quick NDA nc = 16.5 
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Table 4 (contd): Inspection Activities at a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
I. PIV (contd) No. of items Sample MH/ MH/ 
Inspection Activity per 2 weeks Size Activity Inspection 
D. General 
I. Set up, calibrate, 18 
dismantle NDA equipmt. 
2. Prepare, package + ship 4 
samples 
3. Update BI + compare PIL I 
4. Campare records/reports 4 
5. Meetings with operators 6 
6. Calibration + quality 8 
control measurements 
7. Exam. operating records 2 nn = 43 
I I. Flow Verification: 
every 2 weeks 
(18 times per year) 
A. I. Receipt Pu02 cans 10 
i. I.C. + id. check all 0.5 0.5 
ii. Quick NDA 2 20 min I 
iii. Long NDA 2 I 2 
iv. Weigh/Sample I 2 2 
v. Seal all 5 min I 
A. 2. Sample MOX blend or I I I 
pellet 
A. 3. Scrap recovery/recycle 3/4 2/4 0.5 0.25 
A. 4. Fuel rod to assembly area 415 8 20 min 3 
A. 5. FA production: 
i. NDA Quick 5 3 0.5 1.5 
ii. NDA Long 5 0.5 I 0.5 
iii. Apply seal 5 5 5 min 0.5 
A. 6. FA shipment (I O/yr) all all 1.5/2 o. 75 
A. 7. Waste shipment all all 0.5/5 0.1 nrA = 14.10 
B. General 
B. I. Set up, calibrate, 18 
dismantle NDA equipmt. 
B. 2. Prepare, package + ship 4 
s'amples 
B. 3. Campare records/reports 2 
B. 4. Meeting with operators I 
B. 5. Exam. accounting and I 
operating records 
B. 6. Calibration + QC of I 
measurements L:IIB = 27 
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Table 4 (contd): Inspection Activities at a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
III. Verification at Str. Pts. 
(24/yr) 
No. of iterns Sarnple MH/ MH/ 
Inspection Activity per 2 weeks Size Activity Inspection 
I. IC Pu02 cans + check 100 all '2 2 
seals 
2. Replace seals 100 5 5 rnin 0.5 
3. Reverify content via NDA 100 2 20 rnin I 
4. Verification of in-procesE - - - 4 
Pu02 inventory (50 kg) 
5. IC FA, check seals + 40 all I I 
id. no's 
6. Replace seals 40 4 5 rnin 0.5 
7. Reverify FA via NDA Q 40 2 0.5 I 
8. Others - - - 8 nn = 18 
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Table 4 A: Total Yearly Inspection Activities (IMD/yr) at a 
MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
Inspection Activity Flow (II) Int. Verification 
at Str. Pt. (III) for details see Table 4 MH/Insp. MH/Insp. 
I.A. I (II.A. I. i.) (III. I) 0.5 2 
2 (III. 2) 0.5 
3 (III.3) I 
4 (II.A. I. ii.) I 
5 (II.A. I. iii.) 2 
6 (II.A.I.v.) I 
7 (II.A.I. iv.) 2 
I.B. I 
2 
3 
4 (II.A. 2) I 
5 - 7 
8 - 9 (II.A. 4) 3 
10 - II (II.A. 7) 0.1 
12 - 13 (II.A.3) 0.25 
I.C. I 
2 
3 (II.A.5.i.) 1.5 
4 (II.A.5.ii.) 0.5 
5 (II.A.5. ili.) 0.5 
6 (III. 5) I 
7 (III.6) 0.5 
8 (III. 7) LIIA= I 
(II.A.6) 14.1 o. 75 
(III.4) 4 
I.D. I (II.B.I) 18 
2 (II.B.2) 4 
3 
4 (II.B.3) 2 
5 (II.B.4) I 
6 (II.B.6) LIIB= I 
7 (II.B.5) 27 I 
8 (II.B.7) 
-
(III. 8) LIIA+B 8 
LIII 
Totals (man-hours) = 41.1 = 18 
Man-days: X 18/6 X 24/6 
= 123.3 = 72 
Inspection 
man-days (IMD/yr) = 22 6 
Training (IMD/yr) = 38 
Total Inspection 
man-days (IMD/yr) = 264 
PIV (I) 
MH/PIV 
2 
2 
10 
I 
2 
L:IA= I 
20 2 
I 
1 
1 
I 
5.5 
2.5 
HB= 1 
13.5 0.5 
0.5 
I 
1.5 
I 
0.5 
I 
L:IC= I 
16.5 10 
18 
4 
I 
4 
6 
LID= 8 
43 2 
-
LIA-D 
= 93 
X 2/6 
= 31 
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Table 4B: Concealment Methods expected to be covered by 
Inspection Activities in a MOX-Fuel Fabrication Facility 
Location 
I. Feed Storage 
Pu0 2-Cans 
2. Process Area 
Diversion Possibilities 
- Removal of Pu from 
sealed cans 
- Removal of sealed 
cans 
- Removal of Pu from 
different batches 
- Removal of tomplete 
batches 
3. Product Storage: - Removal of Pti from 
rods and FA's Rods and Fuel 
Assernblies 
(FA I s) 
- Removal of complete 
rods and FA's 
Concealment Methods expected to be 
covered by·rnspection Activities 
1.1 ·Falsification of Records/Reports 
1.2 Falsification of Measurement and 
Calibration systems 
1.3 Substitution with inert or active 
materials 
1.4 Borrowing 
1.5 Tampering and counterfeiting of seals 
2.1 Falsification of Records/RQports 
2.2 Diversion into MUF 
2.3 Wrong measurement uncertainties in Dl 
2.4 Falsification of Measurement and 
Calibration systems 
2.5 Substitut1on with inert or active 
materials 
2.6 Borrowing from other Locations 
3.1 Falsification of Records/Reports 
3.2 Changing serial numbers and 
presenting for reinspection 
3.3 Falsification of Measurement and 
Calibration Systems 
3.4 Substitution with inert or active 
materials 
3.5 Borrowing from other Locations 
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Table 5: Inventories and Annual Flows in each Facility Type in 
the Reference Fuel Cycle 
Facili ty type Throughput Inventories 
Amount "+ No,of WSQ+ No,of WSQ items Amount items 
I. LEU-Fabricatn.Facility 
I. I Input:UF6 Cylinders 273.tU/yr 2. 18 215 33 tU 0.26 26 I. 2 Process 
a) uo2-Powder Buckets - - - 4.8 tU 0.04 240 b) uo2-Pellet-Trays - - - 4.7 tU 0.04 943 
c) Fuel Rods - - - 47 tU 0.38 9300 
I. 3 Output 
a) Fuel Assemblies(FA) 270 tU/yr 2. 16 720 28 tU 0.22 75 
b) Misc.+Wastes 3 tU/yr 0.02 - 4 tU 0.03 -
1.4 Total Safeguarded 
Amount/Items 546 tU/yr 4.36 935 121.5 0.97 10584 
1.5 Nuclear Material* I I Index (NMI) 3. 15 
2. LWR 
2. Tlnput: Fresh Fuel (FA) ~ a) U 27 tU/yr 0.22 72 27 tU 0.22 72 b) Pu - - -
2.2 Core Fuel (CFA) } a) U ~ } 81 tU 0.65 216 - - 7.81 b) Pu 625 kgPu 2.3 Output:Spent Fuel(SFA) 
a) u ~ 27 tU/yr 0.22 } 72 1135 tU J 1.08 360 b) Pu 270 kgPu/yr 3.38 1350 kgPu 16.88 
2.4 Total Amounts/Items } 1640 a) U 54 tU/yr J 3.82 144 243 tU ~ 26.64 b) Pu 270 kgPu/yr 1975 kgPu 
2.5 Nuclear Material I 30.24 I Index (NMI) 
3. Reprocessing 
3. 1 Input SFA: 
a) U 216 tU/a ~: I. 7 3 576 216 tU I. 73 576 b) Pu 2160 kgPu/a 27 2160 kgPu 27 
3.2 Process 
a) U - - - ne;gligible - -
b) Pu - - - 65 kgPu 2.71 
3.3 Product 
a) U 214 tU/a I. 71 535 240 tU I. 92 600 
b) Pu 2140 kgPu/a 89. 17 1.070 2400 kgPu 100 1200 
3.4 Wastes 
a) U 2 tU/a 0.02 ' - - - -
b) Pu 20 kgPu/a 0.83 - - - -
3.5 Total Amounts/Items 
Safeguarded ~120. 46 }133.36 a) U 432 tU/ a 2. 181 456 tU 2376 
b) Pu 4320 kgPu/a ~ 4625 kgPu 
3. 6 NMI * 1 22s. I 
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Table 5 ctd. 
Faci lity type Throughput Inventories 
Amount WSQ+ No.of Amount WSQ+ 
iterns 
4. MOX-Fuel Fahr. 
4. I Input 
a) U 16 tU/yr 0.13 40 8 tU 0.07 
b) Pu 440 kgPu/yr · 18.33 220 220 kgPu 9. 17 
4.2 Process: 
Inventory 
a) U - - - negligible -
b) Pu - - - 74 3.08 
4.3 Output: 
Fuel Assernblies 
a) U 15.68 tU/y ~ 0.12 78 7.8 tU 0.06 
b) Pu 433 kgPu/yr 18.03 217 kgPu 9.02 
Wastes 
a) U 0.32 tU/y 0~01 not not pre- -
b) Pu 7 kgPu/yr 0.3 consi- sent -
dered 
Total Safeguarded 
Amounts/Iterns 
a) u 32 tU/yr 0.26 338 15.8 tU o. 13 
b) Pu 880 kgPu/yr 36.66 437 kgPu 21.28 
NMI* 1 39.9 1 
+WSQ: Weighted Significant Quantity, calculated as follows (Ref. 1): 
Separated Pu: Pu [kg] 
8 X 3 
Pu in Spent Fuel Assernblies: 
LEU: 
Pu [kg] 
8 X )0 
u [t] 
2.5x 50 
No.of 
iterns 
20 
110 
-
100 
} 39 
-
-
269 
*NMI: Nuclear Material Indexfora Facility, calculated as follows (Ref. 1): 
NMI: WSQ (Inventory) + WSQ (Input or Output 
whichever is greater) 
Ref. I: SIR for 1979 (Gov/1982, para 95) 
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Table 6: Inspection Activities, SQs, WSQs and NMI in the Reference Fuel Cycle 
Zone I: Three LEU Fabrication Per Input Output Inventory 
Facilities Zone 
Significant Quanti ties 800. 327 327 146 
Safeguarded 
Weighted SQ 16 6.55 6.55 2. 91 
NMI 9.46 
IMD/yr 480 123 324 33 
IMD/SQ yr 0.6 0.38 1.0 0.23 
IMD/WSQ yr 30 18.78 49.5 II. 34 
IMD/NMI 51 
Zone 2: Twenty LWRs 
Significant Quantities 7988 216 891 6881 
Weighted SQ 608.7 4.32 71.82 532.6 
NMI 604.4 
IMD/yr 280 60 60 160 
IMD/SQ yr 0.04 0.28 0.07 0.02 
IMD/WSQ yr 0.46 13.9 0.84 0.3 
IMD/NMI 0.46 
Zone 3A: One Reprocessing Fac.* 
Significant Quantities 1472 356.4 356.4 760 
WSQ 254 28.73 91.73 133.36 
NMI 225 
IMD/yr 1433 600 543 290 
IMD/SQ yr 0.97 I. 68 I. 52 0.38 
IMD/WSQ yr 5.64 20.9 5.9 2.2 
IMD/NMI 6.37 
Zone 3B: One MOX Facility* 
Significant Quantmties 183 61.4 61.4 70.2 
Weighted SQ 58.33 18.46 18.46 21.41 
NMI 39.9 
IMD/yr 264 73 71 120 
IMD/SQ yr I. 44 I. 19 I. 16 I. 71 
IMD/WSQ yr 4.53 . 3. 95 3.85 5.6 
IMD/NMI 6.62 
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Table 6 (ctd.) 
Per 
Zone 
Zone 3 Total 
Significant Quantities 1655 
Weighted SQ 312.33 
NMI 264.9 
IMD/yr 1697 
IMD/SQ yr 1.03 
IMD/WSQ yr 5.43 
IMD/NMI 6.41 
Comments on Table 6 
I. Significant Quanties are calculated for 
SQ U = 
SQ Pu 
tU 
2.5 
kg Pu 
8 
Input Output Inventory 
417.8 417.8 830.2 
47' 19 110. 19 154' 77 
- - -
673 614 410 
I. 61 I. 47 0.49 
14.26 5.57 2.65 
- - -
2. The value of WSQs and NMis are taken from Table 5. The values for LEU Fab. 
are multiplied by 3 to obtain values for zone I and those for LWR are 
multiplied py 20 to obtain values for zone 2. The values for Repro. and MOX 
facilities are given separately for zone 3. 
3. The IMD/yr values for the respective facilities are obtained from Tables I (LWR), 
2A (LEU Fab.), 3A (Repro.) and 4A (MOX),and corrected to zone values by 
multiplying them with the relevant nurober of facilities in the different 
zones. The IMD/yr for general activities and training are proportionally 
distributed among the input/output/inventory valuas for IMD/yr. 
4. IMD/WSQ yr is a more relevant ratio for fuel cycle safeguards analysis 
than IMD/NMI since the latter takes into account only one flow stream 
(input or output whichever is greater), although IMD/yr-ire spent on 
both the streams. 
:'The values per zone correspond to the reprocess ing or the MOX faci li ty 
respectively. 
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Table 7; Interface Activities between FC-Zones 
Zone I Zone 2 Zone 3A(Repro) Zone 3B(MOX Reactors (3 LWR with Pu) 
In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
u t/yr 8I9 8I9 540 540 2I6 2I6 I6 16 I6 16 
Pu kg/yr - - - 5400 2160 2140 440 ~33 433 433 
SQ/yr 327 327 2I6 891 356 356 61 6I 61 6I 
WSQ/yr 6.5 6.5 4.32 7I. 82 29 92 18 I8 I8 6 
IMD/yr I23_1 324 60 60 600 rs-;3 73 71 12 7 
IMD/SQ yr 0.38 1.0 0.28 O.Ot 'I,68 I. 52 I. I9 I. 16 0.2 O.II 
IMD/WSQ yr I8.78 49.5 I3.9 I 0.84 20.0~ 5.9 3.95 3.85 0.67 
Comments to Table 7 
I. The differences between the output/input at 
zones are caused by 
the interface of two consecutive 
export or Jboth of which leave the 
waste streams boundaries. 
zone 
2. The SQ, WSQ and all the IMD values are taken over from Table 6. 
3. Values for 3 LWRs with recycled Pu are estimated from Willy's data conveyed 
through his letter of 25th February 1985. 
I. I7 
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Table 8: Approximate LMUF Values (Operators' Data) for the Zone I and 
different MBAs in Zone 3 (LMUF Zone 2 = 0) 
Zone/Facility (j 
syst Amount Variance(a
2
s) LMUF (a ) 
. s 
% Act.Amount SQ WSQ 
Zone I 
LEU Fab. 
Input 0.3 273 tU 0.67 [wi~ 
Output 0.2 270 tU 0.29 t~~J 2 Waste 5.0 3 tU 0.02 
!~~~~!~E~ 
Powder 0.2 4. 8 tU NO,O .. 
Pellets 0.2 4.7 tU "'0.0 x2 
Rads 1.0 47 tU 0.22 (tU) 2 
Totd Fac. I. 42 1.2 tU 0.48 0.01 
Total Zone 1 4.26 2.0 tU 0.83 0.017 
Zone 3 
Reprocessing 
466,56 ~gEll]; Input 1.0 2160 kgPu 
Output 0.5 2140 kgPu 114. 49 ~gPuj 2 Waste 5.0 20 kgPu 1.0 kgPu 
Inventory 1.0 65 kgPu 0.42x2ligPu-1 2 
Total Fac. 582.9 LkgPuj L 24. I kgPu 3.02 1.01 
Zone 3 
MOX 2 --Input 0.25 440 kgPu I. 21 ~gPu 2 Output 1.0 433 kgPu 18.75 kgPu 2 Waste 10.0 7 kgPu 0. 49 kgPu_ 2 Inventory 0.25 74 kgPu 0.02x2 kgPu 
Total Fac. 20. 49 _fgPu ~ 4.53 kgPu 0.57 o. 19 
:Cota~ Zone 3 603.4 kgPu_ 24.6 kgPu 3.07 1.02 
Comments to Table 8: 
I. UF and fresh fuel assernblies have not been considered for inventory-variance ca~culations since they have been assumed to be covered during throughput 
measurements. 
2. Only process inventories in Repro. and MOX are considered 'for MUF-variance 
caleulations, the rest of the stored materials (Pu02 and assemblies)has been 
considered to be under seal and assumed to be measured during throughput measurements. 
3. The inventory variance is multiplied by two to account for the beginning 
and ending inventories. 
4. All the measurements are assumed to be independent of each other. 
For simplification, only systematic measurement errors have been considered. 
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3.5 Warking Paper II: Comments on Information System, Pattern Recognition 
Methods, Timeliness 
(sent in the form of a letter to J. de Montmollin and W.A.Higinbotham 
on April 12, 1985) 
In this working paper I have presented some ideas on the information system 
for the fuel cycle safeguards. In addition I have also discussed some 
points on other types of fuel cycles as well as on the timeliness of 
safeguards activities. For simplifying the analysis I have included table 9 
with this letter. It contains information on the number of items and 
amounts which are expected to be under safeguards in the reference fuel 
cycle. 
1. Nature of the information system 
In principle, the material flows and inventories in the different zones of 
the reference fuel cycle can be considered to be sequentially converted 
into an inspector validated information flow. This conversion takes place 
in all the three zones of the reference fuel cycle in a near-real-time 
fashion. In zone 1, for example, 54 new UF6-cylinders are verified by the 
inspectors on a monthly basis, i.e. repeating the activities 12 times per 
year for the oncoming new cylinders. All these cylinders are counted and 
I 
identified by the inspectors who are present during the verification 
activities and about 45 of these cylinders are measured through NDA. At the 
same time 180 finished fresh fuel elements are individually counted and 
sealed every month, 12 times a year. Besides, 66 fuel elements are n-collar-
ed over the year. The sampling plan is designed in such a way that every 
month, a loss of one significant quantity can be detected with 95 % 
probability for both the input and the output flows. The total material in 
the zone is verified at least twice, that is at the time when it enters the 
zone as well as at the time when the material leaves the zone in the form 
of finished fuel elements. 
In zone 2 the total number of fuel elements present in each of the reactors 
is counted and identified once a year. The identification takes place in 
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such a way that at least one fuel element can be detected in case it is 
lost. Besides these annual inventory verification activities, the Agency 
inspectors come in addition, three times a year to each of the reactors and 
ensure the presence of the fuel elements at the fresh fuel and the wet 
storages and in the core with the use of C/S-measures. In zone 3 a full 
coverage for all the material entering and leaving the zone or the facility 
is provided on a semi-continuous basis. In the reprocessing facility in 
particular, each and every batch of accountability tank solution is' 
correlated with the relevant fuel elements, is verified with regard to its 
Pu content,and is ensured through observation that the material in the 
batch enters the process area. A material balance is struck araund the 
process MBA in this facility on a bi-weekly basis. This data base is used 
on a near-real-time' fashion to have an idea on the actual flow and 
inventory of materials in this MBA and to enable the Agency to detect a 
lass of a given amount of nuclear material in a timely fashion. The 
timeliness in this context has to be seen with reference to the type of 
diversion seenarios which one considers from the point of view of inter-
national safeguards. If the given amount is diverted over a short period 
of time (abrupt diversion) the near-real-time accountancy enables the 
Agency to detect such a diversion almost immediately after the diversion of 
the ~.;rhole amount has taken place, i.e. within approximately 2-3 weeks 
time. On the other hand, if the diversion takes place over a langer period 
of time, i.e. over the whole year (protracted diversion), the detection can 
take place after the whole amount has been diverted. The sequentially 
generated information in the reprocessing (as well as in the MOX facility) 
provides a fairly powerful data base for recognizing the normal flow and 
inventory patterns in the facility and a deviation from it. For example, in 
the 240 tons/year reprocessing facility in the reference fuel cycle, such 
sequentially generated data base could provide, under suitable operation 
conditions, a detection capability of less than 8 kg with a high probability 
of detection almost immediately after such a diversion'has taken place. 
2. Reporting system öf a State 
The information system which is assumed to be generated in a sequential 
fashion in the reference fuel cycle, can also provide another important 
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advantage. Any state which has a reference fuel cycle of the type we are 
considering, will also have a properly developed state's system of 
accountancy and control. Such a state may send their own inspectors to a 
facility during the time when the Agency inspectors carry out their 
activities. This is the normal case at present. If the state's inspectors 
coulq accept the Agency validated information system generated by the 
Agency inspectors during their activities at the facility, then this 
validated system could form the basis for the reporting system of that 
particular state. Such a system can provide almost all the data necessary 
for the inventory change reports and the material balance reports from a 
state to the' Agency. The Agency, after receiving these reports from the 
state at the headquarters, would not have to validate the information 
contained in these reports since it has already been validated by its own 
inspectors some time back. This would mean that the actual verification 
activity of the Agency inspectors will be concentrated in validating mainly 
the operator's data at the time of their visits to the different zones. 
This particular procedure could simplify a part of the verification 
procedure of the Agency, a part of the reporting procedure of the states 
and improve the transparency of the overall information system. It could 
also improve the credibility of the data base produced by the operators and 
sent by the state to the Agency. The detailed physical inventory listings 
need to be generated only at the time of the physical inventory takings 
which is normally once a year. 
3. Pattern recognition methods 
The more I think about fuel cycle safeguards, the more I get convinced 
about the possibility of using the methods of pattern recognition for this 
type of safeguards. The safeguards activities in individual facilities 
provide titbits of safeguards relevant information which may once in a 
while permit. safeguards relevant statements for such facilities. Only the 
integrated information from individual facilities with the different cross-
linkages and correlations among the flows and inventories permits one to 
extract the relevant data base for the fuel cycle as a whole. 
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Recently I found a picture which depicts an arrangement of a number of 
black, grey and white rectangles which I have included with this letter. A 
close observation and analysis of the individual rectangles does not reveal 
the fact that they depict the picture of a human head. Nevertheless this 
relatively small number of rectangles is sufficient to allow us to 
recognize the features of President Lincoln as soon as we step back a few 
paces away from the picture or blur the outlines of each of the rectangles 
by half closing our eyes. 
This particular example tells us a number of interesting things about the 
possibilities of recognizing the features of a whole system from its 
components. It shows that our brain compares the blurred contours of the 
individual rectangles and the interlinkages among these rectangles with the 
archetype of a face stored and identified in our memory. After this 
comparison we recognize the face of Lincoln in this combination of 
rectangles inspite of the missing parts. It also indicates that even the 
most painstaking analysis of the individual rectangles or evaluation of the 
exact shades and dimensions of the rectangles cannot reveal the underlying 
fact that combined and linked tagether they form the picture of the head of 
Abraham Lincoln. And finally, the example shows in a forceful manner that 
eventhough individual deta~ls of these squares are useful in selecting 
parameters for a particular strategy, they are not useful when trying to 
recognize the underlying system or the behaviour of that particular system. 
It shows also that up to a certain point - the more blurred the focus is 
for the individual rectangles - the easier it is to see what the whole 
system is. 
In a certain sense, for the system approach one has to proceed in two 
distinctly different steps: The individual rectangles have to be analyzed 
and investigated to a certain degree of detail. After that it will be more 
important to arrange these rectangles into their proper context by 
recognizing the interlinkages and correlations than to examine them Ln even 
greater detail. If the second step is forgotten, then one learns a lot 
about the details of the individual rectangles, but very little about the 
system as a whole and its behaviour. This is mainly because of the fact 
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that the characteristics and behaviour of the system depends less on the 
characteristics of the individual rectangles themselves than on the 
linkages between them. 
I feel that similar is the case with the fuel cycle safeguards. The flow 
and inventory patterns in individual facilities correspond to the charac-
teristics of the individual rectangles in the example cited above. One has 
to know to a certain extent, the detailed characteristics of these 
elements. However, to arrive at a safeguards relevant statement for the 
fuel cycle as a whole, one has to work out and establish the linkages and 
the cross correlations of the flow and inventory dynamics amongst the 
individual facilities. The recognition of such linkages is more important 
than knowing all the details of the flow and inventory characteristics of 
these facilities. A number of useful methods in connection with pattern 
recognition has been discussed in the book by K.S. Fu titled ''Sequential 
methods in pattern recognition and machine learning", Mathematics in 
Science and Engineering, Val. 52, published by Academic Press Incorp., 
1968. Unfortunately, I do not have anybody at the EKS at present who could 
go through the methods in some detail and find out the possibility of using 
them for safeguards in fuel cycles as a whole. Maybe you or somebody from 
Brookhaven National Laboratpry might have the possibility to investigate 
this matter. 
4. Timeliness of Agency actions in connection with safeguards 
The question of timeliness has apparently become a bone of contention 
particularly in the United States. Same in the United States have contended, 
as was pointed out by a recent publication of the INMM (safeguarding 
nuclear materials, January 1985), that IAEA safeguards must provide 'timely 
warning', that is, detection of diversionintime for diplomatic action to 
prevent the fabrication of the first weapon, which is claimed to be only a 
few days. Fortunately, it was very correctly pointed out in this publica-
tion that to provide this type of timely warning is not an objective of the 
Agency safeguards. Such timely warnings, if at all relevant, have to be 
provided by totally different types of international or national measures. 
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Any action which the Agency can take in case a diversion has been definite-
ly established, can only be through its Board of Governors. The Agency 
requires, as many other international organizations, probably a few months, 
immediately after a diversion has been established, before it can report 
this matter officially to the Board. This time delay is inherent in the 
decision making system of the Agency and has been considered by many as 
sensible and useful. It permits the Agency to avoid any misinterpretations 
of its results and allows the state time to resolve any anomalies which may 
be caused by false alarms. 
With referen~e to the reference fuel cycle, the activities and their time 
scales of the Agency inspections in zones I and 2 of the fuel cycle are 
such that the time required to report to ·the Board of Governors is expected 
to be of the same order of magnitude as the time considered to be necessary 
for making an explosive device from nuclear materials out of these zones 
after their diversion from the safeguarded sector. Therefore, the problern 
of timeliness is not that relevant for these two zones. For zone 3 
materials, the safeguards system has been designed in such a manner that 
the continuity of knowledge for the Agency is ensured. If a diversion were 
to take place from this zone, the detection time for this diversion would 
correspond approximately to the time required for the manufacture of 
nuclear explosives after the material has been diverted from the safe-
guarded sector. The Agency interprets the timeliness for this type of 
materials in a different way. It considers its safeguards activities to be 
timely if a detection of a diversion can be made within this timescale. 
This is inspite of the fact that even ~n these cases, the Board can be 
officially informed only a few months after such a detection has taken 
place. The main difference between the idea of the timeliness by the Agency 
and that by some in the United States lies in the fact that the Agency 
considers the objective of timeliness to be met when a detection of a 
diversion of a given category of material has been made within the range 
of time which is. considered to be relevant for that category of material. 
Same in the United States on the other hand,interpret the timeliness as the 
point from which time onwards sufficient time would still be available to 
prevent the manufacturing of the first bomb by the diverting state. 
-119-
Prevention of the fabrication of a nuclear explosive is, however, not an 
objective of Agency safeguards. This is like condemning a cow because it 
cannot fly. As I had said earlier, totally different types of measures are 
required to ensure a timely prevention of the fabrication of nuclear 
explosive devices. 
The type of safeguards approach which we have been considering for the fuel 
cycle safeguards, enables the Agency to maintain its continuity of know-
ledge with regard to the amount and location of a given category of nuclear 
materials which is in conformity with the corresponding detection times. 
' Some improvement in timeliness against the facility based safeguards approach 
can be expected because of the fact that the information system is generated 
on a semi-real-time basis and the flow of· the safeguards relevant informa-
tion can become a little more faster between the states and the Agency. 
However, the time required by the Agency to report to its Board of Governors 
will not be altered much by the fuel cycle safeguards. 
5. Different types of fuel cycles 
Willy had in one of his recent letters raised the interesting question of 
how the safeguards approach which we are considering could be used for 
other types of fuel cycles, for example, cycles having only reactors and 
fabrication facilities or önly a few facilities of the same type with some 
research activities, I don't think that a fuel cycle safeguards approach 
for this type of incomplete fuel cycles would be much different to the 
facility based safeguards approach which the Agency practices at present. 
Some correlations between the interface of the two consequent stages of a 
fuel cycle might simplify some of the present activities. The actual safe-
guards effort may not be very much influenced by utilizing fuel cycle 
approach for such partial systems. I would think that the inspection 
activities would range between 2-5 IMD/WSQ.yr for bulk 'handling facilities 
and around.0.4-0.5 IMD/WSQ.yr for reactors. However, the timeliness and 
transparency of the information system for such fuel cycles may be expected 
to improve if the basic ideas in our approach are incorporated there. The 
maximum advantage from a fuel cycle approach can be obtained when different 
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categories of materials are simultaneously used in a fuel cycle and cross-
linkages or correlations between external and internal flows and invento-
ries can be established. 
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Table 9: Items Follow-up in the Reference Fuel Cycle 
Category of Per Facility Per Zone Per Zone 
Materials (Item) (Item) (Amount) 
Zone I 
Input: UF6-cylinders 216 648 819 tU Output: Fresh Fuel Assernblies 720 2160 810 tU 
Inventorl 
Input: UFB-Cylinders 26 78 99 tU 
Process: o2-Bulk 240 720 14.4 tU 
uo2-Pellets 943 2829 14. I tU Fuel rods 9300 27900 147 tU 
FFA 75 225 84 tU 
Zone 2 
Input: FFA 72 1440 540 tU 
Output: Spent Fuel (SFA) 72 1440 ] 540 tU + 5400 kg Pu 
Inventory: FFA 72 1440 540 tU 
SFA (Core) 216 4320 G 1620 tU + 12500 kg Pu 
SFA (Wet Storage) 360 7200 
G 
2700 tU + 
27000 kg Pu 
Zone 3A Reerocessing 
Input: SFA 576 576 ) 216 tU + 2160 kg Pu 
Act.Tank Batches 288 288 ~ 216 tU + 2160 kg Pu 
Output: UN 535 535 214 tU 
Puo 2 1070 1070 2140 kg Pu 
Inventory: SFA 576 576 216 tU + 
2160 kg Pu 
Process: PuN ,..,., 25 25 65 kg Pu 
Puo2 rv I 200 1200 2400 kg Pu 
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Table 9 ctd. 
C.ategory of Per Facility Per Zone Per Zone 
Materials (Item) ( Item) (Amount) 
Zone 3B MOX Fab. 
Input: uo
0 
40 40 16 tU 
Pu 2 220 220 440 
Output: MOX ,FA 78 78 ß 16 tU + 440 kg Pu 
Inventory: uo 20 20 8 tU 
Pu02 in BC 110 110 220 kg Pu 
Process: Puo2-Bulk 220 220 74 kg Pu 
MOX-'FA 40 40 ß 8 tU + 220 kg Pu 
Note to Table 9: 
I. The waste batches have not been considered. 
2, The U-:-Inventories in the process areas of Reprocessing and MOX Eabrication 
Facilities have been ignored. 
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Abb. 1 Das Ganze und die Details 
Um die Aussage des Gesamtmusters dieser Quadrate zu erlahren, 
müssen die Quadrate selbst zurücktreten, indem das Bild aus grö-
ßerer Entfernung oder unscharf (z. B. ohne Brille) betrachtet wird. 
Dadurch treten die Beziehungen zwischen den Quadraten stärker 
hervor und enthüllen ein Portrat von Abrnham Lincoln. 
Fig. 1 The complex unity and the details 
To experience the statement of the overall pattern of these squares, 
they must be pul in the background by looking from a !arger distance 
or blurry (e. g. without glasses) at the picture. Therewith the rela-
tions b e t w e e n the squares stand out in relief and uncover a 
portrait of Abraham Lincoln. 
Taken from: F. Vester; A. von Hesler;Umweltforschungsplan des Bundesministers 
des Innern; Ökologie und Planung in Verdichtungsgebieten. 
Forschungsbericht 80-101 040 34 (1980) 
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Different Zones 
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4.1 Excerpt of a Letter of W. A. Higinbotham to J. de Montmollin on 
Extended MBA Approach. Dez. 19, 1984 
Although it is very useful to look at zones rather than just to the facili-
ties within the zones, I am not convinced that one can omit verification of 
inter MBA flows, as now intended, without reducing the assurance that safe-
guards is intended to provide. There are other ways to assign inspection 
effort more efficiently. If the Agency can't accomplish what it considers 
it should due to resource or other constraints, it can't design itself out 
of this but report its findings to the Board. 
I have some problems with your zone-2 approach and with the present approach 
of the Agency. I have become convinced that there is usually no need to 
verify a shipment before and after it takes place. Verification at one end 
should be enough. To justify this requires discussing each type of transfer, 
the possible diversion-concealment schemes, the verification activities, 
and which end might require the least effort by Agency and facility per-
sonne!. 
Obviously transfer of fresh fuel into reactors and removal of spent fuel 
should be observed. In orde.r to meet the timeliness requirement, the con-
tents of the reactor pools should be. verified directly or indirectly every 
three months. The Agency employs camera surveillance in order to avoid re-
inventorying every three months. If the cameras show unexplained activity 
or confirm that a shipment has occurred, the Agency should reinvertory that 
pool. In the first case fuel may have been removed and it may have been 
substituted for. 
The second case is more complicated. It does not seem very important to me 
to have inspectors observe and seal partially loaded casks. An operator 
could overload casks. In any case, inspectors should observe the unloading 
of casks at a reprocessing or AFR pool or the loading before shipment at a 
reactor. Since assernblies could be replaced by substitutes or rods could 
be removed during shipment, verification of the nurober and some NDA after 
receipt would be more convincing as to what was received and to be accoun-
ted for at the receiving facility. 
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It does not guarantee that more assernblies were not removed. In this case 
the assernblies in the pool would need checking. Substitutes could have been 
brought in in the shipping cask. I don't consider radioactive substitutes 
very credible, unless that adversary should decide to replace higher by 
lower burnup assemblies. Cheap NDA should provide .reasonable assurance that 
technically simple assembly substitution is not taking place. 
The point is not that cameras can be designed to record for a year. The 
' ' 
films should be reviewed every three months to see if a reinventory is 
needed. 
There are technical possibilities which might sigiJ-ificantly reduce the need 
for interim visits, which you and your associates have proposed. Gameras 
could be designed so that the operators could change the cassettes and mail 
them to the Agency every 2 or 3 months for review. Also, cameras could be 
designed to record how many assernblies were loaded into a cask; or VACOSS 
seals designed for plant personnel to attach to the spent fuel casks. A com-
bination of the two might save effort and be at least as convicting as the 
present approach. 
Another problern is how much effort might really be saved. Reviewing films 
is tedious and not 100 % effective in detecting real anomalies. It is also 
likely to observe ambiguous situations which should be investigated. 
Perhaps a way out of this confusion would be for the Agency to identify and 
state its limitations. In such a case, a State which might be concerned 
about another State could understand to what extent the IAEA provides 
assurance and what it would have to determine by national means, should 
this be important. It would also suggest to a State which expects the Agency 
to provide assurance on its behalf, that it might assist the Agency in doing 
a better j ob. 
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4.2 Comments on Alternative Safeguards Approach to Zone 3 (Dez. 19, 1984) 
The reference fuel cycle chosen for study has nuclear materials of different 
safeguards significance in each of three zones, which are described else-
where. Since the material which would require the·least amount of processing 
and effort to make it useful for a nuclear explosive is plutonium, it seems 
reasonable to consider what alternative safeguards approach might be em-
ployed in Zone-3 first. 
At present the important MBAs are essentially the following: 
Table I 
1. The chemical separations process area of the reprocessing plant. 
2. The uranium and plutonium product storage areas. 
3. The Pu(N03) 4 to Puo2 conversion area. 4. The Puo2 product storage vault at No. 3 5. The Puo2 receiving/storage vaults at the MOX fabrication facilities. 6. The MOX fuel fabrication areas. 
7. The MOX fuel product storages areas. 
8. MOX fuel utilization facilities, not analyzed here. 
The following are the key measurement points: 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
Table 2 
Input accountability tank at the reprocessing facility. 
U and Pu product accountability systems at the reprocessing plant. 
Pu(N03) 4 accountability tank between 2 and 3, above. The accountability system for the Pu02 product of 3, above. 
uo2 and Puo2 feed measuring systems aE the MOX facilities. MOX fuel assembly NDA stations. 
In addition there are KMPs for all of the waste discard streams from the 
several processes, and KMP's to measure intermediate products for 
near-real-time-accountancy (NRTA) and after a clean out for a physical 
inventory at MBAs 1, 3, and 6. 
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Present plans envisage the following inspection activities: 
Essentially contiuous inspector presence at the reprocessing plant to: 
(I) verify identity of assernblies chopped and dissolved, 
(2) verify measurements of U and Pu at the input accountability tank, 
(3) verify measurements of U product batches (sometimes) and of Pu-nitrate 
batches transferred to storage tanks, 
(4) verify NRTA in-process measurements, 
(5) verify measurements of Pu-nitrate batches transferred from the storage 
tanks to the conversion process, 
(6) audit books and records and cooperate with other Agency sections in 
analyzing data, 
(7) investigate anomalies, and 
(8) observe and verify PIT measurements, when these occur. 
It is assumed that inspectors will visit the conversion and MOX fuel fabri-
cation plants frequently (at last once a month). Inspection activities at 
the conversion plant would supplement the reprocessing plant/conversion 
plant transfer verifications listed above, observe operation of the process, 
verify Pu02 product containers in the vault and possibly attach seals to 
them, and verify physical inventories when they are performed. 
At a MOX fuel fabrication facility, inspectors should verify the U02 con-
tainers on hand in the receiving area or check the seals, verify the in-
process materials available for NRTA verification, verify the MOX fuel 
assernblies on hand, audit books and records, observe and verify physical 
inventories when they occur, and investigate anomalies. 
On the basis of these activities, the inspectors and the Agency should be 
able to: maintain current books on the amounts, isotopic compositions and 
locations of the plutonium in all of the process and storage MBAs; form 
NRTA and 6 or 12 month material balances for each MBA; have some reasonable 
possibility to detect postulated attempts to conceal the fact that pluto-
nium is missing; observe anomalies so that investigation can be initiated 
promptly. 
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This approach obviously calls for a large amount of intelligent effort. The 
question is, could some of these activities be reduced or omitted without 
significantly affecting the degree of assurance provided, as measured by 
technical effectiveness criteria, for example. Just how effective the base 
case, by-MBA, approach may be is not at issue. The question is would an al-
ternative approach leave uneavered some diversion/concealment schemes which 
now are covered, or might it significantly lower the probability that the 
present activities might detect anomalies which should be investigated. It 
is conceivable, but doubtful, that an alternative approach might be more 
effective. 
Before discussing alternatives it may be useful to discuss inspector effort, 
in general, for these facilities. Everyone agrees that it is essential 
to verify the plutonium into the zone at the reprocessing plant, the MOX or 
other products which would be removed from the zone, and physical invento-
ries when these are performed. It is generally agreed that inspectors should 
have access to a reprocessing plant at any time in order to verify flows and 
inventories. In order to meet the timeliness goals, inspectors should visit 
the conversion and MOX fabrication plants at least once a month. At least 
for the reprocessing plant, it will be impractical to send inspectors from 
Vienna for visits. Several inspectors should be permanently stationed near 
the reprocessing plant. So~eone must be available to witness the measure-
ment of each input dissolver batch, which operation probably will occur 
twice a day or more often, seven days a week while the equipment is operating. 
Probably, the conversion process will be located in or next to the repro-
cessing plant. Often the MOX fabarication plant or other safeguards sensi-
tive facilities will be located nearby. It is possible, even probable, that 
the same inspectors which would be required under the present facility-orien-
ted approach to inspect the reprocessing plant could also perform the 
presently proposed inspection activities at the conversion and MOX fabrica-
tion plants. 
It does not rnake sense in this case to simply add up the hours which inspec-
tors are estirnated to use on inspections. At a reprocessing plant these rnay 
be 1 or 2 hour stints, several hours in a 24 hour day and 7 days a week. 
The inspectors probably would have the time to perform the inspections at 
the other facilities, without being overworked. 
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It would be very inefficient to send two inspectors from Vienna every month 
to perform these operations. Before considering alternative inspection acti-
vities seriously, the inspector effort, including resident housing and tra-
vel time for the base should be understood. 
Zone 3 as an Extended MBA 
This is one extreme case. The flow of plutonium into the zone is verified at 
the reprocessing plant input accountability vessel and the flow of 'pluto-
nium out of the zone is verified for the MOX fuel assernblies transferred 
to some facility which is artificially defined as another zone not involved 
in this analysis. Presumably all intra-zone transfers would be recorded 
and some (between facilities) reported to the Agency; but none of these 
would be verified, as such. 
In order to meet the timeliness goals, the entire inventory should be veri-
fied frequently (e.g., once each month). At the bulk processing facilities, 
not all materials will be accessible for verification. For near-real-time 
accounting, as much of the material as possible would be directly verified 
and the remainder estimated on the basis of experience or modelling. It 1s 
assumed that the bulk processes would be shut down at least once a year and 
cleaned out for physical inventories, which would be observed and verified 
by the inspectors. It will be assumed that the plutonium in storage areas 
could be verified frequently and accurately, although this may not always 
be the case especially for the plutonium nitrate storage tanks. 
Waste products, which are to be disposed of, should be verified in this 
and in all other alternatives. 
It will be useful to postulate some data on flows, inventories, and measure-
ment accuracies, in order to estimate what impact this alternative might 
have on the technical effectiveness of safeguards. These data are for the 
purpose of comparing the alternatives. They are arbitrary, but hopefully, 
realistic enough for the comparison. Only actual data should be used to 
estimate the actual sensitivity of material balance accounting, as practised 
by the Agency for MBAs, however defined. 
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Diversion Assumptions 
The divertor, if any, might attempt to introduce undeclared feed (assemblies) 
to the dissolvers at the reprocessing plant or to alter volume data or 
samples to persuade the Agency that less plutonium entered the zone than 
actually did. This diversion/concealment scheme would affect the base case 
and any alternative approach equally. Likewise, any scheme to convince the 
Agency that more plutonium is shipped out of the zone in waste discards or 
in MOX assernblies does not affect a comparison of alternative approaches. 
Both these schemes deserve attention, but not here. 
It is assumed that plutonium compounds could be removed from any of the 
process or storage areas without being observed. Accountancy is the 
primary safeguards measure, although C/S ~ay be used to provide continuity 
of knowledge: 
seals on Puo2 containers, for example, or surveillance devices at the Pu 
nitrate storage tanks. 
In the base case, an adversary might attempt to mislead Agency inspectors 
as to the volume, weight, or plutonium concentration in items at any of the 
verified KMPs within or between the several processes. When these would not 
be verified, in the extended MBA case, the operator would only have to fal-
sify records and reports, if that should serve any purpose. 
In both cases, some or a lot of emphasis is placed on verifying in-process 
and storage area inventories every month for NRTA. It may be possible for 
the hypothetical adversary to bias weight or volume or samples to conceal 
missing material for some time. Once material has been diverted it remains 
missing. It may be detected in subsequent NRTA periods and should be detec-
ted when all of the processes are cleaned out and the physical inventories 
are verified, assuming that all are inventoried at the same time or in a 
sequence which should detect paper transfer. 
Borrowing or shuffling only appears to be a practical concealment scheme for 
a few of the materials in this zone because the forms öf the material change 
as operations are performed. One material that exists at three plants is the 
Puo2 powder (2.5 kg Pu per can). Another is the MOX assernblies which would be 
at the two fabrication plants. Either or both of these might be sealed so as 
to avoid the need for reverifications. In either alternative, these would 
probably be verified once a month. 
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Table 3: Flows (plutoniurn only) 1 
KMP Tank or Container 
Transfer Rate 
kgPu per 
Day Month Year 
Measurernznt 3 Accuracy Method 
Reprocessing Input 
Reprocessing Product 
Reprocessing Waste 
Gonversion Input 
Gonversion Product 
Gonversion Waste~ 
MOX Fabrication 4 Puo2 MOX Fabrication 
assernblies 4 MOX Fab5ication , 
recycle 4 
2/day 
1/day 
1/week 
irregular 
2/day 
1/week 
1/day 
1/6 days 
1/rnonth 
5 ISO 1500 
5 ISO ISoo· 
7. 5 to 15 
ISO 1500 
5 ISO 1500 
0.75 7.5 
2.5 75 750 
75 750 
7.5 75 
5% 1% 
I 0.5 
50 20 
I 0.5 
0.5 0.25 
50 20 
o.s 0.25 
2. 0 1.0 
2.0 1.0 
MOX Fabrication , 
wastes 1/rnonth 0.375 3.75 20 10 
Notes: 
I. Waste discharges and recycle excluded frorn totals. 
2. First nurnber is randorn, second is systernatic. · 
A 
A(B) 
A 
A 
A(C) 
A 
A(C) 
c 
c 
c 
3. A is volurne or weight and sarnple analysis, B is K-edge absorption and 
gamma-ray spectrornetry, and C is weight, passive gamma and neutron NDA. 
4. For each of two MOX fabrication plants. 
5. Scrap returned to reprocessing plant. 
Table 4: In-process and S/R Storage Inventories (plutoniurn only) 
Location 
Reprocessing MBA 
Pu nitrate tanks 
Gonversion process 
Gonversion Puo2 stor MOX Fabrication, Puo2 
store 
MOX Fabrication, process 
MOX Fabrication, recycle 
MOX Fabrication, 
assernblies 
Notes: 
Operating Inventory 
15 - 30 kg Pu 
5 - 1000 kg Pu 
5 - 15 kg Pu 
5 - 500 kg Pu 
5 - 250 kg Pu 
50 - 100 kg Pu 
0 - 15 kg Pu 
0 - 300 kg Pu 
NRTA Uncertainty 
2.5 - 5.0 kg 
0.5 to 2.5 % (systernatic) 
not estirnated 
0.25 % (systernatic) 
0.25 % (systernatic) 
2.5 - s.o kg 
1.0% (systernatic) 
1.0% (systernatic) 
MOX data are for each of two plants' in-process inventories. In-process 
inventory accuracies vary frorn plant to plant. Capacity of Pu nitrate storage 
tanks and verification accuracies vary frorn plant to plant. 
-137-
It does not appear that the choice of approaches should be influenced by 
this possibility. 
The zone approach does not appear to leave any of the postulated diversion/ 
concealment schemes uncovered. It may not provide as timely detection and 
it may not be as sensitive for some diversion seenarios as the present, 
by-MBA, approach. Also to be examined is the saving of inspection effort, 
if any. 
Annual Material Balances 
Using the numbers in Tables 3 and 4, and making some assumptions as to 
possible correlations, the sensitivity of an annual material balance is not 
much differentwhether the balances are performed by MBA and combined or 
simply based on the uncertainties of the zone inputs and outputs and total 
inventory. See Appendix A for further discussion of this. 
In most cases, the systematic errors are controlling. It is not likely that 
the systematic errors will be correlated for measurements made on different 
forms of the material and by different techniques. It is probable that the 
materials transferred from one facility to another will be measured only 
once, or at least by the same methods. In such cases, the systematic errors 
will tend to cancel each other. The result is that the limit of error, 
determined either way, is about 25 kg Pu. No conclusions should be drawn 
from this as to the LEMUF that the Agency might attain in any case. What 
this indicates is that the sensitivity for annual material balances is pro-
bably not much different for the two alternatives, regarding the zone as a 
whole, There is the difference that in the base case, material balances can 
be calculated for each of the MBAs. For some of these, the measurement 
accuracies achievable are significantly better than for some others. 
Looking at the zone as a whole, the attractiveness for diversion of the 
material does not appear to be much different,whether it is as a nitrate 
sol.ution, an oxide powder or a MOX pellet. It would, however, be somewhat 
more difficult to divert material proportionately and over a considerable 
time from each of the process MBAs. The base case approach has the advertage 
that a lass is identified with an MBA, which might simplify its investigation. 
On other hand, an honest facility operator's records should locate a lass. 
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That some of the important measurements are more accurate than some others, 
suggests that it might be possible to save some effort in the base case by 
designing inspection activities to match the zone rather than what may be 
achievable at each MBA. A few examples are suggested, using measurements data 
from Table 3. These are only illustrative examples. If the overall sensiti-
vity of a material balance for the plutonium in the zone is 25 kg, sampling 
plans might be based on 95 % detection for a loss of 15 kg plutonium, rather 
than 8 kg. It might be acceptable to use the K-edge densitometer/gamma ray 
spectrometry method to assay Pu nitrate samples and thus to avoid sending 
such samples to Vienna for chemical analysis. Only a minimal effort might 
be assigned to verification of waste discards or of physical inventories 
which contain less than say 5 kg Pu. 
Timeliness 
The timeliness goal for plutonium is based on one philosophical and one 
practical consideration. The philosophical reason for timeliness goals for 
recovered plutonium, plutonium in spent fuel, and for uranium containing 
less than 20 % U-235 are explained by the Agency as being related to the 
different times that it might take for a State to convert each material to 
a form useable in a nuclear explosive. Another philosophical reason, 
suggested by others than the Agency, is that a reprocessing plant would be 
needed to extract plutonium from spent fuel and this plus a reactor or an 
enrichment plant to produce plutonium or HEU from natural or low enriched 
uranium. Any such plant would take time and money to build and such facili-
ties might be detacted by national means, whereas relatively simply equip-
ment would be needed to make plutonium metal from plutonium nitrate or oxide. 
The practicalreasonwhy prompt detection of an anomaly is important isthat 
anomalies will be observed, perhaps frequently, by Agency inspectors at 
facilities in States which have no intention to divert nuclear materials. 
Prompt detection and localization should greatly facilitate resolution of 
such anomalies. 
Before comparing the MBA to the zone approach for timeliness and other fea-
tures, a few words are in order regarding the way that flows between the 
MBAs in Zone 3 might be verified (see Table 3 for the flow KMPs): 
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The plutonium content of the input dissolver batches to the reprocessing 
Separations MBA are to be verified as they are measured in either alter-
native. Pu nitrate batches transferred from the Separation process to the 
nitrate storage tanks and from the nitrate storage tanks to the conversion 
process are to be verified when measured in the MBA alternative. 
Puo2 containers should be measured by the conversion plant operators as 
they are produced there, and by the MOX fabrication plant Operators before 
or when being fed into the process for blending with uo2 . In both cases it 
LS probable that these measurements would not be verified directly but that 
sampling plans would be designed for verification of items produced at the 
conversion plant and after receipt at the fabrication plants, at the time 
of monthly inspectar visits. Seals might be attached to verify containers 
to keep track of those which traveled between the facilities between visits 
and to avoid reverifications. 
MOX fuel assernblies would be verified after being fabricated and before ship-
ment, during monthly visits. 
Waste batches should be verified before being written off as having no fur-
ther safeguards significance. Since these streams contain relatively small 
amounts of plutonium, the State and Agency might agree on some schedule to 
minimize efforts, possibly involving randomized verifications. These have 
to be verified for either alternative. 
It would appear that the flow verifications are significantly different for 
the nitrate solutions in the two alternatives, but that the flow verifica-
tions for the Puo2 containers and assernblies are not distinguishable from 
the monthly inventory verifications anticipated for the conversion and 
fabrication plants in both alternatives. 
Both alternatives assume direct verification of clean-out physical invento-
ries at the bulk processing areas. 
The major difference, then, relates to verification of the flows from re-
processing to the nitrate storage tanks to the conversion operation, as 
these may affect the technical effectiveness and timeliness of the approaches 
far the zone. 
The isotopic composition of the plutonium, including Am-241, is of commer-
cial and safeguards significance. Commercially the fissile/fertile ratio 
is important, and the Am-241 gamma rays are important for safety in handling. 
Safeguarcis NDA techniques require knowing the isotopic ratios. 
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Tracking different isotopic ratios through the processes may be useful for 
verification purposes. Since the isotopic ratios for plutonium in spent fuel 
are functions of the original enrichment, exposure in a reactor, and other 
factors, the isotopic ratios of the plutonium entering the separations pro-
cess at a reprocessing plant will vary somewhat from batch to batch and sig-
nificantly when fuels with different histories are reprocessed. Pu-241 de-
cays to Am-241 with a half-life of about 14.5 years. The Am-241 is extracted 
with the fission products during reprocessing. The ratio of Pu-241 to Am-241 
is a function of the time since the Am-241 was removed. 
From Table 4, some estimates can be made of the time a particular batch of 
plutonium spends in each process and storage area and of the possible 
changes in isotopic ratios which may occur: 
Location 
Separations 
Nitrate Tanks 
Gonversions 
Puo 2 Stores MOX Fabrication 
Assernblies 
Table 5 
Residence Time 
3 - 5 days 
7 - 150 days 
I -2 days 
'30 - 300 days 
30 - 60 days 
Indefinite 
Am-241/Pu-241 
.0001 
.0001 
.0050 
.0090 
.009 
0 
to .020 
to .020 
to .060 
to . 068 
plus 
As noted above, the plutonium isotopic ratios may be expected to change 
significantly every few days, from the input to reprocessing. During the 
separations operations some mixing of batches will occur. Most reprocessing 
plants will have plutonium nitrate storage tanks to serve as a buffer bet-
ween the reprocessing and conversion operations and in order to blend batches 
with uniform isotopic composition to facilitate fabrication of MOX with uni-
form fissile content. The capacity of the storage tanks chosen for this illu-
stration are large enough to blend the plutonium solutions produced during 
half a year's operation. At actual facilities the blends might be this large 
or considerably smaller. Large blends would have the advantage that the 
plutonium ratios would not often need to be verified for interpreting NDA 
data. 
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It would appear to be technically complex to perform abrupt diversions simul-
taneously from the several MBAs. If the zone approach is used, and the Pu 
nitrate batch measurements are not verified, the operator could divert from 
anywhere in the separation, nitrate storage, and conversion MBAs, and fal-
sify the records to make it appear that proportionate amounts of material 
were missing from all three. Assuming that the flows into the Pu02 storage 
areas and through the fabrication plant would be verif{ed at the monthly 
visits for both alternatives, there should be no difference between the two 
cases as regards these MBAs. 
Near-real-time accounting (NRTA) has been studied for application to the 
chemical reprocessing area as a sensitive means to detect abrupt diversions, 
and as a means to increase the sensitivity to detect more protracted diver-
sions by sequential analysis of the NRTA balances. In order to perform NRTA 
balances for this process area, it is necessary to verify the plutonium in 
the input dissolver batches, in the plutonium nitrate batches, in the waste 
discards, and to verify the in-process inventory periodically (once a week 
to once a month) in so far as is possible at a specific facility. The fa-
cility operators may attempt to falsify the flow and inventory records and 
to alter the volume and/or concentration indicators which the inspectors 
verify. 
Application of NRTA has als.o been proposed for the conversion process, based 
on verification of the plutoniurn fed to the process as nitrate solution, 
the Puo2 product, the waste streams, and possibly simulation of the process. 
If the plutonium nitrate transfers are not to be verified, the separation, 
tank storage, and conversion processes would have to be treated as one big 
MBA (the Puo2 product would be verified each month as was explained above). 
This would have been necessary at the Mol, Belgium reprocessing plant which 
had no nitrate storage and no nitrate solution accountability station, but 
converted the nitrate solution to an oxide powder directly. At a plant such 
as the one described here,there would be a large and varying in-process in-
ventory in the extended MBA which includes the nitrate storage tanks. 
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Inspection Effort 
A substantial inspection effort would be required for the facilities in 
Zone 3, in a State with such facilities, for either of the alternatives con-
sidered. The flows into and out of the zone should be verified in either 
case; inventories are to be verified, as well as possible, every month, and 
physical inventories at least once a year. What might be omitted, with the 
zone approach, are verification of the many batches of plutonium nitrate 
solution transferred from reprocessing to the ni trate storage tanks' and from 
the tanks to the conversion process. What, if any, effort might be assigned 
to verification of the reprocessing and conversion in-process inventories 
is discussed in the following section. It would not be a large fraction of 
the total effort in any case. 
Inspection effort estimates for the activities which might be performed at 
these facilities have been presented in several papers. The estimates have a 
range of about 2 to I, due to different assumptions as to the design and 
capacities of the facilities and as to how long it might take to perform 
the postulated inspection activities. It may be pure chance that they are 
this close. The inspection activity which is assumed to call for the grea-
test effort is verification of the plutonium in the dissolver solution 
batches, .which activity is required in all alternatives, This activity in-
volves verifying which assernblies are fed to the dissolvers, verifying 
the volume measurements and observing preparation of samples to be shipped 
to the Agency from each accountability batch, and other activities. 
The main time consuming acitvities which would not be performed in the 
zonal approach are verification of the plutonium nitrate batches transferred 
from reprocessing to the storage tanks and from the tanks to the conversion 
process. These involve verification of volumes and observation of sample 
preparation or of sample assay using densitometry and gamma-ray spectrometry. 
The following inspection effort estimates are only intended to indicate in a 
very qualitative way what might be the difference for the two alternatives 
~n this hypothetical case. It is not considered likely that the difference 
in percent would be larger in any actual case. 
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Table 6 
MBA MBA Approach Zone Approach 
Reprocessing 900 700 man days 
Storage Tanks 260 60 
Gonversion ISO ISO 
MOX Fabrication 2SO 2SO 
MOX Fabrication 2SO 250 
1810 1410 man days 
The requirement that inspectors should verify every input batch to the re-
processing plant's chemical extraction MBA implies that inspectors should be 
available to verify such measurements whenever they occur, day or night while 
the process is operating. In consideratio.n of the other inspection activi-
ties assumed for either alternative and inspections to be performed at the 
receiving spent fuel storage MBA that is in Zone 2, it would appear to be 
necessary to assign S inspectors, who reside nearby, to the reprocessing 
plant, the nitrate solution storage tanks and the conversion plant, or at 
least I ,000 inspector working day. 
In any given case there should be other ways to make more efficient use of 
inspectors at these facilities, procedures to provide assurance of the 
integrity of samples, local sample analysis using Agency equipment, more 
effective use of isotopic correlations, etc. 
Tentative Conclusions 
In the MBA approach, the flows into and out of each MBA are to be verified, 
the in-process inventories are to be verified to the extent possible every 
month, and physical inventories are to be verified when they are performed. 
In the zone approach, flows into and out of the zone are to be verified, and 
the in-process and clean-out physical inventories are to be verified as be-
fore, except that all physical inventories should be performed and verified 
at about the same time. 
The effort-intensive verification of plutonium in dissolver batches entering 
the zone must be performed when the input batches are measured in either 
alternative. 
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The flows of Puo2 in containers produced by the conversion process, trans-
ferred to the MOX fabrication plants and used there, are verified during 
the interim visits to these facilities, along with the interim inventory 
verifications. For this reason, interim and annual material balances can be 
verified for the MOX fabrication plants and the storage areas located there, 
in either alternative. 
Some inspector effort might be saved by omitting verification of the pluto-
nium nitrate batches transferred to and from the plutonium nitrate storage 
tanks, in the zone approach. This would, in effect, create an extended MBA 
for verification of interim (monthly) and annual (or semi-annual) invento-
ries consisting of the chemical processing area, the nitrate storage tanks, 
and the conversion process. 
It was assumed that the storage tanks would have a large capacity, that the 
amount of plutonium in the tanks would vary in respause to operating de-
cisions, not influenced by the Agency, and that the tanks may be designed 
for comparatively accurate verification of the contents, or they may not be 
well designed for this purpose. At other facilities the tanks may have 
considerably smaller capacities, or none. 
If the facility should be designed to produce Puo2 directly as the product, 
as was the reprocessing plant at Mol, the whole system would be treated as a 
single MBA, the input and qutputs would be verified for both of the alter-
native approaches, and there would be no difference. NRTA could be per-
formed on such a restricted and continuous process. 
Only if the chemical Separation and conversing processes are separate, and 
especially if there are large plutonium nitrate storage tanks, would there 
be a significant difference as to inspection activities and inspection effort 
for the two alternative approaches. 
For the case described, performing the in-process inventory verifications 
for the separate and extended MBAs would probably be similar, but the 
amounts on inventory would be large and variable and NRTA for the extended 
MBA would certainly be less sensitive to abrupt and more protracted diversions. 
The very rough estimates given here suggest that perhaps as much as 22 % of 
the inspection effort assigned to this zone might be saved if the zonal 
approach were to be adopted. Analysis of a hypothetical fuel cycle, such as 
this, can only suggest roughly how much effort might be saved this way and 
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to identify the more obvious impacts of such a choice on the technical 
effectiveness. There are only a few States, and for some time will only be 
a few States, which have Zone 3 facilities of substantial size. 
The tentative conclusion in this case is that the reduced technical 
effectiveness of the zone approach probably would not justify the relatively 
small saving of inspection effort. It would appear to be necessary to ana-
lyze each individual case to see if this conclusion is ·valid for it. 
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Appendix: LMUF in the zonal and MBA-Approach 
Material balances are derived from the flow data in Table 3 and the inven-
tory data in Table 4, except that the inventories for the three process 
areas after a cleanout for a physical inventory should be quite small and 
accurately measureable. There are three Pu02 storage areas, at the conver-
sion and the two MOX fabrication plants. Since the uo2 measurements 
are included in the flow data, it is assumed that the uo2 containers would 
be treated as items for annual inventories. 
The following measurements are considered to be uncorrelated, because the 
measuring procedures are different in each case: reprocessing input, Pu pro-
duct and liquid wastes; Puo2 powders (see below), MOX fuel assemblies; con-
version and MOX fabrication wasters. 
The following inter-MBA measurements are correlated because the same proce-
dures are used for measurement and S/R differences should be resolved: Pu 
nitrate from reprocessing to storage tanks, to conversion; Puo2 from 
conversion to the MOX fabrication facilities. Any bias in these measurements 
should cause a loss at one of the MBAs and gain in the other. 
The same measurement procedures will probably be employed at both of the 
two MOX fabrication facilities. In this case the systematic flow errors 
for the two plants are additive. 
It is assumed that inventory measurements will have both random and syste~ 
matic errors. The only inventory material which is likely to have a signi-
ficant impact on a material balance is the plutonium stored in the storage 
tanks at that time. At sametime during the year, the amount of plutonium 
in these tanks should be small and the measurement error correspondingly 
small. At an inventory the amount may be estimated on the basis of one or 
more direct measurements and from the difference between additions and re-
moval since the tanks were nearly empty. 
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An LE of 5 kg at an inventory is arbitrarily used below to emphasize that 
this may be significant. 
For the zone as a whole, the flow variances are the reprocessing plant in-
put, the MOX assembly output, the several waste streams, and scrap recycle 
from fabrication to reprocessing. The last item will be ignored. Only 
systematic errors are considered: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 15 +(2x7.5) +2 +1.5 +(2x.375) =457 kg 
It is assumed that the LEs for the processing areas are each I kg, for the Pu 
nitrate storage tanks, 5 kg, and no others. The total variance for beginning 
and ending inventories is: 40 kg2. 
The LE for the zone is, then, 22 kg Pu. 
Next, the material balances for the following MBAs are calculated: 
reprocessing separation, Pu nitrate storage tanks, conversion including the 
Puo 2 store, one MOX fabrication plant including Pu02 and MOX assembly stores. 
Annual material balance for the reprocessing plant separations MBA variances 
(input, Pu product, wastes, beginning end ending inventories): 
As noted above, the nitrate storage tank MBA is a special case, taken here 
to have an LE of 7 kg Pu (50) 0 · 5 . 
The conversion plant flow plus inventory variance is: 
For one MOX fuel fabrication plant the numbers are: 
Except for the nitrate storage tanks, most of the uncertainty comes from 
the flow measurements. In this example, the major measurement errors are 
taken to be for the input to the reprocessing plant, and for the MOX 
assembly products of the zone. 
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If one simply combines the four variances above, the resulting LE is 23 kg 
Pu, which is not significantly different from the zone LE. However, if the 
LEs for the two MOX fabrication plants are taken as additive, the result is 
25.5 kg Pu. 
If material balances are dra'vn araund each of the MBAs, as illustrated 
above, the Agency can draw conclusions regarding each MBA, and for the zone 
as a whole, assuming that physical inventories are performed simultaneously, 
or nearly so, for all of the MBAs in the zone. Balances by MBA are more 
sensitive to diversion or lass from one MBA than would a zone balance be. 
Perhaps more important is the fact that anomalies, Agency - facility 
differences which will occur, would probably be more promptly observed with 
the MBA approach, and easier to resolve when located by MBA. However, since 
the facility operators should have records by MBA, locating what might need 
investigation may be possible with the zone approach. 
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4.3 Distribution of Inspection Efforts in Different Zones 
(Letter of W. A. Higinbotham to J. de Montmollin and D. Gupta, 
Feb. 25, 1985) 
Recently, Dipak said that the assignment of effort in zone I is very high 
compared to that assigned in zone 3 per SQ. What numbers one assigns for 
inspection effort depends on a number of assumptions. On the basis of my 
assumptions, there is not a great imbalance. For discussion I assume: 
A. 2 LEU fuel fabrication plants producing 300 MT/year each 
B. 20 LWRs with 30 MT reloads per year each 
c. 200 MT/ year reprocessing plant and colocated conversion facility 
D. MOX fabrication plant producing Pu-recycle fuel with the Pu from C 
E. Recycle of MOX fuel in 3 of the LWRs. Fresh MOX fuel will be there 
half of the time. 
Inspectors visit each A plant once a year for a PIV and 11 times to verify 
LEU fuel assernblies before shipment. 
Inspectors visit each LWR 4 times/year, once for a PIV and 3 times to check 
fresh LEU fuel and C/S equipment. A PIV takes 6 and an interim 2 man days. 
At C inspectors should be available any time, day and night. Sever,al should 
reside nearby in order to do this. I arbitrarily guess that 5 or 6 could do 
this with sick-leave and vacations. 
The Agency now plans to have monthly visits to a MOX fuel plant. I assume 
two PIVs and 10 interim visits per year. A PIV takes 2 inspectors 5 days 
and an interim visit 2 inspectors for 3 days. 
The three reactors that use MOX fuel are assumed to have this on-hand half 
a year or less. Verifying the fresh MOX fuel calls for 4 extra visits/year 
to each of these and extra time during the 2 other visits/6 months. For 
these (E) I add 2 inspectors X2 days X6 visits per reactor. 
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I assume the LEU is 3% and that spent fuel contains 1.0% Pu. I add 
day/inspector for travel per visit except for the resident inspectors at C. 
This gives the following table: 
Item Inspections Travel Total 
A. 2 facilities X (15+44) = 118 + 25 = 143 
B. 20 X 12 = 240 + 160 = 400 
c. 60 X ISO 900 900 = ··9oo 
D. 20 (PIV) + 60 (interim) 80 + 24 104 
E. 3 X 24 = 72 72 + 8 = 80 
On these assumptions, the man days/SQ are: A = 0.6, B = 0.53, C = 3.6, D = 
0.42, E = 0.64. The reprocessing/conversion facility is the one which is 
out of line. 
One could significantly increase the effort in zone I by adding inspector 
days for more NDA of the LWR fresh fuel assernblies at facilites A or B or 
both. My thought is that the active collar should be used but that a samp-
ling formula at much less than 90 % probability for detection of one SQ 
should be acceptable for this material of less safeguards significance. 
I toss this in to.stimulate discussion. 
I think that we should consider what we might conclude from our study. It 
seems to me that we and others may conclude that less effort should be de-
voted to zone I and more to zone 3, at least in advanced nuclear countries. 
What do we say then about countries with a couple of power reactors, or six 
of them and fuel fabrication? 
I have given a lot of thought to the zone approach and the possibility of 
treating a zone as an extended MBA. I don't think that this would be 
acceptable for zone 3. Since little effort is now assigned to verifying 
flows in zone 2, it doesn't make much difference here. In zone I, I feel 
that verification of UF6 receipts is not important if the shipments from 
enrichment plants are adequately verified. The real problern in zone I is 
how and where to verify, the fresh LWR fuel assemblies. Unlike Jim I feel 
that the use of seals may be very usefuel on these, in order to dispose of 
the shuffling and borrowing seenarios that the Agency is so worried about. 
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Obviously, attempting to detect diversion of one SQ at every nuclear faci-
lity doesn't make sense, much less if the goal is for a whole, advanced 
country. What makes sense to me is the percentage or fraction of a State's 
fuel that could reasonable be detected by agency verification, perhaps by 
zone. I know that this is too simplistic an approach; but it is reasonable 
to study variations of it. At present the Agen:cy designs sampling plans to 
have a 90 % probability to detect a loss of one SQ per facility, if possible. 
The result is that a lot of effort is assigned to some facilities qlthough 
the conceivable detection probability for the whole country may be many 
times larger. 
I would suggest that we not attempt to analyze safeguards as a deterrent 
because most of the countries under safeguards have no intention to divert 
and the objective of safeguards is to provide assurance, as I understand 
this subject. 


